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2. How to ensure that savers can get the best products in retirement  
‘I suppose I ought to eat or drink something or other; but the great 
question is, what?' The great question certainly was, what? Alice looked all 
round her at the flowers and the blades of grass, but she did not see 
anything that looked like the right thing to eat or drink under the 
circumstances.  
Lewis Carroll (1865), Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 
In the past, most members of DC pension schemes were required to buy a lifetime annuity 
at some point during their retirement. The Budget on 19 March 2014 has changed that 
requirement, as well as opened up the possibility that new types of retirement products will 
become available. Not all of these will be appropriate, especially if they can lead to people 
spending all their pension savings before they die. We will examine the new products to see 
which are most suitable, given the new pension flexibilities. We then consider the most 
effective way in which scheme members can access the best of these products. In particular, 
we will look at how ‘longevity insurance’ (e.g., in the form of an immediate or a deferred 
lifetime annuity) can be combined with ‘scheme drawdown’ to provide a cost-effective 
institutionally delivered retirement income solution that allows for flexibility in spending 
during retirement, while ensuring that savers do not run out of money before they die. We 
end by looking at the best way of helping people deal with stranded pots. 
2.1 Introduction 
Until recently, the only purpose of a pension scheme was to provide lifetime income 
security. Members of defined benefits (DB) schemes received a pension for life and 
members of defined contribution (DC) schemes had to buy a lifetime annuity and the 
annuity provider purchased low-risk bonds to back the annuity payments. The annuity, in 
effect, died when the member died and the annuity could not be bequested (unless a joint 
life annuity was purchased for a surviving partner).   
However, a combination of falling bond yields and increasing life expectancy resulted in a 
substantial reduction in annuity rates, making annuities more expensive.62 This was one of 
the factors that led to the introduction of income drawdown in DC schemes in 1995 as an 
alternative to an annuity. The pension scheme retained an investment in growth assets 
during the decumulation phase and this helped to generate an average return in excess of 
the return on bonds, although with the risk that the value of the assets in the pension pot 
could fall in times of financial market turbulence.63  
                                                     
62
 This does not necessarily make them poorer value. 
63
 It would be interesting to know, given the degree of global stock market turbulence since 2000, how many 
of those using drawdown have actually enjoyed a higher standard of living than they would have done had 
they instead bought an annuity. 
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When income drawdown was first introduced, it was a recommended strategy only for pot 
sizes above £250,000 and there was still a requirement to annuitise the remaining pot by 
age 75. Compulsory annuitisation ended on 6 April 2011. From that date, retirees with a 
minimum income requirement (MIR) of at least £20,000 from all state and DB pensions 
could make use of ‘flexible drawdown’ and access any DC pension pot without any 
restrictions. Anyone failing to meet the MIR was required to use ‘capped drawdown’ which 
restricted the annual amount that could be withdrawn to some multiple of the GAD rate, 
which was the amount from a single life level annuity as specified by the Government 
Actuary’s Department. The multiple, which is set and changed by the Government, has 
varied between 100% and 150% of the GAD rate. As a result of these changes, drawdown 
providers lowered the minimum pot size they would accept to £75,000 – £100,000 
depending on the provider. However, the median pot size at retirement is currently around 
£17,000, the average pot size is £28,000 and only 10% of the 350,000-400,000 people who 
retire each year have pot sizes of £75,000 or more.64 
The 2014 Budget introduced a new regime of ‘freedom and choice’ for all DC scheme 
members from age 5565 (whether retired or not).66 The most significant of these was that no 
one was required to annuitise at all.67 However, only a small number of people currently 
have a sufficiently large pot size to take full advantage of the new regime without risking 
running out of money before they die. With the success of auto-enrolment, pot sizes will, on 
average, be larger in future. Although pension contributions and pension adequacy are not 
formally part of our remit, it is worth restating the obvious point that in order to get a 
decent-sized pension pot for retirement, it is necessary to make adequate pension 
contributions (something of the order of 15% of pensionable salary,68 shared between the 
                                                     
64
 ABI annuity sales statistics. 
65
 To rise to 57 in 2028. 
66
 The enabling legislation for the Budget proposals was the Pension Schemes Act 2015, while the 
consequential changes to pension tax legislation were set out in the Taxation of Pensions Act 2014.  
67
 The risks associated with ending annuitisation were discussed in: 
 David Blake,  Edmund Cannon, and Ian Tonks (2010) Ending Compulsory annuitisation: What are the 
Consequences?,  Pensions Institute; 
www.pensions-institute.org/reports/EndingCompulsoryAnnuitisationConsequences.pdf;  
 David Blake,  Edmund Cannon, and Ian Tonks (2010) Ending Compulsory Annuitisation: Quantifying 
the Consequences, Pensions Institute; 
www.pensions-institute.org/reports/EndingCompulsoryAnnuitisationConsequences2.pdf;  
 David Blake (2014) The Consequences of Not Having to Buy an Annuity, Pensions Institute; 
www.pensions-institute.org/workingpapers/wp1409.pdf 
68 Lord John Hutton, former Work and Pensions Secretary, is the latest in a long line of people who have 
recommended that the UK adopts a national retirement savings target of 15% to avoid future pensioner 
poverty (reported in Ollie Smith (2015) Labour peer calls for 15% UK retirement savings target, New Model 
Adviser, 10 March). If people think that a 15% contribution rate is a lot, they should consider what happens in 
other countries. In Holland, for example, the contribution rate is around 20%. As the Dutch say, ‘we work 
Fridays for our pension’. In Sweden and Singapore, the contribution rate is even higher.  
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employer and scheme member) into a pension scheme which are then invested over many 
years.  
From 6 April 2015 (or Flexiday), individuals above the age of 55 will have to decide the 
retirement financial strategy for their DC pot. This comprises: 
 The investment strategy – the strategy for investing the pension pot  
 The withdrawal strategy – the strategy for withdrawing cash from the pension pot to 
finance expenditures 
 The longevity insurance strategy – the strategy for determining when longevity 
insurance is purchased and when it comes into effect.69 
There are three broad classes of product for delivering the retirement financial strategy: 
annuities, drawdown and hybrids (which combine drawdown and annuities). These products 
have different advantages and disadvantages in terms of withdrawal flexibility and 
investment risk and we discuss these at length in this Chapter.  
There are five legal forms70 for drawing funds from a DC pension scheme from 6 April 2015, 
as laid out in the Taxation of Pensions Act 2014 (all of which are subject to income tax at the 
highest marginal rate while the member is alive, although 25% of the pension fund can be 
taken as a tax free lump sum, known as a ‘pension commencement lump sum’):71 
 Lifetime annuities (LTAs). LTAs provide an income for however long the scheme 
member lives. Payments on LTAs can be guaranteed for a set period even if the 
member dies during that period. There are no death benefits with standard annuities 
unless they are joint life annuities or have a guarantee term. However, it is possible 
to buy a capital-protected LTA. 
 Capped drawdown. This option is not available for new schemes after 6 April 2015, 
but can continue if it was already in place on 5 April 2015. The member takes an 
income from the fund, but the income is capped at 150% of the equivalent annuity 
rate set by the Government Actuary’s Department, known as the GAD rate. The cap 
will be reviewed every three years prior to age 75 and annually thereafter. The 
member can take up to 25% of the fund as a tax-free benefit. Whatever tax-free 
lump sum is taken, three times that amount will be treated as ‘crystallised’ for tax 
                                                     
69
 A scheme without a longevity insurance strategy is NOT a pension scheme. 
70 There is technically a sixth product called ‘money purchase scheme pension’, but since it is currently not 
possible to move from a scheme pension to drawdown, it is likely that the popularity of this product will 
decline. 
71
 For more information about these choices, see: Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales 
(2015) Freedom and Choice in Pensions: A Guide to the Pension Reforms; Aon (2015) Reward: In-depth Guide to 
Retirement and Pension Changes; Staffcare and LCP (2015) Your Essential Guide to Implementing Flexible 
Benefits; Retirement Intelligence (2014) The Retirement Advice Survival Guide 
(www.mgmadviser.com/retirement-advice-survival-guide). 
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purposes on the death of the member, with the remainder of the fund being 
‘uncrystallised’.72 If members only take the tax-free lump sum, they can continue to 
make contributions to a scheme under capped drawdown up to the £40,000 money 
purchase annual allowance (MPAA) with tax relief available on contributions up to 
age 75. If they draw down more than the lump sum, the MPAA reduces to £10,000. 
 Flexible drawdown. There are no restrictions on what can be withdrawn from the 
fund. Prior to the Budget, flexible drawdown was only available to members who 
had a guaranteed income (known as the minimum income requirement (MIR)) of 
£20,000 from other sources, such as the state pension or a DB pension. Members 
choosing this option will have their pension fund transferred into a ‘flexi-access 
drawdown (FAD) fund’.73 The trigger event for a reduction in MPAA is the same as 
with capped drawdown. 
 Uncrystallised fund pension lump sum (UFPLS).74 The fund is drawn down in a series 
of payments when the member needs cash. The first 25% of each payment is tax free 
and the rest is taxed as income.75 What is left in the fund is ‘uncrystallised’ on death. 
Members using this option have their MPAA for making additional contributions 
reduced to £10,000 and there will be no option to carry forward any unused annual 
allowance.  
 Trivial commutation. Members with up to three pension pots each of £10,000 or less 
from three different providers can take them as a lump sum rather than transfer to a 
drawdown policy. This means that up to £30,000 can be taken as a lump sum (which 
is now the trivial commutation limit). The first 25% is tax free and the rest taxed as 
income. Any residual balance on death will not be taxed, but will instead will be 
included in the member’s estate for inheritance tax purposes.76  
The tax treatment of death benefits with capped drawdown, flexible drawdown and UFPLS 
is shown in Table 2.1, following the 2014 Taxation of Pensions Act. The Taxation of Pensions 
Act 2014 does not apply to DB schemes. 
                                                     
72
 See below. Essentially this means that this segment of the pension fund has not been accessed by the 
member for inheritance tax purposes. 
73 Beneficiaries’ FADs are separated into dependants’ FADs, nominees’ FADs and successors’ FADs. Nominees 
are those who are not dependants on the first death, while successors comprise all beneficiaries on the second 
death. The successor is named not by the member, but by the nominee, unless the member nominates a trust 
on the first death with trustees who will reflect the member’s wishes.  
74
 Note this is not the same as the pension commencement lump sum which is tax free. 
75
 This option is only available from uncrystallised funds. It is not available in drawdown. It can therefore be 
offered by schemes which do not offer flexi-access drawdown. 
76 ‘Inheritance tax (IHT) rules on when a pension fund will be counted in the deceased’s estate have not 
changed. Generally, where the scheme member can bind the trustees to pay to a specified beneficiary who is 
not a dependant, it will be treated as part of the deceased’s estate for IHT. But where the trustees can exercise 
discretion, the funds will generally be outside IHT assessment. Most schemes operate on an expression of wish 
basis (sometimes called a ‘nomination of beneficiary’), with the scheme administrator making the final 
decision’ (Source: Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (2015, p.4) Freedom and Choice in 
Pensions: A Guide to the Pension Reforms). 
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The Pension Schemes Act 2015 allows scheme members to transfer all their DC benefits and 
leave their DB benefits in the scheme.77 It seems unlikely that the trustees of a DB scheme 
will allow their members to exercise the new flexibilities within the scheme itself and 
instead will require members to transfer the value of their benefits to a DC arrangement.78 
This could be a transfer either to the sponsor’s own DC scheme if it has one or to an external 
provider. In addition, the changes to the tax treatment of death benefits do not currently 
apply to DB schemes. A dependant’s pension in a DB scheme is taxed at the dependant’s 
                                                     
77
 Previously, all benefits had to be transferred. 
78 Reported in Natasha Browne (2015) Schemes likely to rebuff plans to extend freedoms directly to DB, 
Professional Pensions, 22 January. Simon Taylor, partner at Barnett Waddingham, said: ‘From the schemes I’ve 
spoken to, there’s not a lot of interest in administering these freedoms within their DB scheme. I think it falls 
into the ‘too difficult’ box. You have all sorts of admin and actuarial issues about how to calculate the benefit 
that’s left behind. What do you do about advice and guidance?’. 
Table 2.1:  Tax treatment of death benefits with capped drawdown, flexible drawdown and 
UFPLS 
Age 
at 
death 
Paid from benefits which 
are: 
Benefit 
type 
Relevant 
time 
Tax Subject to Life 
Time  Allowance  
test? 
< 75 
years  
Crystallised Income < 2 
years 
Tax Free No 
< 75 
years 
Crystallised Income > 2 
years 
Tax Free No 
< 75 
years 
Uncrystallised Lump 
Sum 
< 2 
years 
Tax Free Yes 
< 75 
years 
Uncrystallised Lump 
Sum 
> 2 
years 
45% No 
< 75 
years 
Uncrystallised Income < 2 
years 
Tax Free Yes 
< 75 
years 
Uncrystallised Income > 2 
years 
Marginal No 
< 75 
years 
Crystallised Lump 
Sum 
< 2 
years 
Tax Free No 
< 75 
years 
Crystallised Lump 
Sum 
> 2 
years 
Tax Free No 
≥75 
years  
Crystallised/Uncrystallised Income N/A Marginal No 
≥75 
years  
Crystallised/Uncrystallised Lump 
Sum 
N/A 45% No 
Source:  Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (2015, p.5) Freedom and Choice in Pensions: A 
Guide to the Pension Reforms 
66 
 
marginal rate of tax irrespective of the age at which the member died. Further, death 
benefits can only be paid to a narrow group of dependants in DB schemes, whereas death 
benefits can be paid to any named beneficiary in a DC scheme.79 
Of equal importance to the pension product itself is the delivery or distribution vehicle, the 
arrangement through which the scheme member receives the pension product. 
Traditionally, the distinction was between institutional and retail distribution arrangements, 
but a new hybrid institutional-retail distribution arrangement is being considered. Currently, 
most DC scheme members have to go to the retail market to buy a pension product, even if 
they have been a member of their employer’s pension scheme during the accumulation 
stage.80 But the retail retirement income market has a reputation for poor design and high 
charges. 
Although, the 2014 Budget will revolutionise the retirement income market, this will only be 
of any benefit to customers if the new market is both effective and efficient in terms of both 
product design and delivery channels. It also needs to meet the customer’s needs as well as 
recognise that retirement will no longer be a single point in time event in future, but instead 
will for many people be a process that takes place gradually over time.  
A good product for delivering retirement income needs to offer at the very minimum:81 
 Accessibility – the degree of flexibility to withdraw funds on an ad hoc basis 
 Inflation protection either directly or via investment performance, with minimal 
involvement by individuals who do not want to manage the investment risk82 
 Longevity insurance. 
No single product meets all these requirements, but a combination of drawdown and a 
deferred (inflation-linked) annuity does, for example. So a well-designed retirement income 
plan will have to involve a combination of products. Mark Fawcett, chief investment officer 
of NEST, agrees with this. He argues that ‘for many members, flexibility in the early stages of 
retirement is key, as they will simply not know what their income needs will be….[However], 
as retirees get older, they need less flexibility and longevity risk becomes the most 
important risk. The most appropriate solution is therefore a hybrid product that blends 
                                                     
79
 Punter Southall (2015) Flexiday Briefing Note Issue 10, February. 
80
 This is unlike a defined benefit scheme in which the member receives a pension directly from the scheme. 
The exception would be members of group personal pension schemes. 
81
 This was suggested at a meeting with Ewan McCulloch and Stuart Patton Evans of Scottish Widows on 12 
May 2015. Other criteria for a good pension scheme are listed in Table 1.1. 
82
 This is confirmed by surveys discussed in the next Chapter. 
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drawdown in the early years and longevity insurance, with opt out options, in the later 
years’.83 
Taking all these issues into account implies that the appropriate arrangement for providing 
income in the period between retirement (or more strictly the age at which the pension is 
first drawn) and the age at which the longevity insurance comes into effect: 
 Benefits from institutional design, governance, and pricing 
 Is simple to understand, transparent and low-cost 
 Requires minimal consumer engagement 
 Benefits from a low-cost delivery system. 
If any product satisfies these conditions as part of a hybrid solution in a good pension 
scheme (as specified in Table 1.1), it might be considered to be a ‘safe harbour’ product.  
The term comes from the US Pension Protection Act 2006 which introduced auto-enrolment 
in the US and created a demand for safe harbour Qualifying Default Investment 
Alternatives, such as target-date funds, for 401(k) savings plans. Any adviser in the US 
recommending such a product cannot subsequently be sued for poor advice. So far the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has refused to grant safe harbour status to any UK 
investments. 
We now turn to an examination of the following issues:  
 The products on offer for investing the accumulated pension pot and for providing 
an income in retirement 
 Current and planned delivery systems for these products  
 The withdrawal strategy 
 The longevity insurance strategy 
 Charges, charge disclosure and proposals to cap charges 
 Product and provider regulation 
 How to deal with stranded pots 
2.2 The products on offer for investing the accumulated pension pot and for providing an 
income in retirement  
We discuss the three main ways of providing an income in retirement: annuities, drawdown 
and hybrid products.  
                                                     
83 Quoted in Amanda White (2015), Best practice de-cumulatisation - a hybrid approach, Top1000funds, 14 
May. 
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2.2.1 Annuities84 
2.2.1.1 Lifetime annuities (LTAs) 
Lifetime annuities (LTAs) provide a guaranteed income for life for the scheme member 
(single life annuity) or for the scheme member and their partner (joint life annuity). There 
are two variations: level (the income is fixed for the whole period) and index-linked (the 
income increases with inflation). For the same premium, index-linked annuities pay a lower 
starting value than a level annuity: around 50% lower at age 55, 44% lower at age 65 and 
26% lower at age 75.85  The Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) covers 100% of 
the value of an annuity in the event that the insurance company providing the annuity 
defaults.  
LTAs have two main advantages, as Tom McPhail, head of pensions policy at Hargreaves 
Lansdown, points out: ‘they provide a guarantee of income for the rest of an investor’s life, 
however long that may be; they also allow investors to benefit from the “mortality cross-
subsidy”,86 by sharing out some of the value of the pensions of those who die young, they 
increase the payments to those who live longer. This is an extremely efficient system’.87  
LTAs also have a number of disadvantages. First, there is no flexibility to change the 
payments. Second, there is no residual fund with a single life annuity on the death of the 
annuitant, so it is not possible to bequest the annuity when the annuitant dies.88 Third, the 
investment return on LTAs is related to the return on bonds. This is because annuity 
providers, which must be established as life assurance companies, invest the proceeds from 
selling the annuity (i.e., the premium) in low-risk, low-return bonds and make the annuity 
payments from these.89 Further, due to the nature of the guarantees involved in providing 
LTAs, the life companies selling annuities face stringent capital requirements, the cost of 
which is inevitably borne by the annuitants. Nevertheless, the return on a LTA does increase 
the longer the annuity purchase is delayed, on account of the mortality premium being 
higher at higher ages.90 Finally, LTAs will become more expensive in the new pensions 
                                                     
84
 For more details, see Billy Burrows (2015) The Case for Annuities, Retirement Intelligence. Prior to the 2014 
Budget changes, 90% of annuities sold were level, 5% index-linked (or inflation-linked) and 5% investment-
linked  (ABI sales data 2014). 
85
 Cazalet Consulting (2014, p. 69) When I’m Sixty-Four, September. 
86
 The ‘mortality cross-subsidy’ – also called ‘mortality premium’, ‘mortality drag’, or ‘mortality credit’ – arises 
because LTAs are a longevity risk pooling mechanism, whereby those dying earlier than their life expectancy 
cross-subsidise those who live longer.  
87
 Reported in Corporate Adviser, 29 September 2014. 
88
 This is not a design fault. It is a deliberate feature of the longevity risk pooling aspects of an annuity which, 
unfortunately, is not well understood by consumers. 
89
 The provision of annuities is not primarily an investment risk management business, rather it is a longevity 
risk management business. 
90
 The greater the age at which the pool starts, the greater the percentage of the pool that will die every year, 
and hence the larger the mortality premium that goes to surviving annuitants. 
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environment. This is, in part, because fewer annuities will be sold in future and, as a result, 
scale economies and the effectiveness of risk pooling will be reduced. It will also be because 
of the impact of ‘selection’ effects: those buying LTAs in a voluntary market are likely to 
have higher life expectancies than those buying in a mandatory or compulsory purchase 
market and this will be reflected in their price. 
It is also important to bear in mind the following point about adviser fees. The FCA’s Retail 
Distribution Review (RDR) banned advisers from receiving commission from product 
providers and providing ‘free’ advice to customers in exchange. Instead, from 1 January 
2013, clients must pay advisers a fee for advice. However, if annuities are sold directly to 
consumers via a comparison website or platform, the FCA does not stop providers paying 
commission (of between 1-3%) to the owners of the comparison website or platform.91 So 
we have the anomaly that, on the one hand, customers using an adviser pay an advice fee 
but no commission, and, on the other hand, customers using a comparison website or 
platform indirectly pay commission but receive no advice, even though the commission 
might be equal to or higher than the fee might have been. Moreover, there is less consumer 
protection – via the FSCS – for customers who make the product choice, because, by so 
doing, they take responsibility for the decision. 
The Market Study on annuities by the Financial Conduct Authority (2014), together with the 
Occasional Paper by Aquilina et al (2014), found that annuities generally provided good 
value for money relative to alternative withdrawal strategies if they were purchased on the 
open market by someone in good health for their age and an average-sized pension pot.92 
But the FCA found that the current annuity market did not serve well the following types of 
customer: captive (or internal or rollover) customers of an insurance company accumulation 
fund who did not shop around,93 consumers in poor health who would have benefited from 
an enhanced annuity, and consumers with small pots. The failure of customers to shop 
around, despite being told about the open market option (OMO) – the right to buy an 
                                                     
91 A platform is ‘an online administration service, with a single point of contact to the investment market. It 
provides advisers and clients with a single view of the client’s entire portfolio. A platform provides the 
technology for advisers to manage their client’s investments more efficiently and more effectively’ (Emma Ann 
Hughes (2012) What is a platform?, FT Adviser, 4 April). Platforms provide portfolio valuation statements and 
portfolio planning tools. They also need to safeguard clients’ assets and disclose separate platform, adviser 
and fund manager fees. Platforms are typically provided by life insurance companies where they are also 
known as wrappers  (e.g., Cofunds which was owned by Legal & General at the time of writing) and by fund 
supermarkets (e.g., Vantage is owned by Hargreaves Lansdown), although there are some independent 
platforms. See Chapter 3 for more details. 
92 Financial Conduct Authority (2014), Retirement Income Market Study: Interim Report, Market Study 
MS14/3.2, December (http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/market-studies/ms14-03-2.pdf); Matteo 
Aquilina, Robert Baker and Tommaso Majer (2014), The Value for Money of Annuities and Other Retirement 
Income Strategies in the UK, Financial Conduct Authority, Occasional Paper No. 5, December 
(http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/occasional-papers/occasional-paper-5.pdf) 
93
 They were ‘deterred from engaging with their options by the length and complexity of the “wake-up packs” 
sent out by providers’ (p.6) in the period before they have to make their annuity decision. 
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annuity from a different insurer to the one which offered the pension savings scheme – is a 
serious problem. Figures from the Association of British Insurers (ABI) show that 60% of 
annuities sold in the first quarter of 2015 were bought from customers’ existing  insurers. In 
some cases, this will be because the annuities have valuable guarantees not available with 
other providers. But, in many cases, it will be because they are, according to Tom McPhail, 
‘disengaged from the whole shopping around process’.94 
Even for annuities sold on the open market, annuity rates have fallen by 73% since 2000 as a 
result of falling interest rates and increasing longevity. A study by Moneyfacts found that, if 
a 65-year old man who paid £100 a month into a typical personal pension fund for 20 years 
and bought a level annuity in 2015, he would receive an annual income of £2,109, compared 
with £7,748 if he had bought it in 2000. Richard Egan, pensions editor at Moneyfacts, said: 
‘The days of 15 years ago have gone forever. The economic climate has worked massively 
against retirees. Dreams of a comfortable retirement could easily be shattered unless 
individuals can either make up the pension shortfall through greater contributions or accept 
that they may have to delay their retirement’.95  
As a result of the high proportion of captive customers who did not get a competitive rate 
and negative press coverage, the value of annuities is now severely underappreciated.  
However, annuities are being given a makeover and we will consider some examples below. 
There are also attempts to rebrand them as a ‘guaranteed income for life’ product. In the 
process, their critical role in well-designed retirement income plans will need to be 
explained much better. Customers need to understand the difference between investment 
and insurance – only insurance (an annuity) can provide a perfect hedge against longevity 
risk.  
LTAs sold on the open market (via the OMO) could be classified as safe harbour products.  
2.2.1.2 Short- or fixed-term annuities (FTAs) 
Short-term or fixed-term annuities are written under income drawdown rules and the 
product is classed as an investment within a drawdown plan, and, indeed, is sometimes 
referred to as ‘guaranteed drawdown’. This means the FTA could be either a single 
arrangement whereby the whole of the DC pot is used to buy a FTA or part of a drawdown 
portfolio that also includes investment funds. Although classed as drawdown, the product 
can, and usually is sold on a non-advised basis. Typical commission is about 2% of the fund. 
While products vary, the conventional FTA provides income payments for a set number of 
years, e.g., five. Traditionally, the annual income did not exceed the GAD maximum. The 
                                                     
94 Reported in Ruth Lythe (2015) Savers urged to shop around as two in three opting for an annuity take the 
first pension deal offered to them, Dail Mail, 1 July. 
95
 Reported in Rosie Taylor and Louise Eccles (2015) 75% fall in annuity income in 15 years: Ageing population 
and rock bottom interest rates blamed for the fall on pension income, Daily Mail, 14 September. 
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premium might be invested in a short-term gilts fund, but some products link the income 
level to a fund or index performance. As with LTAs, most sales of FTAs are for a level single 
life, but the policy can be set up on a joint life basis and with a guaranteed income period or 
a value-protection option to provide death benefits.  
At the end of the term, the insurer returns a percentage of the original premium as a 
maturity value, e.g., 80% after five years – the amount will depend on the number of years 
and the level of income chosen. The maturity value can be used to continue DC 
decumulation, for example, by purchasing another FTA, a LTA, or by using drawdown.  
The advantages of the FTA, like income drawdown, include the deferment of the LTA 
purchase, while still receiving a regular income. A traditional use of the FTA was to provide a 
bridging pension for an individual who had a DC pot that matured at age 60 and a good DB 
pension that began at age 65. In this case, it made sense to take the maximum income 
permitted from the FTA. The 2014 Budget allowed all pension pots to be accessed from age 
55 from April 2015. 
The main attraction of a FTA as promoted by providers is that when the fixed term ends, 
annuity rates might have  improved and/or the individual’s health might have deteriorated, 
in which case he or she might qualify for a higher LTA rate than would have been the case 
previously. However, the opposite might also occur, so the individual needs to be aware of 
the risks associated with uncertain future annuity rates (interest rate risk) and the 
individual’s future state of health (longevity risk). These are very significant risks which, 
from an individual’s perspective, are not so much unknown as unknowable.  
There is, therefore, a danger that this product confers a potentially misleading sense of 
psychological security. Although it keeps the capital secure for a short period, it is not ‘safe’ 
in terms of protecting future income sustainability, since it cannot guarantee the income 
that the maturity value will buy when it matures in, say, five years’ time. This is a significant 
risk for low-income investors, especially if they are also conservative investors. Therefore, 
we would argue that fixed-term annuities might be more accurately described as short-term 
income drawdown. It will be important for the promotion of these products to avoid the use 
of the word ‘guarantee’, unless the precise nature of this ‘guarantee’ is explained clearly. 
Moreover, the combination of income and return of fund can vary and we were told that 
some providers emphasise the higher income at the expense of maturity value. If the 
income taken at the outset is at the GAD maximum, the fund returned at the end of the 
term will be lower than if a lower income had been taken. If, at this time, interest rates are 
lower and less favourable mortality assumptions are being used to price new annuities, then 
the buyer of the FTA could end up with a lower income than if a LTA had been purchased 
from the start. We were informed that there needs to be a 10% increase in the prevailing 
annuity rate for the annuitant to break even, when compared with the purchase of a LTA 
from the outset. One adviser who ran a series of quotations for us showed that assuming no 
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changes in health, the income that could be purchased after five years is likely to be 
significantly lower. Reinvestment risk is therefore the main concern with this product, as 
well as the additional charges which include the new fee for advice or the new commission 
where a replacement annuity is purchased via a non-advice service.  
Legal & General has introduced two FTAs that it describes as ‘flexible retirement income 
products’ which people with a larger pension pot can combine with flexible drawdown to 
produce the best combination of retirement income solutions for their circumstances: 
 A cash-out retirement plan, which offers a guaranteed level of income over an 
agreed time period and also allows for tax-efficient withdrawals to stop people 
exceeding their tax allowance 
 The fixed-term retirement plan provides a guaranteed level of income over an 
agreed time period with a cash lump sum at maturity.  
An example of a FTA provided by a fund manager rather than an insurer is the FTSE100 
Retirement Deposit Plan 1 launched by Investec Structured Products in August 2015. The 
product offers guaranteed income payments plus a bonus payment at maturity which is 
dependent on the level of the FTSE100 index at the time. The product – available only via a 
self-invested personal pension (SIPP) – offers fixed annual payments of either 5.25% (Option 
1) or 4% (Option 2) over its six-year term. Option 1 aims to return the full deposit amount 
provided the FTSE100 index is greater than 90% of its start level at maturity, while Option 2 
requires the index to be greater than 75% of its start level at maturity, to return the full 
deposit. Gary Dale, head of intermediary sales at Investec Structured Products, said: ‘In 
today's financial environment of low interest rates and low gilt yields, it is more and more 
important to be able to ensure that capital lasts longer and retains its power to provide 
long-term income throughout the period of retirement. This new [plan] will help clients 
maximise income from their retirement funds at a time when the need for more 
competitive retirement income is clearly a priority within the post-retirement market’.96  
FTAs could NOT be classified as safe harbour products, since they do not hedge longevity 
risk.  
                                                     
96 Reported in Professional Adviser (2015) Structured product for retirees launched, 19 August. 
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2.2.1.3 Annuities with more flexible payments and more flexible terms, including 
marketability 
Annuities with more flexible payments 
HM Treasury (2014, p 14-15)97 announced that it was consulting on whether to allow 
annnuities to have more flexible payment terms that: 
 Allow lifetime annuities to decrease, which will provide significantly more flexibility 
around the design of the product. This will allow providers to offer products which 
meet individuals’ needs more closely, for example, by allowing annuity payments to 
reduce once an individual becomes eligible for the state pension  
 Allow lump sums to be taken from lifetime annuities, on the condition that this is 
specified in the contract at the point of purchase. This will allow providers to 
structure much more flexible products that are capable of meeting specific 
circumstances, such as care needs 
 Allow payments from guaranteed annuities to be paid to beneficiaries as a lump 
sum, where they are under £30,000. This will allow beneficiaries to receive pension 
payments as a lump sum if they wish, rather than having to spread these out over 
several years.  
Another proposal is to have ‘lifestyle annuities’ which provide an income that depends on 
which stage of retirement – early, mid or late – the annuitant is in. Specific examples of 
these are U-shaped and J-shaped annuities.98  A U-shaped annuity has payments that are 
initially high, then fall and later rise again. This is designed to match expenditure needs in 
the three periods of retirement: active retirement, inactive retirement and the final period 
of life when care costs start to impact. A J-shaped annuity is a U-shaped annuity which 
allows for the possibility that expenditure during the final phase of retirement might be 
higher than during the initial active phase. 
Annuities with more flexible payments could be classified as safe harbour products. 
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 HM Treasury (2014) Freedom and Choice in Pensions: Government Response to the Consultation, Cm 8901, 
July 2014;  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/332714/pensions_response
_online.pdf 
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 Suggested by Dr Ros Altmann (2014) Pensions revolution: how a 'J-shaped annuity' could revolutionise your 
retirement, Daily Telegraph, 21 July;  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/pensions/10979903/Pensions-revolution-how-a-J-
shaped-annuity-could-revolutionise-your-retirement.html 
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Annuities with more flexible terms 
A number of suggestions have been put forward to allow annuities to have more flexible 
terms. These include a cooling-off period after purchase and the ability to change the type 
of annuity, to switch provider and to sell the annuity. 
The former Pensions Minister, Steve Webb MP, had a pre-2014 Budget proposal to 
introduce a 12-month cooling-off period after the LTA purchase. The Government was 
aware of the intense pressure DC customers are under when they make their LTA purchase.  
The idea is that the cooling-off period would give retirees the chance to review and change 
what might have been a poorly informed decision. It would have the additional benefit of 
putting insurance companies and distributors on notice, since they would suffer if there 
were a mass exodus of customers in the first 12-months due to poor pricing and/or sales 
processes. Moreover, data on redemptions and repurchases would be very valuable for the 
industry and the regulators, as it would be possible to identify insurance companies that sell 
inappropriate products at uncompetitive rates and distributors that operate poor sales 
practices. 
Nevertheless, there are cost implications. Insurance companies would have to hold the 
premium in low-interest liquid assets for a year in case annuitants asked for their money 
back at the end of the cooling off period. Further, the annuity would have to be re-priced at 
the end of the year to reflect prevailing interest rates and any revised mortality 
assumptions. If insurance companies were required to honour the quote made a year 
earlier, then this would have to be sufficiently low to account for the risks that the insurance 
companies are carrying in the intervening period.  
Following the 2014 Budget reforms, this proposal should no longer be necessary at the point 
of retirement, particularly if scheme drawdown becomes the norm, since this would provide 
a breathing space pre- rather than post-LTA purchase. This would avoid the introduction of a 
potentially complex and costly process of LTA review, rebate and repurchase that the 
cooling-off period would entail, and the equally likely danger of a ‘churn’ mentality 
developing among insurers and distributors, since they now have an incentive to bid for 
these clients during the cooling off period.  
Despite these concerns, the proposal still might be relevant for two reasons. First, the 
purchase of annuities for health/lifestyle reasons at the point of retirement might be 
inappropriate where the enhancements are small. It will be important to avoid annuitisation 
under the new regime, where the rationale is based on the availability of an enhancement 
without considering its merits relative to drawdown. Second, it will still be important when 
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DC retirees purchase a LTA in later life, since at this point it will be essential to achieve the 
best rate in the open market, based on the underwriting of health and lifestyle factors.99 
Currently, people cannot switch between products, such as between a single-life and a joint-
life annuity and vice versa if their circumstances change. In future, insurers could be allowed 
to offer policies that enabled members to switch from a joint-life to a single-life policy if 
their spouse or civil partner dies before them, or to make the opposite switch if they marry 
after purchasing a single-life annuity. 
Steve Webb, also had a pre-Budget proposal that would enable members to switch annuity 
provider post purchase. The proposal was met with fierce criticism by insurance companies, 
which argued that the cost of this flexibility would reduce LTA rates by about 25%.   
Insurance companies are buy-and-hold investors of the bonds used to make the LTA 
payments. They buy bonds with different maturities and make the annuity payments from 
the coupons and redemption payments on these bonds. The cash inflows from the bonds 
need to be received before the LTA payments are made in order to minimise the insurance 
companies’ holdings of liquid reserves.  
LTA payments typically are made monthly, but the coupon payments on the bonds are only 
received semi-annually. The required cash-flow matching exercise is complex and needs to 
be done in the most cost-effective way. Once the bonds are in place, they are held until they 
mature and then the redemption proceeds are used to buy new bonds at prevailing rates 
which might be higher or lower than the insurance company had initially predicted. This is 
known as reinvestment risk and insurance companies need to hold reserves to cover the 
possibility that interest rates are lower and therefore that the new bonds are more 
expensive than predicted.  
Insurance companies already have to accommodate in their reserves the possibility of 
adverse mortality experience, i.e., that realised mortality rates turn out to be lower 
(annuitants live longer) than predicted. If, in addition to this, insurance companies have to 
allow for the possibility that annuitants can sell back their annuities at any time, then this 
would certainly increase costs. Insurance companies would have to hold sufficient liquid 
reserves to avoid the possibility of having to sell some of the bonds needed to make 
payments to the remaining annuitants. This proposal has, to a certain extent, been 
superseded by the next proposal, namely the introduction of a secondary annuities market. 
Annuities with more flexible terms could be classified as safe harbour products. 
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 This is where insurers ask applicants to fill in a medical questionnaire relating to their health and lifestyle. 
Insurers will be aware that individuals who voluntarily purchase annuities are likely to know from their own 
and their family’s medical history that they will have above average life expectancy and insurers need to get as 
accurate a fix as possible on their true life expectancy. 
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Secondary (or marketable or second-hand) annuities 
In the Budget on 18 March 2015, the Chancellor announced that annuitants could sell (or 
assign) their annuity for cash to the highest bidder (but not back to their annuity provider) 
from 6 April 2016.100 The proceeds could be paid directly to the seller or paid into a 
drawdown account. In both cases, tax on withdrawal is payable at the individual’s marginal 
income tax rate.101 However, people who did this would not be allowed to claim means-
tested benefits to compensate for the loss of income, and people already on means-tested 
benefits would not be eligible. Also the annual allowance would be reduced to £10,000 if 
the option were exercised. Further, the option will not be open to someone receiving a DB 
pension. The institution buying the annuity would receive a taxable income for as long at 
the annuity seller is alive. Steve Webb had raised the possibility of selling annuities in 
January 2015.102 There are currently around 6 million people in the UK with annuities from 
their pension scheme.    
In July 2015, MorganAsh, a company that provides medical information for assessing 
longevity for the financial services industry, announced plans to operate a 'central annuity 
bureau' in the second-hand annuity market, following discussions with the FCA and other 
interested parties. The company proposed using medical underwriting to help in the 
valuation of the annuities brought to market. It said four key points had emerged during its 
discussions on annuity resale: 
 There is efficiency in undertaking the medical underwriting and other checks on the 
consumer just once and sharing among the various purchasers 
 There is merit in having one or a few central annuity bureaux (CAB) or portals that 
would undertake the medical underwriting and additional checks 
 There is merit in the CAB being independent from the purchaser and the seller to 
avoid bias 
 There is benefit to having some structure and order to the medical underwriting and 
tendering process. 
The company argues the CAB service could run as a commercial operation, rather than a  
government-sponsored organisation, on the grounds that: 
 Commercial organisations can be flexible and quick to provide solutions 
 The purchasers are likely to self-police the quality of the medical underwriting 
services, as they are likely to lose out if this service is poor or biased 
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 HM Treasury (2015) Creating a Secondary Annuity Market, March; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/413763/Creating_a_second
ary_annuity_market__print_file_.pdf 
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 In addition, there would be no tax-free allowance. 
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 Tim Ross (2015) Sell your pension for cash under radical plan, Sunday Telegraph, 4 January. 
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 90% of the systems and processes required already exist within commercial 
organisations.103 
There was some support for the idea of a secondary annuity market.  For example, Dr Ros 
Altmann suggested that the following would benefit:104 
 ‘People who purchased an annuity because they had no choice, but need the money 
now to repay debts or pay for health or care needs or other urgent spending’ 
 ‘People who have other pensions and for whom the annuity is not an important 
source of their retirement income’ 
 ‘People who purchased small annuities, for whom the small amount of ongoing 
income will make little difference to their standard of living in retirement. For 
example, someone with a £5,000 pension fund who bought an annuity at age 60 
might have less than £5 a week for life, whereas having a few thousand pounds 
straight away could make a real difference to their lives’. 
Similarly, Stephen Lowe, group external affairs and customer insight director at Just 
Retirement, gives qualified support for the idea:  
As you would expect, we are passionate supporters of guaranteed income 
to provide simplicity and peace of mind through retirement. Yet we also 
support the power of innovation and choice to drive better value through 
individually tailored solutions. The secondary annuity market will free that 
small but significant minority of annuitants who could benefit by switching 
out of their current contract. 
So in what kind of scenarios might people benefit by trading their annuity 
in? 
• To reconfigure benefits – for example, to switch out of a single life 
annuity to provide income for a spouse, or to switch from regular income 
to more flexible arrangements 
• To preserve value for the next generation – trade the annuity and 
transfer the value into flex-access drawdown 
• To turn income into a lump sum – where people find they have sufficient 
income from other sources 
• To rationalise a small annuity income – to switch an annuity paying a 
trivial income into a worthwhile lump sum, and 
• To extract more value from pensions containing guaranteed annuity 
rates (GAR) for those people needing a lump sum – accept the GAR but 
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 Reported in Jenna Towler (2015) MorganAsh reveals secondary annuity market bureau plans, Professional 
Adviser, 1 July. 
104
 Reported in Scott Sinclair (2015) Ministers 'to discuss' radical annuities-for-cash plan, Professional Adviser, 
12 March. 
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then trade the annuity to generate a lump sum above the current value of 
the DC pension. 
Our support for a secondary market depends on two major conditions. 
..[T]here needs to be robust consumer protection in place to ensure people 
considering selling their annuity fully understand the consequences. There 
also needs to be a transparent and competitive marketplace.105 
 
A secondary annuity market could also help DB plans hedge their longevity risk. According to 
Adam Michaels, partner at LCP, traded contracts could be bundled and sold to DB schemes 
to match pensions in payment, hedging changes in long-term interest rates and longevity 
improvements.106 
However, most industry insiders were not particularly enthusiastic about the proposal.  A 
Pensions Buzz poll in Professional Pensions of 135 trustees, scheme managers and industry 
figures found that only 30% thought it was a good idea.107 A common view was that ‘It is all 
too easy to imagine older pensioners being bullied by their families into selling their 
annuities for a lump sum for their own needs, leaving the pensioner more reliant on the 
state… I can’t imagine it would be an option we would advise taking often’.108 Sales would 
need to be carefully regulated to prevent high-paying annuities bought before the fall in 
interest rates as result of quantitative easing being sold to unscrupulous companies for a 
pittance. Another negative factor is the insurance company’s gross profit margin. We were 
told this accounts for up to 20% of the original purchase price  and for the sale to be equally 
profitable, the annuitant will receive a ‘secondary screwing’.109 Some commentators have 
suggested that sales costs could be between 20% and 40% of the value of the annuity.110  
The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) pointed out the complexity of the decision, especially for 
older people: ‘Evidence suggests that at least a significant minority of annuity holders – in 
particular, older annuity holders – may struggle with the complex decisions required in 
valuing their annuity compared to an alternative lump sum. This suggests that, at the very 
least, individuals will need to have access to good quality financial advice and guidance in 
order to navigate this new market – if, indeed, such a market does spring into existence’.111 
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 Reported in Natasha Browne (2015) Second-hand annuities would help DB schemes hedge longevity risk, 
Professional Pensions, 24 June. 
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close policing', Professional Adviser, 24 August. 
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There would be a particular issue with joint life annuities in order to ensure that the 
interests of the second beneficiary were protected and that they were getting fair value for 
their foregone benefits. 
It was also not clear that all providers would find the proposition that attractive: ‘a lifetime 
annuity is priced on the life and medical conditions of that particular customer. So if it is 
sold on, the new risks and medical conditions would need to be priced in as part of the 
transaction’.112  There is a clear moral hazard problem, since there is nothing to stop an 
annuitant who develops a life shortening illness from trying to sell the annuity without 
informing the provider of their new medical situation.  There is also a clear adverse selection 
problem as the IFS recognises: ‘Who is most likely to want to cash in their annuity? 
Someone who now knows they don't have long to live. How much will they get for their 
annuity? Not much’.113 
There would also be an expensive monitoring process to ensure that the annuity payments 
stop when the annuitant dies if the policy were sold to a third party. The seller would have 
to agree to regular certification of being alive (such as a monthly phone call) with the 
original insurance company. Finally, there is the issue of contract law. It is hard to change 
existing contracts if one side does not want to. Nevertheless, Toby Strauss, then chief 
executive of Scottish Widows, while acknowledging the contractual problems, thought that 
some new providers might be interested in investing in these income streams.114 
An obvious question is whether a second-hand annuity could be sold to a retail investor and 
the Government has ruled this out. A second-hand annuity would be similar to a traded life 
policy or life settlement. The FCA condemned these as ‘high-risk, toxic products’ and 
effectively banned them for sale to retail customers in 2014.115  More suitable buyers might 
be pension funds which wanted such assets to match their pensions in payment,116 but it is 
not clear how big a market this would be. A simpler solution would be to sell the annuity 
back to the original life company in exchange for a lump sum, subject to a medical 
examination, but how would a fair price be determined in this case? While it might be 
argued that the facility to surrender annuities would stimulate competition and prompt 
insurance companies to offer higher rates initially, the calculation of the ‘surrender value’ of 
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an annuity would prove complex and potentially allow the insurer to extract additional 
profit.117   
A survey by Saga of 2,000 existing annuity holders found that 20% would be willing to sell, 
with those with the smallest pots and hence the lowest incomes ‘most likely’ to do so. The 
main reasons are as follows: 58% said their monthly income is too small to be able to do 
anything meaningful with it, 30% said they would use the cash to invest in an ISA or the 
stock market, and 12% said they would spend the money on luxuries such as cars and 
holidays.118  A survey of 1,800 retirees by Tilney Bestinvest found that 17% would consider 
selling their annuity, 33% said they would not sell, while 50% stated they did not know what 
their plans were.119 
Another survey, this time of 1,531 over-55s conducted by YouGov and sponsored by the 
Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (IFoA) found that 55% of annuitants would avoid cashing 
in their policies on a secondary market, despite only 48% believing their policy to be good 
value. Only 9% said they would be tempted because they had not wanted to buy it in the 
first place, and an additional 10% said they were in a position to cash in their annuity 
because they had another source of income. Around 40% agreed there was a high risk they 
would end up worse off if they cashed in their contract. Gareth Connolly, chairman of the 
IFoA pensions board, said: ‘It remains to be seen how much demand there will be in practice 
for buying secondary annuities once the market has developed, and whether they will be 
good value for pensioners. As the YouGov survey demonstrates, annuities will continue to 
play an important role in the pensions market as people value the certainty they provide. 
Access to adequate financial advice will be vital for pensioners in understanding the pros 
and cons, and the inherent risks, relating to the new option they will have available. Many 
annuitants will likely be amongst the most vulnerable in society. It is therefore crucial that 
the implications of choices are fully understood and that consumer safeguards are in place 
to reduce the risk of mis-selling’.120  
In July 2015, the Government announced that the introduction of a secondary annuity 
market would be delayed until April 2017, much to the relief of industry. Huw Evans, 
director general of the ABI, said: ‘The new timetable announced today is a very welcome 
move and follows strong representations from the industry that the previous timetable was 
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too quick. Providers want the reforms to the secondary annuity market to work for 
customers and it is right more time is allowed to get the right structures and regulation in 
place before going ahead’.121 The same announcement also allowed the annuity to be sold 
back to the original annuity provider. 
Marketable annuities could be classified as safe harbour products.  
2.2.1.4 Annuities with guarantees 
Extended guarantee annuities 
HM Treasury (2014, p 14-15)122 announced that it would remove the 10-year guarantee 
period limit for guaranteed annuities and allow payments to be made to beneficiaries from 
guaranteed annuities to continue beyond the current 10-year maximum. This will allow 
providers to create annuities that ensure more of an individual’s fund is returned to their 
families in the event of their death. 
However, such extended guarantee annuities are expensive to offer and it appears unlikely 
those over 75 would be permitted to buy them. 
Annuities with extended guarantee periods could be classified as safe harbour products.  
Annuities with capital protection  
One way to overcome members fears of losing their capital when they die is the capital-
protected (also known as the value-protected or money-back) annuity. This might be more 
attractive than an annuity with a 10-year guarantee period.123  
These annuities work by gradually phasing into full annuitisation over a period of time. Only 
a small amount of the fund is annuitised in the first year after retirement, and then there is 
a gradual increase in the percentage of the fund annuitised, with full annuitisation occurring 
only by around age 80, after which age the entire remaining fund will be lost on death in 
exchange for the lifetime income guarantee. 
The capital-protected annuity removes one of the single biggest consumer objections to 
annuities: ‘If I die soon after I retire, the annuity provider will keep my fund’. The ‘live or die’ 
guarantee of the member getting their money back is very easy to explain and avoids 
uncertainty by allowing the member to lock into investment and longevity guarantees to 
provide guaranteed lifetime income.  
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The cost of the capital protection is around 7% for a standard healthy life and 14% for an 
unhealthy life.  In October 2014, the best annuity rate for a standard 65-year old male with a 
£100,000 pension pot was £6,024 pa, while it was 7% lower for a 100% capital-protected 
annuity at £5,596. For a 65-year old male who survived a heart attack, the rate was £7,130, 
while full capital protection lowered the rate to £6,119, which is 14% lower.124 
In April 2015, MGM Advantage introduced a capital-protected annuity which offers retirees 
a selection of guarantee options with improved death benefits. This is achieved through 
either an extended income guarantee period of up to 30 years or returning the fund balance 
in a lump sum. Another option is for a capital protection benefit of up to 100% of the initial 
purchase price, giving a lump sum on death at any age. Andrew Tully, pensions technical 
director at MGM, said: ‘The money-back guarantee is a cost-effective option that everyone 
should consider, and which can be designed to suit the needs of individual customers. This 
gives families peace of mind that the money invested in providing a secure income won't be 
lost and removes the understandable sense of financial injustice that can sometimes be felt 
when a holder dies early. [MGM’s own research showed that consumers do still want a 
secure income for life, so] it’s important that annuities are reinvigorated so they can remain 
central to retirement planning in the future’.125 
Annuities with capital protection could be classified as safe harbour products.  
Ruin-contingent life annuities  
Another type of annuity with guarantees is the ruin-contingent life annuity (RCLA) which 
makes payments based on two contingencies related to longevity and weak investment 
performance. A RCLA is an annuity that pays out only if both the pensioner is still alive at a 
certain date and there has been weak investment performance prior to that date. The 
payments are inflation protected.   
RCLAs are not currently available in the UK. 
2.2.1.5 Investment-linked annuities (ILAs) 
This type of annuity (also known as ‘investment-backed’), which accounts for 5% of total 
annuities sold, invests the premium in one or more funds. There are two types: with-profits 
annuities (WPAs) and unit-linked annuities. As the name suggests, the former invests in a 
with-profits fund; the latter invests in the annuitant’s choice of a range of unit-linked funds, 
which can be actively or passively (indexed) managed. The income, which is set at the outset 
with reference to the prevailing annuity rate and an assumed investment return, might 
fluctuate significantly, depending on the choice of fund. On average over the long run, a 
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higher income should be achieved by an ILA which invests in growth assets compared with a 
LTA which invests mainly in bonds, but this is not guaranteed. 
ILAs offer a similar range of features to the LTA, such as single or joint life, a guaranteed 
period, and different payment frequencies. We understand that enhanced terms can also 
apply. Some providers set a guaranteed floor below which the income will not fall, which 
might be around 50-55% of the LTA rate at the time of purchase. As with a standard annuity, 
a mortality premium is built into the return, although this is likely to be smaller than with a 
LTA because, in general, it is only the wealthier and healthier annuitants who buy this 
product.  
While favoured by some experts, due to the potential for income growth, there are 
important considerations that might make this product unsuitable for some people: 
 Standardisation – There is little standardisation in product design, which makes it 
very difficult to compare like with like. Nevertheless, the purpose of the ILA is to 
combine the best features of drawdown – maintaining an investment in growth 
assets in the immediate period after retirement – with the best features of an 
annuity – providing longevity insurance. In principle, if it were well designed and 
offered good value for money, the ILA would be an attractive competitor to 
drawdown, particularly if it included capital protection features which are currently 
not common. It is also more attractive than a LTA for those who would not qualify 
for an enhanced LTA rate and who have no partner or dependants to consider. The 
ILA might also represent a suitable component part of a mixed portfolio of DC 
decumulation products. 
 Cost – Annual costs are estimated at about 2% p.a., with a higher charge in the first 
year to include the cost of advice.  However, we were shown many examples where 
the costs were not easy to calculate. Nevertheless, charges are typically lower than 
with drawdown 
 Investment risk – Investment risk and income risk are closely connected, as we show 
in the more detailed consideration of the with-profits annuity below. The perceived 
attraction of the ILA is that it will deliver a higher income over time than is possible 
with the LTA, therefore the fund must generate a minimum level of growth, after 
charges, so that the actual maximum income that can be drawn is higher than that 
offered by the LTA rate that was available at the date of purchase. 
Example: With-profits annuities 
To explore the risks of the ILA, we focus on the with-profits version. It is significant to note 
that the with-profits market is generally in decline, as a result of reputational damage 
caused by Equitable Life and with-profit mortgage endowment policies. Nevertheless, 
several providers – including mutual insurers – continue to offer the fund as a general 
investment. The important point here is that the choice of provider and its financial strength 
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(which indicates its ability to support future bonuses, among other factors) is crucial. Where 
a provider closes its with-profits book to new business, the investment strategy will become 
more cautious as the book matures.  
With-profits funds invest in a range of asset classes, for example, bonds, equities and 
property. The declared annual bonus is set to provide a smoothed – generally growing – 
income from the fund, unlike the income from a unit-linked fund which is much more 
volatile since the value of the units directly reflects the value of the underlying fund. The 
smoothing mechanism requires the holding of a reserve, with the objective of delivering a 
fairly stable income even during periods where the markets are volatile and falling.  
How the bonus is calculated is not at all transparent to customers. The initial income is set in 
accordance with basic LTA principles, but the future income in a particular year depends on 
the relationship between the declared bonus – which represents the actual ‘return’ on the 
fund to the annuitant in that year – and the anticipated bonus rate (ABR) – which is the 
projected growth rate of the fund. The annuitant – with the help of his or her adviser, where 
relevant – can increase the starting income by selecting a higher ABR.  
The Retirement Academy describes the process as follows: 
The ABR can currently be anywhere between 0% and 5% and effectively 
allows a policyholder to borrow against future income payments. At the 
end of the year, the anticipated bonus is subtracted from the annuity 
before adding the actual bonuses declared in that year. If the anticipated 
bonus is lower than the declared bonus, the annuity payments increase 
and vice versa.  
For example, if you select a 4% ABR, the starting income will be similar to a 
standard level annuity. This makes sense because standard annuities are 
priced in relation to yields on fixed interest bonds which in normal market 
conditions are around 4%. The ABR is effectively the yield on which the 
WPA is priced. Whereas the yield on the standard annuity is fixed for the 
term of the annuity, the annual bonuses on WPAs change every year. 
This means that, if in year two the declared WPA bonus is higher than the 
ABR, the WPA income will increase, whereas, if the bonus is lower the 
WPA, income will fall. 
Example 
Assume a WPA with an ABR of 4% pays a starting income of £ 1,000 p.a.  
If the year 2 declared bonus is 5%, the Year 2 income increases to 
£ 1,000 x [1.05 (Declared bonus) – 1.04 (ABR)] = £1,010  
However if the year 2 declared bonus is 3%, the Year 2 income decreases to   
£ 1,000 x [1.03 (Declared bonus) – 1.04 (ABR)] = £ 990  
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A few insurance companies have tried to launch a product that invests part of the premium 
in a LTA and part in a with-profits annuity. However, we understand that these products 
have been withdrawn after a short period.  
Despite the current poor reputation of with-profit products, there is great value to having a 
product which smooths out investment returns (using a smoothing fund) and provides an 
income for life.126 There is therefore a strong case for ‘re-inventing’ with-profit annuities 
with a new name. However, this will only be successful if there is much greater transparency 
over how the smoothing is done and also over costs. 
If the issues surrounding standardisation, cost and investment risk can be resolved, then ILAs 
(with a minimum income underpin127) could be classified as safe harbour products. 
2.2.1.6 Deferred annuities 
With a deferred annuity, a premium is paid when the annuity is purchased, but the income 
received does not start for a number of years. In the case where the income does not begin 
until the purchaser has reached a high age such as 80 or 85, the annuity is known as an 
advanced life deferred annuity (ALDA). In the standard case, the premium is non-refundable 
if the purchaser dies before the payments begin. 
A deferred annuity is potentially an ideal asset in a drawdown programme. It would, 
however, require investment managers to partner with insurance companies to provide 
ALDAs.   
However, there are a number of important hurdles to cross. First and foremost is the fact 
that a deferred annuity market does not currently exist in the UK. There used to be a market 
for deferred level annuities for the self-employed, but a combination of high inflation in the 
1970s and more onerous regulatory capital requirements under various EU solvency capital 
requirements led to its demise. Solvency II, introduced in January 2016, will not help. 
Second, deferred annuities would need to be medically underwriten and this will add to 
costs. Third, there is the reluctance of individuals to buy deferred annuities because they 
are concerned that they might die during the deferment period. 
A key question is: ‘will deferred annuities make a comeback?’. Adrian Boulding, Pension 
Quality Mark chairman, believes they could do. He points to the growing success of 
‘longevity insurance’ in the US which is the US name for a deferred annuity. It works by 
using 10-15% of the pension pot at age 65 to buy longevity insurance. Mr Boulding believes 
that having to pay for longevity insurance upfront might put people off and prefers the idea 
of monthly instalments. Simon Chinnery, head of UK defined contribution at J.P. Morgan 
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Asset Management, also believes deferred annuities will make a comeback: ‘There will still a 
place for annuities as the primary retirement vehicle for those wanting certainty, but we're 
likely to see more investors incorporating partial or deferred annuities as one part of a 
wider investment mix’.128  
Others doubt whether this will happen. Adrian Kennett, director at Dalriada Trustees, said: 
‘Who is going to voluntarily buy this product? If you are taking your DC benefit flexibly, you 
are doing that because you want the cash now. The only way that product will fly is if 
someone legislates to say you have got to buy it – and that is not going to happen because 
that goes against the pension freedoms’. David Harris, managing director of TOR, argues 
that communicating the benefits of deferred annuities would be a challenge: ‘They are 
notoriously confusing and complicated to explain’. 
Andy Cheseldine, partner at LCP, believes it is a matter or branding: ‘If you asked people, 
“would you like to buy an annuity?”, 90% of people would say “no, no, that's horrid”. But, if 
you asked, “would you like an insured guaranteed income in retirement?”, a lot of them 
would say “yes”. It's the same thing, it's just annuities have had a bad press’.  Mr Cheseldine 
accepts that deferred annuities could be expensive, but believes the strengths outweigh the 
weaknesses: ‘It will look expensive no matter how you do it, but being expensive does not 
make it poor value. I think it would be popular if you get it right. There are some people who 
would not be able to afford it and just take cash. If you are going to take your income over 
the long term, then this is a really good safety net and does make sense. These products will 
then be popular because it means people are not running out of money in old age’.  
Mark Stopard, head of product development at Partnership, believes that the way that 
deferred annuities are sold – through the retail market or packaged up as part of an 
integrated institutional solution – will also have an important impact: ‘From the customer's 
point of view, it needs to be a packaged solution. As soon as you ask consumers to buy an 
add-on, it becomes a more complicated and difficult decision for consumers’.  
Deferred annuities could be classified as safe harbour products. One fundamental problem, 
however, is that a deferred annuity market does not currently exist in the UK. Another is that 
level deferred annuities would be subject to inflation risk. 
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2.2.1.7 (US-style) Longevity Insurance Annuities 
The 2014 Budget overhaul of the DC decumulation tax rules, and, in particular, the new 
regime after Flexiday, will – or certainly should – focus attention on the value of the LTA as 
an insurance product that provides a perfect longevity hedge for pensioners in later 
retirement, when insurance against living beyond their life expectancy becomes a more 
important consideration than investment returns. Such a focus would recognise that the 
real weakness in the new DC regime is the long tail of longevity risk that individuals must 
bear.129 
In the US, one form of DC decumulation for those with 401(k) pension plans130 is to split the 
fund, say, 85/15, between a drawdown product and a deferred annuity product. The 
former, known as a ‘rollover’ or income retirement account (IRA), operates in a similar way 
to income drawdown. The latter can come in one of two forms: a deferred income annuity 
(DIA) or, since 2014, a longevity insurance annuity (LIA).  The distinction is that DIAs can 
start at any age, while LIAs start at advanced ages.  LIAs are also known as an advanced life 
deferred annuities or simply as longevity insurance. They begin to pay out at a date in very 
late retirement, e.g., age 80 or 85, if the DC customer survives to that age, although they 
could start as early as age 70.  Both types are purchased at the time of retirement.  
When they are purchased through IRAs, LIAs are provided on a gender basis.  LIAs are also 
available through employer-sponsored plans under ERISA,131 but in this case must be 
provided on a unisex basis. Because annuities sold on a unisex basis disadvantage men and 
the extent of the disadvantage increases with age, men are reluctant to buy unisex LIAs. 
One of the respondents to our consultation told us: ‘In my view, a market for longevity 
insurance annuities is not viable in the UK, because they would be offered only on a unisex 
basis. The difference in life expectancy by gender at older ages makes these annuities 
unfavourable to males, so, in principle, they would only be offered based on female 
mortality rates. To my knowledge, nowhere in the world is there a viable unisex longevity 
insurance market’.  
The basic LIA is pure insurance: it only pays out if the insured individual lives until the 
specified age. It is possible to buy certain features, which reduce the rate, e.g.:  
 Death benefit – if the annuitant dies before the start of payments, the insurance 
company returns the value of the fund and, in some cases, adds an amount for 
interest.  
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 Cash refund – if the annuitant dies after payments commence, the balance of the 
fund is paid to his or her beneficiaries.    
 Early payment – this can be arranged with some providers, for example, where the 
annuitant has to go into a nursing home. This element is also known as a life-care or 
immediate needs annuity (see Section 2.2.1.8). 
Only a small number of US life companies offer LIAs, notably, New York Life Insurance  
Company, Symetra Life Insurance Company and Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance 
Company.  New York Life is currently the largest seller, although only 4% of the purchasers 
of these annuities buy a pure LIA; the rest are LIAs with death benefits. Fidelity and 
Vanguard sell DIAs.  LIAs are also sold in Chile, but not currently in the UK. 
The combination of tail-end longevity insurance (via a LIA) and drawdown potentially 
sounds an attractive proposition, but there are some problems. The first is the regulations 
on unisex annuities, although this could possibly be circumvented by individual 
underwriting. Second, the standard LIA is a level annuity, so the impact of inflation is likely 
to be significant by the time the annuitant begins to draw the income. Third, from a 
regulatory perspective, LIAs are capital intensive for insurers to provide in the absence of a 
longevity hedge.132   
Nevertheless, if these problems can be overcome, LIAs could be classified as safe harbour 
products.133 As with deferred annuities, it would be important to recognise that level LIAs 
would be subject to inflation risk. 
2.2.1.8 Annuities linked to health status 
Enhanced Annuities 
There are two types of enhanced annuity: 
 Lifestyle annuity – provides higher annuity payments to an individual who has a 
lower life expectancy than a typical member of that individual’s cohort as a result of 
the individual’s lifestyle. An example is an individual who smokes or is obese. A 
smoker can get a 10-15% higher annuity payment than a non-smoker of the same 
age.134 
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 Impaired life annuity – provides higher annuity payments to an individual who has a 
medical impairment which lowers their life expectancy. Examples would be heart 
disease, high blood pressure, cancer, and Parkinson’s disease. Someone with 
prostate cancer can get a little more than twice the amount paid to a normally 
healthy person of the same age.135 
All enhanced annuities are medically underwritten: individuals applying for one need to fill 
in a health questionnaire and might also need to give permission to their doctor to show the 
insurer their medical records. If the health questionnaire contains an extensive set of 
questions and the insurer also makes a detailed examination of the applicant’s medical 
records, a procedure known as full underwriting, the applicant might be offered a much 
higher annuity than the standard annuity, since the insurer will now have a better estimate 
of the applicant’s reduced life expectancy. If, on the other hand, the health questionnaire is 
short and there is no examination of the applicant’s medical records, a procedure known as 
light underwriting, the level of enhancement offered might be quite small compared with a 
standard annuity.136     
Billy Burrows argues that enhanced annuities are hard to beat when compared to 
drawdown (in The Case for Annuities, April 2015). The annuity specialist Partnership 
estimates around 65% of people could qualify for an enhanced annuity.137 
Immediate-Needs/Long-Term Care Annuities 
The standard benefit from a long-term care (LTC) insurance policy is a particular type of LTA 
known as an immediate-needs or long-term care annuity. This will pay an income for the 
remainder of the policyholder’s life and the income is used to fund long-term care for the 
policyholder.  
It is important to bear in mind that, while an immediate-needs or LTC annuity is payable for 
life, there is no guarantee that the annuity will provide sufficient income to cover the full 
cost of the care required. This might be because the inflation rate in LTC provision is much 
higher than the general inflation rate. There are also tax benefits if the annuity is paid 
directly to the care or nursing home: the policyholder is not liable to income tax on the 
annuity payments.  
It is also important to recognise the possibility that the policyholder might eventually 
experience dementia and that this should be prepared for by the policyholder assigning a 
power of attorney to a family member or solicitor who would, if necessary, take 
responsibility for spending the income under the annuity. 
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Tom McPhail and Patrick Gale, Defaqto non-executive chairman, have proposed that the 
Government allow savers to access their pension pots tax free to pay for long-term care,138 a 
move supported by Dr Ros Altmann, then the Government’s business champion for older 
workers, in her report  A New Vision for Older Workers released in March 2015.139 
Both enhanced annuities and immediate-needs/long-term care annuities could be classified 
as safe harbour products. 
2.2.1.9 State annuities 
On 2 April 2014, the Government announced the details for its plan to allow pensioners and 
those who reach pension age before 6 April 2016 to top-up their state pension by up to £25 
per week.140 The offer, which will be available for 18 months starting in October 2015, will 
enable people to get a higher inflation-proofed state pension by making Class 3A Voluntary 
National Insurance Contributions. The cost is based on age and takes account of average life 
expectancy. For a 65-year-old, an extra £1 of weekly pension will cost £890; for a 75-year-
old, £1 per week will cost £674. A calculator is available online.141 
This is an interesting move on the Government’s part, as, in effect, it represents a short-
term entry into the retail annuity market.  The Government’s pricing compares very 
favourably with an index-lined annuity bought on the open market.   
2.2.2 Drawdown products  
2.2.2.1 Issues to consider with drawdown 
Standard drawdown does not involve the purchase of an annuity at any stage after 
retirement. Instead, the buyer of a drawdown product can take the tax-free lump sum, 
leave the rest of the fund invested and make withdawals as and when required. 
Withdrawals are taxed as income at the marginal income tax rate. People can invest in funds 
offered by life offices or investment managers, either directly or via a platform, or they can 
build their own investment portfolios. The investments can be actively or passively 
managed. If the withdrawals exceed the income generated by the investment fund, then the 
fund will be reduced. With an annuity, the product automatically provides a lifetime income 
in retirement. But, this is not the case with drawdown where the customer has to make an 
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active decision to withdraw cash and the fund can run out of money before the customer 
dies.  
Drawdown has three components:  
 the product in which the pension pot is invested according to an agreed investment 
strategy 
 the arrangement for delivering the pension (e.g., a self-invested personal pension 
scheme or scheme drawdown), and 
 the withdrawal strategy, the programme for withdrawing funds over time to finance 
expenditures.   
Drawdown, by itself, does not have to have a longevity insurance strategy, and, because of 
this, it could not be classified as either a pension scheme or a safe harbour product. 
As an investment product that is classified by the FCA as potentially high-risk, the regulator 
used to require a fully advised process for drawdown. This is distinct from guided- or non-
advice (execution-only) which is the most common method of purchasing annuities, 
particularly for funds worth less than £100,000. However, providers and advisers now make 
drawdown available for DC customers with as little as £30,000 to invest. Since, Flexiday, 
drawdown customers are not required to take regulated advice.142 
The suitability of drawdown in relation to the risk-return trade-off will depend partly on the 
individual’s risk tolerance, but also on a professional assessment of the ‘Type A Critical 
Yield’. This is the return needed to provide and maintain an income equal to that obtainable 
under an equivalent immediate annuity. The calculation assumes that an income will be 
taken at the level of the available annuity until a specified age (usually 75) and, at that age, 
there will be sufficient money in the drawdown fund to purchase an annuity equal to what 
could be bought at the point when drawdown started. The higher the annuity rate available 
(for example, enhancements might apply), the higher the critical yield required.   
Unfortunately, it appears that the regulations on calculating the critical yield, which were 
introduced in 1998, are out of date and contain dangerous loopholes. Where these 
loopholes are exploited, this could lead to cases of mis-selling on the basis of an 
understated investment risk. In particular, the rules do not specify the basis of the 
calculation. A revision to the rules should include the requirement to use the best OMO 
rates, including the best enhanced rates.  
Annuity Direct gave us the following explanation: 
This creates an issue in that the basis for the annuity is not properly 
defined and when Regulatory Update 55 was drafted in August 1998, the 
                                                     
142
 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
92 
 
enhanced market was not as advanced as it is today. This means that 
providers generally use their own annuity rate to calculate the critical 
yield. The result will be that, where the annuity rate is not competitive, the 
critical yield will be lower, resulting in the risks of drawdown being 
understated. 
The problem is exacerbated when a client is eligible for an enhanced 
annuity, because the higher the annuity rate available, the higher the yield 
required. Our practice, therefore, is to broke the annuity in the open 
market – including medical information where appropriate – and then to 
use the highest annuity rate to calculate the Type A Critical Yield. The 
following example may help: 
A client has £61,000, which he wants to use for drawdown. 
The quote from the [provider’s name deleted] internal rates produced an 
annuity of £3,010 and this was used to calculate a Type A Critical Yield of 
6.6% p.a. 
We were able to obtain an enhanced annuity for the client amounting to 
£3,488. When we ran this rate through the critical yield quote system, the 
required yield increased to 7.65% p.a. 
 
A final issue to consider is the implication of the ageing process, as Fiona Heald, head of 
court of protection at Moore Blatch, points out. Drawdown, unlike an annuity, requires the 
person to be able to manage their financial affairs until they die. However, as individuals 
age, they are more likely to experience a physical or mental disability that could reduce their 
ability to manage their own affairs. The appropriate way to prepare for such an eventuality 
is through a lasting power of attorney (LPA). This is a legal document allowing the ‘donor’ to 
appoint someone (known as an ‘attorney’) to make decisions on their behalf, should they 
have become incapacitated. There are two types of LPA, one for managing a person’s health 
and welfare, and one for managing a person’s property and financial affairs.143 
2.2.2.2 Examples of drawdown products 
All drawdown products need to balance income security, growth and cost. But modern 
drawdown products also need to be able to deal with much smaller pot sizes than before.  
With a current average pot size of £28,000, many retirees will prefer to take that as cash. 
But a percentage of retirees will want to experiment with drawdown.   
We begin with the investment funds that have been proposed for use with drawdown. The 
most common are multi-asset funds – in particular, diversified growth funds (DGFs) – multi-
asset target return funds, and multi-asset income funds. There are also examples of multi-
manager funds. In addition to the charges (for administration and fund management) 
                                                     
143
 Reported in Jenna Towler (2015) Why all drawdown clients need lasting power of attorney, Retirement 
Planner, 20 August. 
93 
 
reported below, there would be a platform charge of 0.25-0.5% p.a. and a potential advisory 
charge of 0.5-0.75% p.a.144  
We came across the following examples of diversified growth funds:  
 Prudential has launched a range of diversified growth funds. The five Dynamic 
Growth Funds were designed to reflect different member risk appetites, with the 
lowest risk option having a 30% weighting in equities and the highest risk option 
having 100% exposure. The asset allocation of the different funds is built using sub-
funds, such as Blackrock’s passive equity funds and M&G's active fixed interest 
funds. Charges fall within the 0.75% charge cap imposed on default investment funds 
in the accumulation stage145  
 HSBC Global Asset Management has introduced three risk-rated multi-asset 
retirement funds:  cautious, balanced, and dynamic. Head of UK institutional, Stuart 
White, said the DC investment world needed to move from a ‘collectivised approach’ 
to ‘mass customisation’ where savers' individual needs can be met.146  Each portfolio 
will have an annual management charge of 0.25% and the ongoing charges figure 
(OCF) will vary between 0.46% and 0.53% depending on the underlying asset mix. 
 Blackrock has introduced a dynamic diversified growth fund with a charge of 0.65%. 
Similarly, some examples of target return funds: 
 Pimco’s multi-asset fixed income fund has a target return that is based on the 
average of three objectives – tracking annuity prices, outperforming cash and 
producing a stable income – thereby providing a compromise between the 
requirements of those who want an annuity and those who prefer to remain in 
drawdown 
 Legal & General Investment Management’s (LGIM) Retirement Income Multi-Asset 
(RIMA) Fund. This has a target return of 3.5% above the Bank of England base rate 
over a complete 5-7 year market cycle. Income is paid by redeeming units and LGIM 
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believes that a drawdown rate of 6.5% is sustainable. The fund’s principal 
investments are bonds and equities, but the fund also invests in property and 
alternatives, such as global real estate investment trusts, infrastructure, private 
equity and high yield bonds.147 This involves a much greater diversification into long-
term growth assets than traditional drawdown products, a key benefit of 
institutional design. But LGIM is also concerned that savers are not forced to sell 
assets in distressed markets and so the fund is designed to generate sufficient 
regular cash flows from coupons, bond redemptions, and dividends. The annual fund 
management charge is 0.35% p.a.148 
 Schroder’s Flexible Retirement Fund is a multi-asset fund –  invested in risk-seeking 
assets, such as equities, and property, but also investment grade bonds – has the 
target of generating returns in line with the Consumer Price Index plus 2% for 
members over a three to five-year business cycle, with losses limited to 8% over any 
time frame. John McLaughlin, head of portfolio solutions, said: ‘When volatility goes 
above 6%, we take a break. If something spooks the market, we would immediately 
put a quarter of the portfolio into cash – so if, for instance, stress is at 8%, they 
would sell out and take volatility down to 6%’.149 The fund has sufficient liquidity to 
meet withdrawals. The annual fund management charge is 0.3% p.a.150 
Multi-asset income funds aim to generate a stable income (higher than on a deposit 
account) with capital preservation.151 There are three types of income funds: (a) equity 
income funds which invest in the equities of mature companies and utilities generating a 
dividend yield in excess of 3.5% per annum, (b) fixed-interest income funds which invest in 
corporate bonds but offer no capital growth, and (c) covered call funds which use call 
options to boost the ‘natural’ income152 produced by the underlying assets, paid for by 
giving up some capital growth. 
Some examples of multi-asset income funds involving equities or bonds are: Premier Multi 
Asset Monthly Income (estimated yield 5%), Fidelity MoneyBuilder Balanced (4%), 
Woodford Equity Income (4%), Artemis Global Income (3.2%), Henderson UK Property 
(3.4%) and Jupiter Strategic Bond (3.2%). Typical multi-asset income funds have annual fund 
                                                     
147 David Blackman (2014) Welcome to the world of drawdown, Pensions Insight, November/December. 
148
 http://www.trustnet.com/Factsheets/Factsheet.aspx?fundCode=M5FUH&univ=P 
149
 Reported in Louise Farrand (2015) Five new investment innovations ahead of April 6
th
, Pensions Insight, 6 
March. 
150
 http://www.schroders.com/globalassets/staticfiles/schroders/sites/ukinstitutional/pdf/schroders-flexible-
retirement-fast-facts-january-2015.pdf 
151
 Nicola Brittain (2015) Income funds - Will they solve the pensions freedom conundrum?, 
Professional Adviser,  29 January. 
152
 This concept is explained in Section 2.4. 
95 
 
management charges of around 0.9% a year.153 The M&G Episode Income fund has a 1% 
fund management charge. It aims for a 4% yield, is managed dynamically and holds between 
20% to 50% in equity, 40% to 80% in fixed income (including cash), and up to 20% in other 
assets.  
Examples of covered call funds are:  Insight Equity Income Booster (estimated yield 8%), 
Schroder Income Maximiser (7%), Schroder Asian Income Maximiser (7%) and Fidelity 
Enhanced Income (6.2%).154  
Danny Cox, head of communications at Hargreaves Lansdown, argues that income funds 
should be a serious consideration for customers considering income drawdown. 155 
Nevertheless, Tom Becket, chief investment officer at Psigma Investment Management, has 
warned that, as a result of quantitative easing, it has much more difficult for income funds 
to generate returns without taking on more risk. He said: 'Years of monetary stimulus had 
turned low-risk, higher-yielding assets into high-risk, lower-yielding assets….It has never 
been more difficult to be a cautious investor. In fact, the term 'cautious' is now basically 
prehistoric as the ravaging and distorting effects of central bankers have eliminated the 
return potential of most traditionally cautious investment choices….Our analysis shows that 
some cautious funds [which traditionally invested mainly in gilts and investment grade 
bonds] now have around 50% of their assets in equities, mostly in income strategies’.156 
It is also the case that UK equity income fund managers are struggling to find suitable 
investment opportunities in the UK and are beginning to look overseas. They are able to 
hold up to 20% of their assets in overseas equity markets. Some of the largest funds are 
nearing the 20% limit (e.g., Newton UK Income), although the average for 2015 is 13%, up 
from 10% in 2013. Simon Molica, senior investment consultant at Morningstar which 
compiles the data, said: ‘If your manager is buying overseas stocks, you need to understand 
how the currency could add to the volatility within the fund performance, and whether the 
fund hedges currency exposure’.157  
Multi-manager funds outsource investment decisions to other fund managers. These can 
have higher annual fund management charges up to 2%, although some are lower.158 For 
example, Schroder’s Multi Manager Diversity Funds have OCFs in the range 1.26 – 1.97%.159  
                                                     
153
 Kyle Caldwell (2015) Under the microscope - the new funds launched for pension freedoms, Daily 
Telegraph, 14 May.  
154
 Kyle Caldwell (2015) Five ways to invest a £300,000 pension pot, Daily Telegraph, 17 April. 
155
 Quoted in Nicola Brittain (2015) Income funds - Will they solve the pensions freedom conundrum?, 
Professional Adviser,  29 January. 
156
 Laura Dew (2015) Psigma's Becket - 'Cautious' is now a prehistoric term, Investment Week, 15 April. 
157
 Reported in Anna Fedorova (2015) Yield squeeze forces UK income fund managers to look overseas, 
Investment Week, 16 June. 
158
 Kyle Caldwell (2015) Under the microscope - the new funds launched for pension freedoms, Daily 
Telegraph, 14 May.  
96 
 
Hargreaves Lansdown has a multi-manager range of six funds for non-advised retail 
investors called Portfolio Plus. The six funds, which are rebalanced back to their original 
weightings every six months, are: Adventurous Income (estimated yield 3.03%), Balanced 
Income (estimated yield 3.03%), Conservative Income (estimated yield 2.38%), Adventurous 
Growth, Balanced Growth and Conservative Growth. There are no set-up charges, but the 
annual management charge varies between 1.34% and 1.46% and there is an additional 
platform (Vantage) charge of 0.45%. The portfolios are constructed from Hargreaves 
Lansdown's five multi-manager funds, including its Equity & Bond and Special Situations 
funds.160  
The main advantages of drawdown can be summarised as follows: 
 Control over the investment strategy 
 Flexibility to change the income drawn on an annual basis (subject to the maximum 
in the case of capped drawdown) 
 Potential for higher returns over the longer term, but only if the fund is invested in 
riskier assets than those used to provide an annuity (mainly bonds)  
 Death benefits: on death in drawdown, the investor’s partner or other nominated 
beneficiary can continue to draw an income or take it as a lump sum 
 Deferment of the annuity purchase – in theory indefinitely, although experts agree 
that in most cases the guarantees provided by the LTA will become attractive at 
some point. 
The main disadvantages of drawdown can be summarised as follows: 
 Ill-informed decisions – this is the risk that the guidance and advice market161 will 
not provide the level of individual support required to ensure all consumers make 
well-informed decisions, for example, in relation to taxation and the income level 
drawn 
 Cost – drawdown can be an expensive product and not all of the costs involved will 
be visible 
 Longevity risk if longevity insurance has not been purchased – the risk that the 
individual will run out of money before death 
 Investment risk – the risk that the investment returns will not exceed those on a 
comparable annuity after the additional costs have been taken into account. In 
addition, there is the potential inability of drawdown products to generate stable 
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returns over time.162 There is increasing evidence that investment returns since 2000 
have been on average lower and more volatile than in the 50 years before 2000.  The 
implication is that retirees will have to draw down their capital to maintain their 
living standards, which increases the likelihood that they will run out of money 
before they die. Furthermore, investment risk increases as life expectancy reduces, 
since there is less time left to recover from a big fall in the stock marketAnnuity-
conversion risk – a range of factors, including the level of interest rates, the mortality 
assumptions and the individual’s health status, will all affect the LTA rate in the 
future, assuming the individual buys longevity insurance at some point 
 Capacity to take risk – related to the previous three points, any longevity insurance 
needs to be in place before its price exceeds the funds available to purchase it and 
the capacity to continue taking risk disappears. 
David Trenner, technical director at Intelligent Pensions, argues that the new style multi-
asset funds will fail to deliver in precisely the same way that the old style multi-asset funds 
failed to deliver: 
[I]f the objective of drawdown is to provide income for life, the one 
keyword that seems to be absent from all of these changes [following 
pension freedom] is sustainability. 
Quite simply people want to ensure that their income does not expire 
before they do. 
Back in 1995, a number of the early drawdown plans offered by insurance 
companies offered with-profits investment. 
With reversionary bonus rates as high as 9% per annum, it looked simple 
to take the bonuses as a sensible level of income, leaving the capital intact.  
Some companies did not offer with-profits funds for drawdown, however. 
They argued that bonus rates might fall – how right they were! They also 
drew attention to the need for market value reductions when the 
underlying value of assets was below the face value of the with-profits 
units. 
So these companies introduced drawdown invested in managed funds. 
These invested in cash, bonds, property and equities to provide the 
prospects for growth, but with downside protection. But they did not solve 
the problem of taking income when markets were down: while the fund 
included cash it was still necessary to take income from all of the fund 
thereby capitalising any losses. … 
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Since Mr Osborne announced the pension freedoms there have been few 
new products, but there has been a plethora of new fund launches. And 
the fund of choice seems to be the ‘multi-asset fund’. 
These funds include income producing assets with income targeted at 
around 3% of the fund. But which client wants only 3%? 
From where I sit, multi-asset funds are just managed funds coming back 
with a new name, and if I am right, they will fail drawdown investors for 
the same reason that managed funds did.163 
 
Standard flexible drawdown products could NOT by themselves be classified as safe harbour 
products, since they do not hedge longevity risk.  
2.2.3 Hybrid products 
Hybrid products combine drawdown with longevity insurance to provide a lifelong income.  
They are therefore part drawdown and part annuity to differing degrees, although this will 
not be apparent to the consumer for whom an ‘annuity’ is a bad product. Those that are 
more annuity-like are provided by insurance companies, those which are more drawdown-
like with income guarantees tend to be offered by investment management houses and 
investment banks, as well as some insurers. We focus on two key examples: variable 
annuities and guaranteed drawdown. 
2.2.3.1 Variable annuities 
The classic example of a hybrid product lying between lifetime annuities and drawdown is a 
‘variable annuity’ (VA) which was invented in the US in the 1950s and was introduced in the 
UK around 10 years ago.164 However, unlike a lifetime annuity or drawdown, VAs have an 
accumulation stage and a decumulation stage, although people are free to use only a 
decumulation stage VA. As such, they offer both living benefits and death benefits. 
Living benefits are those which can be exercised by policyholders while they are still alive. 
These include: 
 Guaranteed minimum accumulation benefits (GMABs)165 
 Guaranteed minimum income benefits (GMIBs) 
 Guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefits (GMWBs)166 
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 Free partial withdrawals (FPWs). Under specified conditions, the policyholder can 
exercise the right to withdraw a proportion of the fund value without incurring a 
surrender charge. An example might be the option to withdraw up to a specified limit 
(e.g., 30%) of the expected value of the residual payments based on a mortality table 
at the time of purchase on a one-time only basis on a key date (e.g., the 5th, 10th or 
15th anniversary) upon a ‘significant non-medical loss’ 
 Guaranteed minimum surrender benefits (GMSBs). 
Death benefits (in the form of guaranteed minimum death benefits, GMDBs) are those 
which accrue to contingent beneficiaries once the policyholder has died. The most common 
is the (partial) return of premium.  When the VA policyholder dies, a specified beneficiary 
will receive the larger of the account balance and the value of the initial investment less 
total withdrawals. 
The lifetime income and investment guarantees, whereby the policyholder receives a 
minimum income irrespective of longevity and investment returns, are funded via an annual 
management charge and a restriction on maximum withdrawals in any year. The continued 
access to capital and higher death benefits comes at the expense of a lower income than 
available under a conventional lifetime annuity. The living benefits options incur higher 
charges as well as having the effect of reducing the death benefit paid to individuals who die 
at older ages, but also enable the provider to build up reserves from all policyholders up to 
the point of their death to help it honour the lifetime income guarantee to those who live a 
long time. This is the way in which the longevity bonus works with a VA. 
The new flexible payment terms for standard annuities (see Section 2.2.1.3) also apply to 
variable annuities. Previously, while the income paid can increase if the underlying 
investment fund performs well, it was not possible to cut the income if the investments are 
performing poorly. In future, providers of variable annuities will be allowed to raise and 
lower the income paid depending on investment performance.   
Subject to there being complete transparency over design and the absence of excessive 
charges, variable annuities (with a minimum income underpin) could be classified as safe 
harbour products.  
2.2.3.2 Guaranteed drawdown 
An example of a ‘guaranteed drawdown product’ is the Secure Income Option offered by 
MetLife, a US life insurance company with a presence in the UK since 2007.167 The product 
offers flexible drawdown (in the form of immediate income and deferred income) with 
guarantees. Customers can consolidate existing DC pension pots into a pre-drawdown 
product and lock in a drawdown rate pre-retirement. There is a formula for uplifting the 
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drawdown rate if income is deferred. If the client chooses a secure income, this is 
guaranteed by MetLife. The drawdown rate is lower than an annuity by up to 30% (e.g., 4% 
at age 65 when the annuity rate is 5.5%), but allows more flexibility of access, a guaranteed 
income and death benefits. MetLife does not offer standard LTAs, but there is no maturity 
date with the guaranteed drawdown product which therefore potentially provides a 
guaranteed nominal income for life.168  
Once purchased, the customer locks in guaranteed future income rates. If they elect not to 
take benefits on their initial chosen age, they have flexibility to change dates and use the 
guaranteed rate for new higher age, for example 4% at age 65 increasing to 4.10% at age 
66.  For each year the guaranteed income in delayed, MetLife will increase the guarantee 
base by 5%. So for a £100,000 investment, a delay in taking income by a year will increase 
the guarantee to £105,000. If after 12 months, the fund value is higher, e.g., increased to 
£107,000, then the higher fund value of £107,000 will be locked in and become the new 
guarantee base. In addition, if the fund has performed better than 5%, the higher value will 
be locked in annually.  
Lump sum withdrawals above the guaranteed level of income will proportionately reduce 
the guaranteed income. For example, a £100,000 investment could pay a guaranteed 
income of £4,000 p.a. at 65. If the policyholder decides to withdraw a lump sum of £10% of 
the fund, the guarantee base would reduce by 10% to £90,000. Subsequently, the 
guaranteed income would reduce by 10% to £3,600. 
The death benefit paid is the higher of:  
 the initial guaranteed base minus guaranteed income taken, and 
 the fund value.    
So for example, suppose a policy has an initial guarantee base of £100,000. Suppose also 
£10,000 of guaranteed income is paid and the fund value has fallen to £85,000. The amount 
payable is £90,000. The policyholder’s beneficiaries can take the death benefit as a lump 
sum or as income. 
Longevity risk modelling and analysis is an important component of the design of the 
product and MetLife: 
 Uses a standard actuarial table for mortality (not the general population table) 
 Assumes a mix of males and females 
 Makes adjustments to these tables to reflect MetLife’s client demographics 
 Allows for mortality improvements over time. 
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The product invests in unit-linked funds and involves unit-linked guarantees. The objectives 
of the funds chosen by policyholders are to manage volatility to a target and to seek a total 
return. This creates liabilities for MetLife. MetLife uses a dynamic hedging programme 
called constant proportion portfolio insurance (CPPI)169 to hedge the risk to its balance sheet 
from offering these guarantees.170 CPPI involves daily switching between unit-linked funds 
and risk-free assets (such as Treasury bills) as the value of the unit-linked funds changes. If 
the fund values fall, units are sold and T-bills purchased; if the fund values rises, the 
opposite set of transactions occurs. The goal of the hedging programme is to construct a 
synthetic put option to protect the portfolio from falls in the market values of the 
underlying assets. The effectiveness of the hedge depends on holding assets which can be 
readily bought and sold. This broadly means that the funds it offers will comprise equity and 
fixed interest assets which are listed on large stock markets. MetLife uses BlackRock (for 
equities) and Fidelity Worldwide Investment (for fixed income). Only small amounts of 
property or hedge funds are included in the portfolio as they are inherently unhedgeable 
asset classes.  
Since no hedge is perfect, it is possible for mismatches between assets and liabilities to 
occur. In this case, the liability is MetLife’s, so any shortfall would be met from MetLife’s 
reserves/capital. If the hedging programme were to fail, then the shareholder capital would 
be used to cover any unmet policyholder liabilities. The only point at which the guarantee 
could fail would be if MetLife Europe Limited were to fail. In this circumstance, the 
customer’s investment and their guarantee could be lost. However the products are 
covered by the FSCS.  
Charges are as follows: 
 Annual management charge (i.e., the charge for administration) – 0.70% for funds up 
to £149,999, 0.6% for funds from £150,000 to £249,999, 0.5% for funds from 
£250,000 to £499,999, and 0.4% for funds above £500,000 
 Investment management charge (for the operation of the funds) – 0.55% 
 Guarantee charge (for providing the income guarantee) –  0.60% 
 Additionally, there may be an adviser charge. 
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This means that the charge for a £50,000 investment by a 65-year-old would be 1.85%, 
excluding any adviser charge.171  
The preferred customer is someone with a £1.5m pension pot who uses £0.5m to provide 
minimum core income for essential spending and puts £1m into a diversified portfolio. Next 
are clients with other assets who want to guarantee a legacy for their descendants with 
long-term capital guarantees. Next are mass affluent clients with £100,000-150,000. MetLife 
has now brought down the minimum to £30,000, in line with the new level of trivial 
commutation. 
Clients come via advisers (i.e., the product is an advised solution) who help explain longevity 
risk and the risk of underestimating how much people need to live on using cash flow 
modelling software (e.g., Voyant) which inputs data on typical spending patterns of the 
client. According to MetLife, ‘advised sales provide greater comfort as benefits and risks of 
our products are explained to our customers and the adviser checks for understanding. For 
example, MetLife believes it is important how customers understand sequence-of-returns 
risk and how safe drawdown overcomes this’.172   
Another example is Aegon which has launched a drawdown product with combined access 
to unit-linked guarantees on its Retirement Choices platform in July 2015. David Macmillan, 
Aegon managing director, said: ‘The ability to combine true lifelong income guarantees with 
drawdown on platform will provide customers and their advisers with the certainty of 
income they tell us they want, but also with a huge amount of flexibility, both in terms of 
income and in terms of their ability to switch between products’.     
Zurich is also launching a guaranteed drawdown product in 2016 that combines drawdown 
and a protection element that converts the plan into an income for life at a certain pre-
determined age. The charge is not yet known. The product was designed in response to a 
survey Zurich conducted which revealed that 18% of respondents were interested in 
drawdown, but were fearful of running out of money. The survey results were as follows: 
 10% of over-55s in DC pension schemes have dipped into their retirement savings 
under the new freedoms 
 69% of over-55s have not explored their options under the new freedoms (37% were 
‘not ready', 26% had already bought an annuity). 
The main reasons for not accessing pensions after exploring options were: 
 54% were not ready to make a decision 
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 34% were keeping their pension funds invested and tapping into other assets first 
 18% claimed the fear of running out of money by taking a lump sum or going into 
drawdown was holding them back 
 7% said their pension provider did not offer the option they wanted.173 
Subject to there being complete transparency over design (in particular how the guarantee is 
underwritten) and the absence of excessive charges, guaranteed drawdown products (with a 
minimum income underpin) could be classified as safe harbour products.  
2.2.4 Other products 
2.2.4.1 ‘Mix and match’ 
Just Retirement has launched a range of ‘mix and match’ retirement income products 
targeted at ‘Middle Britain’. Alongside LTAs, it offers UFPLS, guaranteed income products 
with flexible extended guarantee periods and ‘drawdown-lite' which invest in a selection of 
moderate to low-risk passive funds. Stephen Lowe, director, said: ‘The consensus of 
consumer research shows that people with sufficient pension savings would like the best of 
both worlds – a guaranteed income for life to ensure regular bills may be paid and a flexible 
fund that may be accessed when required for irregular expenditure and to provide a ‘just in 
case’ fund’.174  
2.2.4.2 DIY 
Some commentators have proposed a do-it-yourself approach which involves investing in 
assets and dipping in to them to withdraw investment returns or capital as required. Simple 
examples of assets suggested for this purpose are investment trusts and exchange-traded 
funds that focus on income generation. Typical yields lie between 3.4 and 3.8%.175 More 
sophisticated approaches would involve constructing a DIY fund, in other words, a 
personalised multi-asset fund consisting of UK and global income funds, possibly with some 
diversification into property.176 
DIY products could NOT be classified as safe harbour products, since they do not hedge 
longevity risk.  
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2.2.4.3 Pension bank account 
This is where the pension scheme is used as a cash machine (i.e., taking withdrawals via 
UFPLSs, where 25% of what is withdrawn is tax free) and has traditionally been available 
only for retail customers via a SIPP. So-called ‘pension bank accounts’ have very high 
charges. The initial fee could be as high as 3% and there will be additional administration 
and fund management charges of 1% p.a. For example, someone setting up a SIPP with 
Alliance Trust with a pension pot of £20,000 will pay an arrangement fee of £300, annual 
administration charge of £311 plus an annual fund management charge. Ad hoc cash 
withdrawals could cost anywhere between £30 and £400 per withdrawal depending on the 
SIPP provider.  
In March 2015, the FCA said it would ‘look at the different types of charging structures put 
in place, and look at whether they are sufficiently transparent [and whether] people are 
aware of what charges they will face’.177  
The charges are a lot lower in providers’ schemes that allow UFPLS.178 For example, Aviva, 
Scottish Widows, Standard Life and Aegon will allow such withdrawals and will not charge 
extra for doing so or limit the number of withdrawals, while Legal & General and LV= will 
not, and Prudential and Friends Life were undecided as of February 2015.179 However, most 
existing workplace DC pension schemes cannot currently be used as bank accounts, since 
they are not set up to offer this facility.180 
In June 2015, the Daily Telegraph reported that Friends Life was refusing to allow clients to 
use their pension schemes as ‘bank accounts’, while other companies, including NEST, were 
refusing to allow clients to ‘dip into their funds as often as they need’. Customers faced the 
following restrictions depending on the provider: a minimum withdrawal of £5,000, a 
maximum of 3 or 4 withdrawals per year, and no flexible access if the pension pot is less 
than £30,000. Fidelity charged no fee for up to three withdrawals per year, while NFU 
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Mutual charged £240 per withdrawal. However, under pressure from the Daily Telegraph 
and other national newspapers, Friends Life reversed its decision shortly after. 181 
In July 2015, Which? published a report on drawdown charges, included those on UFPLS.182 
This again confirmed the variety of charges from different providers ranging from Charles 
Stanley Direct which charges £270 for the first withdrawal each year, through James Hay 
(£100), Barclays Stockbrokers, Halifax Sharedealing and TD Direct (all £90) to Fidelity and 
Hargreaves Lansdown which have no charge at all. 
There is a risk that people will take their pension as a cash lump sum and leave it in a bank 
account. The Financial Services Compensation Scheme provides 100% protection for 
annuities and up to 90% of the value of other insurance products without limit. For deposits, 
however, it only protects up to £75,000 per person per bank or building society. FCA 
Consumer Panel chair Sue Lewis says: ‘We are concerned that consumers with pension pots 
exceeding the FSCS’s £75,000 limit may inadvertently lose out on protection for their money 
if they choose to withdraw their pot rather than buying an annuity or leaving their money 
invested’.183  
Pension bank accounts could NOT be classified as safe harbour products, since they do not 
hedge longevity risk.  
2.2.4.4 Buy-to-let pensions184 
With a buy-to-let pension, part of the pension pot is used to make a deposit on a buy-to-let 
property. The pensioner then takes out a mortgage and uses the rest of the pension pot to 
cover the mortgage repayments.  The rental income provides the pension which is taxable. 
The attraction of buy-to-let was that the mortgage repayments attracted tax relief. 
However, this relief was removed in the Budget on 8 July 2015, in large measure due to the 
increase in pension wealth moving into buy-to-let and the distortions to the housing market 
this was causing, following the introduction of the pension reforms in April 2015. Instead a 
tax credit worth 20% of the mortgage interest will be applied. The changes will be phased in 
between 2017 and 2020. The Daily Telegraph provided the following before and after 
example to illustrate the consequences, assuming a landlord paying 40% tax:   
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NOW  
Your buy-to-let earns £20,000 a year and the interest-only mortgage costs 
£13,000 a year. Tax is due on the difference or profit. So you pay tax on 
£7,000, meaning £2,800 for HMRC and £4,200 for you.  
2020  
Tax is now due on your full rental income of £20,000, less a tax credit 
equivalent to basic-rate tax on the interest. So you pay 40% tax on £20,000 
(i.e., £8,000), less the 20% credit (20% of £13,000 = £2,600), meaning 
£5,400 for HMRC and £1,600 for you. Your tax bill has therefore gone up by 
93%.  
Now, say Bank Rate – and in turn your mortgage rate – rises by a small 
fraction, lifting your mortgage cost to £15,000, while your rent remains at 
£20,000.  
You will have to pay £5,000 tax in this scenario, so you make no profit at 
all.185  
 
In November 2015, the Government announced that purchasers of buy-to-let properties will 
have to pay an extra 3% in stamp duty from April 2016. There are other potential pitfalls.  
The mortgage lender is likely to require a deposit of 40% or more. If the pensioner draws 
down the pension pot to pay a mortgage of this size, this could put the pensioner into a 
higher income tax bracket which could make the strategy uneconomic. The net rental 
income after taking into account mortgage repayments, the letting agent’s fee, insurance, 
service charges and maintenance costs might not be very large. Further any void periods, 
where the property is unlet, will reduce rental income. If a large number of people start to 
use buy-to-let, this will have the effect of lowering average rents. Also the buy-to-let 
property is included in the pensioner’s estate for inheritance tax purposes. If the property is 
sold before death, capital gains tax is payable.  
A survey of 1,000 over-55 year olds by Prudential in September 2015 indicated that 14% of 
them were planning to buy property to let as a result of the pension freedoms, while 37% 
said they were planning to buy property to live in themselves. The most common reason 
(43%) for planning a purchase was to downsize to a smaller home.186 
It is an open question whether a buy-to-let pension could be classified as a safe harbour 
product. While it potentially hedges longevity risk (assuming a sufficiently long lease) and 
could provide an inflation-linked income, the changes to the market announced by the 
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Government on and after 8 July 2015 have substantially reduced the return on and increased 
the risk of this product. 
2.2.4.5 Extreme-inflation protection 
At present, due to the approximate 40% reduction in initial income, only about 5% of people 
who buy a LTA purchase inflation-proofing (i.e., buy an index-linked annuity). We were told 
that it would be possible to design a cheaper form of inflation-proofing which aims to match 
RPI more closely and which would provide a hedge against extreme inflation shocks (a 
feature described as an ‘inflation-kicker’).   
The concept, which has yet to come to market, is based on the assumption that most 
retirees can tolerate a limited amount of inflation risk. Therefore, if inflation were below 
3%, the annuity income might fall slightly. If it were exactly 3%, there would be no change. 
Above this figure, the income would increase. 187  
This is an interesting idea and quite different from the two existing methods of capping the 
cost of inflation protection. The first is to buy a fixed rate of escalation, e.g. 3% per annum. 
The problem with this is that the annuitant receives the increase irrespective of actual 
inflation rates, so it could be more or less than is needed to keep pace. Due to the current 
low-inflation environment, 3% indexation is not significantly cheaper than full RPI. The main 
problem with a fixed rate of escalation is that it offers no protection in the event of soaring 
inflation, such as that experienced in the 1970s. With quantitative easing about to unwind, 
it would be impossible to rule out an inflation spike over the next 20 or 30 years. 
The second method is limited price indexation (LPI). This matches RPI, but only up to a limit 
of 2.5 or 5%. So, like fixed escalation at 3%, it does not protect against a future inflation 
spike.  
2.2.4.6 Home equity release plans 
Home equity release plans (also known as reverse mortgages or lifetime mortgages) can 
take the form of a LTA, although this is not the most popular form. Equity release allows 
home owners to borrow from the equity in their homes while still living in them. This might 
be particularly attractive to the elderly who might have low pensions, but substantial net 
housing wealth.188 According to a study by LV=, 32% of retirees live on less than the 
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minimum wage, are going without adequate food and heating, yet the majority of these 
have untapped housing assets.189 
Home equity release plans started in US in the 1980s, where they are available from age 62. 
The most common type is the home equity conversion mortgage, which allows borrowers to 
take a reverse mortgage in the form of: a lump sum, a lifetime income or drawdown (in 
effect a line of credit). The amount that can be borrowed is negatively related to the 
interest rate. Interest (typically 1.50% above government bond rates) is accrued and paid on 
moving or death, so there is no credit risk. However, the total interest payable is capped at 
the sale price of the property and lenders are protected against total interest costs rising 
above this limit (as a result of the home owner living a very long time) by a mortgage 
insurance policy that the borrower is required to take out (at a cost of 2% of the amount 
borrowed plus 0.5% p.a.). 
In the UK, home equity release plans are provided by members of SHIP (Safe Home Income 
Plans). SHIP members offer a range of guarantees, including the right to live in the property 
for life, the flexibility to move home without penalties, and never owing more than the 
value of the property. 
The following types of plan are offered: 
 Home reversion plans – The home (in whole or part) is sold in exchange for a lump 
sum or monthly income (or some combination). The home owner therefore becomes 
a tenant and when the property is eventually sold (typically following the plan 
member’s death), the reversion company receives the value of the loan plus interest 
(up to the value of the property sold) 
 Home income plans – The plan member takes out a mortgage against the value of 
the property and uses the money to buy a purchased life annuity (PLA). Interest on 
the mortgage is deducted from the annuity, while the capital sum borrowed to buy 
the annuity is generally repaid when the property is sold after the plan member’s 
death 
 Lifetime mortgages – The plan member receives a lump sum or annuity (or some 
combination) with the interest being rolled up into the loan.  The original loan plus 
interest is repaid when the property is eventually sold. 
The maximum initial loan increases with the plan member’s age, but is generally capped at 
50% of the value of the property.  
Equity release has not always had a good image in the UK. There was a mis-selling scandal in 
the 1980s. Since then, standards have improved with the establishment of the Equity 
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Release Council (ERC). Membership of the ERC ensures that only qualified independent 
financial advisers can sell equity release products, that the value of the loan cannot exceed 
the value of the home, and that a homeowner cannot lose their home, since interest can be 
rolled up and paid on their death. However, the protection against losing the home has 
been put at risk by the European Mortgage Directive (EMD)  which allows new ‘equity 
release-lite’ products called ‘lifetime mortgages’ to be sold.  They can be sold without advice 
and require interest to be paid rather than rolled up. The requirement to pay interest means 
the product no longer comes under the equity release rules, but instead comes under the 
residential mortgage rules, which means borrowers can lose their homes if the interest is 
not paid.190 
In September 2015, the ERC announced that there was £710m of equity release in the first 
half of 2015, the largest half-year amount on record. Homeowners over 55 were 
withdrawing more than £4m of housing wealth every day. The main reasons given for this 
are rising house prices, tougher borrowing conditions and inadequate pension provision. 
Table 2.2 provides details of the equity release market and shows, for example, that 65% of 
new plans were drawdown and 35% were lump sum.191 
Table 2.2: The equity release market in 2015 
  Drawdown Lump sum 
Average house price  £304,340 £242,476 
Average initial withdrawal £46,958 (15.4%)* £77,494 
Average drawdown reserves £32,348 (10.6%)* NA 
Average loan-to-value (LTV) 26% 32.0% 
Average age at purchase 71.5 67.7 
Source: ERC 
Note: * % of average house price 
 
Alex Edmans, head of retirement at Saga, said: ‘The [FCA’s] Mortgage Market Review has 
stopped many older people from accessing a traditional mortgage, this and the fact that 
many people are now coming to the end of their interest-only mortgage term without a full 
repayment plan, has meant that more are turning to equity release as a viable solution to 
borrowing in retirement. Indeed, Saga has seen an increase in the use of equity release to 
clear a mortgage. Now is a good time to consider equity release, as interest rates are at 
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their lowest ever levels, property prices are increasing and loan-to-values have recently 
increased, meaning people are able to access more of the wealth tied up in their 
property’.192 
In September 2015, the FCA announced that it was considering how regulation can help 
foster ‘more of a market’ in equity release. Christopher Woolard, director of strategy and 
competition said: ‘The average pension pot is £30,000, yet a significant number own 
property assets of around seven times that number or more. The ability to access some of 
that asset, as a restricted lump sum or as a gradual income, could make a significant 
difference to people's lives. Yet, in the not too distant past, equity release became a dirty 
word. Whilst we have seen a combination of regulation and industry-led initiatives to help 
clean up the market, some will argue that the costs of equity release, both up front and 
compounded over time, are relatively high for the individual, and that the previous image 
has stuck. We believe there is a debate to be had about what products and markets could 
exist, and whether more entrants and innovation here might benefit consumers with 
greater choice and improved products’.193 
Some argue that equity release could also be used to fund long-term care. For example, 
Adrian Walker, retirement planning manager at Old Mutual Wealth, raised the issue when 
he discussed the findings from a survey his company had conducted for its Redefining 
Retirement report. The YouGov survey of 1,600 people aged 50 to 75 showed that ‘while 
equity release was predicted to play a greater in people’s retirement and long-term care 
planning, long-term care is still one of the great unknowns of growing old. We Brits 
famously don’t like to talk about death and, similarly, it would seem that we also don’t like 
to think about how and where we might spend our later days’. The survey asked people 
aged 50 to 75 about their provision for long-term care: 30% of respondents have some 
savings set aside for their long-term care, but only 1% had a care plan in place, and 2% have, 
or plan to have, long-term care insurance; 46% had not thought about their long-term care 
needs and 8% had no intention of doing so. 
Mr Walker argues that ‘advisers and clients must address the potential need to meet long-
term care costs and come up with a plan accordingly. As property is very often the biggest 
asset that people hold, it makes some sense to look at how that, as an asset, could be used 
to help pay for a person’s care costs. Housing assets are taken into account in the current 
system. If you have more than £23,250 in assets194 you will be responsible for your own care 
costs. However, if you receive care in your own home, property assets are not considered in 
the calculation. As soon as you move into a care home, then your home is included and can 
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be used to cover costs. In the same survey, we asked whether people would be interested in 
releasing value from their home and, of those who would, 34% said they would do so in 
order to pay for their long-term care’. 
Mr Walker accepts that: ‘[Equity release] is already increasing in its use as a source of 
delivering income in retirement of which care costs would be part. It seems a logical step 
that people should start to consider how they access the value of their property when they 
are able, in order to put something aside and form a plan for later in life when they may 
have a requirement for care outside their home and when they may not have the luxury of 
time to plan’.  
However, many people do not like the idea of someone else having an interest in their 
home, so another solution is downsizing, allowing the released equity capital to be invested 
to fund future long-term care, although this too has ‘emotional issues attached to it’.195 It 
also has cost implications, with typical moving costs in the region of £20,000.196 
2.2.4.7  ISA pensions and care ISAs 
ISA pensions have been proposed by Michael Johnson of the Centre for Policy Studies.197 He 
argues that ‘Many eschew pension saving, thereby missing out on tax relief, but 
engagement with ISAs is high. Ready access and flexibility is valued above tax relief’.  
His proposals involve replacing occupational pensions with ISA-style pensions. This, in turn, 
would involve replacing the existing EET (exempt-exempt-taxed) pension tax system with 
the TEE (taxed-exempt-exempt) tax system of ISAs. 198  With EET, contributions and 
investment income are exempt from tax and only the pension is taxed. With TEE, 
contributions are taxable (i.e., paid from post-tax income), but investment income and 
withdrawals are exempt. Mr Johnson believes this switch would bring forward significant tax 
payments and reduce the deficit by ‘perhaps up to £10bn’.   
Early research from PwC suggests that employees would welcome switching to a system 
that treats pensions like ISAs, since they believe that the current tax treatment of pensions 
is too complex. PwC surveyed 1,197 employees and found two-thirds did not understand 
the current system. Around 40% said they would rather contribute out of taxed income, and 
enjoy tax-free money in retirement, while only 27% wanted to keep the current tax regime, 
and just 14% said the tax relief on offer was an incentive to save. Further, 60% said that the 
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constant tinkering with the pension system had put them off saving. Philip Smith, head of 
defined contribution pensions at PwC, said: ‘People want a once in a lifetime overhaul of 
how pensions are taxed to create a simple and stable system which they can understand 
and trust. Moving towards an ISA-style tax system would create consistency across people’s 
savings pots and help them plan for their future with more certainty’.  
Nevertheless, Raj Mody, head of pensions consulting at PwC, said the Government would 
still need to incentivise people to put money into retirement saving vehicles, if upfront relief 
was removed: ‘The reality is that when it comes to tying up money for the long term, people 
need an incentive. Otherwise, why would you bother saving for your retirement when faced 
with more immediate pressures on your finances?’. A similar warning came from Jonathan 
Howe, UK insurance leader at PwC: ‘Pensions savings are a hugely important part of the UK 
retirement bank. Any reform must not reduce incentives for individuals to save for the long-
term and increase the risk of a future pensions hole. Upfront reliefs can be a very important 
element and they also help make it clear that pensions are intended to be different – for 
long-term saving’.199  
Phil Loney, chief executive of Royal London, also warned that saving levels could fall 
significantly under the TEE framework. He also believes that many people will not trust a 
system which requires people to accept that a future government will not tax pension 
withdrawals. He said: ‘This so called “ISA-style” tax treatment of pension contributions is a 
fundamental and far-reaching change to the principles of pension savings, which could pose 
considerable risk to the Government's aim of creating a savings culture in the UK. There is 
no evidence that the promise of tax-free income, 25-30 years into the future, would be 
believed by the public given the volume of changes to the pensions system over the last 25 
years. Consequently, there is a real risk of a significant fall in savings, which are already too 
low in the UK. It would also create a parallel system which is wholly incompatible with 
people's existing pension arrangements, would take years to develop and would increase 
the overall cost of pensions. We believe that it is vital to reform the current tax relief system 
to make long term saving fiscally neutral for all. The incentives need to focus on those with 
lower incomes, to create a more realistic and lower risk way forward. This could also enable 
the abolition of the lifetime allowance’.200 
In a similar vein, Dr Ros Altmann, before becoming Pensions Minister, proposed ‘Care ISAs’, 
as a vehicle for funding later life care.201  In August 2015, the insurer LV= disclosed that, over 
the previous five years, more than 19,000 pensioners had to remortgage their homes with 
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local authorities because they were unable to afford the cost of residential care. Many 
people face care bills well in excess of their pension pots because of a dramatic increase in 
the average time spent in a care home in recent years.202 
ISA pensions would NOT be classified as safe harbour products, since they do not hedge 
longevity risk. 
2.2.4.8 Peer-to-peer loans 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) lender Zopa has launched a campaign to allow members of SIPPs to 
include P2P loans in their pension pots. This followed a successful campaign for P2P loans to 
be allowed in a new style of innovative finance ISA (IFISA) from April 2016. According to the 
Daily Telegraph: ‘Currently, P2P loans are classed as non-standard investments, meaning 
that the pension provider must set aside more capital against the possibility of the loan 
defaulting. The result is that any SIPP provider who does allow P2P investment will charge 
the pensioner extra fees to cover the capital cost.   
‘Peer-to-peer loan firms market themselves as an alternative to banks, where savers put 
their money into a platform that lends it on to pre-vetted individuals or companies. 
However, in return for the extra interest savers must also accept a greater risk that the 
borrower will not repay the loan and so it is possible to lose money…[and] 57% of lending on 
Zopa is funded by savers aged 55 or above’.203  
In February 2016, the FCA announced it would bring P2P loans under its investment advice 
rules. This would allow advisers with appropriate permissions to advise on the products and 
introduce a ban on commission from the products. Other types of advisers would not be 
expected to give advice on specific P2P loans.204 
Also in February 2016, Lord Adair Turner, former chair of the FSA, was concerned that 
automated processes and a lack of good credit underwriting will mean people are bound to 
lose money from their investment. He said that: ‘You cannot lend money to small and 
medium enterprises, in particular, without somebody going and doing good credit 
underwriting. This idea that you can just automate that on to a platform, I think it has a role 
to play, but I think it will end up producing big losses….The losses which will emerge from 
peer-to-peer lending over the next five to ten years will make the worst bankers look like 
absolute lending geniuses’.   
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Kevin Caley, chief executive of crowdfunding platform ThinCats, confirmed that neither it 
nor its ‘sponsors’ – a network of former bank managers who write a report on what the 
business does, its cashflow projections, and its ability to repay the loan – give 
recommendations to investors. He said is was the responsibility of the financial adviser 
recommending a client make a P2P loan to do their own due diligence on the borrower.205 
Peer-to-peer loans would NOT be classified as safe harbour products. 
2.3  Current and planned delivery systems for retirement income products  
Until Flexiday, the most common vehicles for delivering retirement income from DC 
schemes were personal pensions, SIPPs, and group personal pensions (GPPSs), all of which 
are essentially retail products. Following the new pension flexibilities, three forms of 
retirement income delivery vehicle have been developed: institutional, retail, and a hybrid 
combination of institutional and retail.  
2.3.1 Institutional distribution vehicles  
2.3.1.1 Institutional annuitisation  
With institutional annuitisation, the DC scheme arranges for the pension to be paid until the 
scheme member dies.  This is what happens in DB schemes. There are two cases.   
In the first case, the scheme self annuitises and is responsible for making good any deficit 
arising because, say, member life expectancy has been underestimated. The benefit from 
group self-annuitisation is that the scheme retains the mortality premium that arises from 
those members of the scheme who die earlier than their life expectancy. It is equal to the 
ratio of the proportion of the annuitants aged x who die during a particular year (having 
survived to the beginning of that year, denoted qx) to the proportion of the annuitants aged 
x who survive the particular year (denoted (1 – qx)).
206 It can be used to enhance the annuity 
paid to those who live longer than their life expectancy. This can be seen from Figure 2.1 
which shows that the amount paid on an annuity has three components: the return of 
capital or initial premium,207 the investment return on the capital (less charges), and the 
mortality premium.208 Initially the weight of the mortality premium in the total payment is 
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quite low, since only a small proportion of the retirees die soon after retirement. By 
contrast, the proportions of the total payment represented by the return of capital and the 
investment return (net of charges) are initially quite large. Over time, these proportions 
decrease in size as capital is returned to the annuitant and the relative significance of the 
mortality premium increases.  
Group annuities are the only financial asset ever invented to benefit from this additional 
source of return. Drawdown products do not benefit from the mortality premium (since 
they do not pool mortality risk). Unfortunately, very few people understand this.209 
 
Figure 2.1: Decomposition of annuity payments 
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An international example of group self-annuitisation is the Swedish Premier Pension System 
(PPM).210 Here each cohort of retirees completely ‘self-annuitises’ using tontine annuities.211  
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The starting annuity rate is set on the basis of current mortality projections and interest 
rates. However, the annuity is rebased annually in the light of revised mortality projections 
and investment returns. This means that the annuity can rise and fall over time. The 
intention is to avoid intergenerational cross-subsidies. 
In the second case, the scheme buys in annuities for its retired members from an insurance 
company via bulk purchase annuities (BPAs). BPAs have become common in DB schemes 
since 2007 and the economies of scale involved can benefit scheme members as well as the 
DB scheme itself (i.e., through an improvement to its funding level and its risk profile 
relative to liabilities). The idea is for the insurance company to underwrite the longevity 
risks, relative to a guaranteed lifetime income, presented by a cohort of retirees. There 
would be a requirement for the individual underwriting of each annuity sold by means of a 
medical questionnaire, but it is possible that this could be simplified if there were common 
characteristics in the cohort, for example, in relation to the industry in which they worked 
(e.g., a common occupational health risk) and/or in the area in which they lived (‘postcode’ 
or socio-economic underwriting, also known as geodemographic profiling). 
If this model could be fully developed for the DC auto-enrolment market, it could deliver 
better value for money for retirees, and it might be implemented via a national clearing 
house, for example, to ensure universal access and competitive pricing. It might also be 
offered directly by the large-scale DC schemes, once they have achieved the necessary 
critical mass. However, it is also possible that some – indeed many – schemes might be 
reluctant to assume the additional liabilities associated with group self-annuitisation. 
2.3.1.2 Scheme drawdown 
How scheme drawdown works 
Scheme drawdown is where a pension scheme is used to provide a withdrawal facility 
together with an institutional investment management solution to meet the decumulation 
needs of DC members in early retirement, i.e., until longevity insurance kicks in. In many 
respects, scheme drawdown is a natural extension of the default fund used by modern 
multi-trust, multi-employer schemes for the auto-enrolment accumulation stage.  It is also a 
natural extension of the trustees’ governance role and fiduciary duties, which, prior to 6 
April 2015, ended very abruptly when members were steered towards the purchase of LTAs 
at the point of retirement. Under scheme drawdown, the trustees would be responsible for 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
surviving subscribers. As each subscriber dies, his or her share is divided among the survivors in proportion to 
their initial subscription. Depending on the mortality experience of the pool and the investment performance 
of the fund, the survivors will receive either an increasing or falling annuity over time. The last surviving 
subscriber gets the entire residual fund.
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governance, which would include the selection of the investment manager(s) and 
administration of payments into retired members’ individual accounts. This governance 
structure would avoid the need to rely on individual employers.  
The specific details about scheme drawdown offerings available are sketchy. However, 
Towers Watson’s Fit for Retirement Survey 2015 suggested that 31% of schemes are 
planning to offer some form of scheme drawdown in 2016 and a further 13% are 
considering its introduction in 2017.212 We were told that the maximum recommended 
income that a member can drawdown might still be linked to GAD rates, as was the case for 
retail drawdown prior to Flexiday, although it would be reviewed annually (rather than 
every three years) because members might wish at any point to purchase a LTA. The cap on 
maximum income might be set at a slightly lower level than the GAD maximum – e.g., 5-10% 
lower – in order to provide a ‘buffer’ or reserve. This would enable the fund to smooth the 
income payments when markets are volatile and also to return funds to members who 
decide the time is right to make an annuity purchase.  
The income would be generated partly from the investment yield and partly from a 
drawdown of capital (i.e., the accumulated pension pot). For example, if the aim were to 
deliver a maximum income of 6%, this might comprise 3.5% from the yield and 2.5% from 
capital.  Funds are likely to be low-risk and largely bond-based, but might also include a 
modest allocation to growth assets in order to help preserve the annuity-purchasing power 
of the funds.  
We were told that there would be no need for individual advice with this type of 
arrangement – as there is with retail income drawdown – because it is an income-paying 
fund with an administration facility offered by the scheme trustees. Even if this is the case, it 
will be necessary for trustees to provide clear member communications and much would 
depend on whether scheme drawdown is the default or an option. Where drawdown is the 
default, then for the early years of retirement, there would need to be some form of 
screening process to ensure members for whom the strategy is not suitable are offered 
alternative arrangements. For example, a single person with no dependants who is in poor 
health would probably be better off with an enhanced annuity or a cash lump sum. Where it 
is not the default, a professional decumulation service appointed and monitored by the 
trustees could steer members towards the most appropriate decision for their 
circumstances, in which case, the scheme drawdown fund would be one of the available 
options. The regulator would also have to settle the issue of whether any such steer 
constituted guidance or advice.213  
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The attraction of scheme drawdown is that it has the potential to be much cheaper and 
deliver more consistent results than conventional drawdown, due to economies of scale, 
trustee oversight, and the use of a well-designed institutionally managed fund. Scheme 
drawdown would also be more flexible than a FTA because members would be able to 
purchase an LTA at any time or at designated regular intervals, depending on the scheme 
rules.  
Scheme drawdown could therefore be used as a relatively short-term decumulation 
solution. This would provide members with a breathing space before purchasing the LTA. It 
might also be used for a longer period during the early stage of retirement. The scheme 
might have a default age to switch to an LTA, such as 75.  
We did not have access to the pricing of products that are being launched, but we estimate 
that the member charge might be in the region of 0.6% to 1%. The breakdown for a member 
charge of 0.6% might be 0.40% for fund management and 0.20% for administration of 
payments to individual accounts.   
Investment strategies with scheme drawdown 
The investment strategies with scheme drawdown will have to reflect the realities of the 
new world of ‘freedom and choice’. In particular, scheme designers will have to reconsider 
the asset allocation of the glide path during the de-risking phase pre-retirement. Previously, 
most de-risking glide paths ended up with a fund that was 25% in cash, to hedge the tax-
free cash element, and 75% in bonds, to hedge annuity rates. This would no longer be 
suitable for members who go into drawdown: it would be appropriate to have a much larger 
weight in growth assets at the beginning of the decumulation phase. However, for scheme 
members who want to take cash as soon as they can under the new flexibilities, a glidepath 
that ends with 100% in cash is more appropriate in this case.  
Scheme providers will therefore have to ask their members what their likely choice will be – 
cash, drawdown and annuitisation – at the beginning of the scheme’s de-risking glidepath, 
which might be 5 or 10 years before the nominated retirement age. If the choice is 
drawdown, then the next question that scheme providers will need to ask members is what 
income level they wish to achieve in retirement. This will allow members to reconsider their 
funding strategy and, if necessary, increase their contribution rate. They might also use the 
opportunity to consider the investment strategy they will employ post retirement (although, 
of course, that can be reviewed again much closer to the date).   
A key aim of scheme drawdown is to deliver a low-cost and flexible drawdown facility. The 
most common investment vehicle for doing this is a target date fund (TDF) which spans the 
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later years of accumulation and the early years of decumulation. 214  The TDF is an 
investment strategy designed for DC default funds, whereby the scheme establishes a range 
of TDFs, each with its own de-risking glide path. This might involve a TDF for each possible 
retirement date, or there might be a single TDF for members who plan (or are expected) to 
retire within a given five-year window. The more traditional method of de-risking in the UK 
is to use lifestyle strategies. The similarities and differences between the TDFs and lifestyle 
strategies are presented in Table 2.3.  
 
Table 2.3: Target date funds versus life style strategies 
Similarities 
 Both place funds in higher-risk assets when individuals are younger and move these 
in to less risky assets as they approach retirement  
 Both types are managed with a retirement date or retirement window in mind 
 Both types have assumed, at least until recently, that individuals will with draw a 
25% tax-free lump sum and purchase a level annuity 
Differences 
 Target date funds are overseen by professional fund managers who can make 
changes to both the strategic and tactical asset allocation in the event of changes to 
the markets or regulatory framework. In contrast, lifestyle strategy funds are 
generally pre-programmed to place funds in lower-risk assets as individuals 
approach retirement, and only change this approach at the discretion of trustees and 
pension providers 
 Target date funds operate to a broad retirement window (e.g., 2032-34 fund) in 
contrast to lifestyle strategies that target a specific day, often linked to a birthday 
 Target date funds can continue to pro-actively manage members’ assets beyond 
their retirement date in contrast to lifestyle strategy funds that tend to ‘set and 
forget’ after reaching the assumed retirement date 
Source: Pensions Policy Institute (2014) DC savers’ Needs under the New Pension Flexibilities, PPI Briefing Note 
Number 72, October 
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TDFs have their supporters. For example, in August 2015, Mark Fawcett, chief investment 
officer at NEST, gave his views on why he supports the use of TDFs which he regards as 
inherently flexible when compared to 'mechanistic lifestyling': 
With fewer and fewer workers knowing the exact date they'll retire, what's 
the point of target date funds? If savers are now going to continue 
investing through retirement, why de-risk as they approach state pension 
age? Retirement rarely happens on one day at the end of a working life 
anymore. It's more of a journey than an event. But this doesn't undermine 
the case for target date approaches to investment management, in our 
view. 
Rather we'd argue that target date funds represent an agile way to 
respond to savers' shifting needs in a world of changing retirement 
patterns and greater pension freedoms. People may continue investing for 
longer, but there'll come a point when they're no longer building up their 
pots and start to rely on them for income instead. Their risk capacity will 
change significantly in their final working years and beyond. The amount 
of investment risk in their pots will need to be gradually reduced, although 
not necessarily completely into bonds and cash, as in the days of 
compulsory annuitisation. They'll also need a different type of asset mix, 
focusing on generating an income and avoiding the risk of sharp declines in 
value. 
Unlike with mechanistic lifestyling, the target date fund structure is 
inherently flexible. This allows for sophisticated and dynamic risk 
management that can be implemented and adapted, efficiently and cost 
effectively. In traditional ‘lifestyling', the re-balancing of assets happens 
automatically at the same rate, each year, irrespective of market 
conditions and the valuation of the different asset classes. By contrast, 
target date fund managers, like NEST, are able to analyse economic and 
market conditions at the time and then act accordingly to best keep 
members on track. 
But this isn't all. NEST's ‘default fund', where members are invested if they 
don't make an active choice, is actually made up of around 50 single year 
target date funds. This unique structure means we've been able to adapt 
to the new landscape by implementing two significant changes to the de-
risking phase of these funds. 
The first was to the shape of the glidepath into retirement following the 
‘freedom and choice’ reforms. Many pension providers including NEST 
have tended to de-risk into annuity-tracking portfolios, which no longer 
seems appropriate. Savers are now less likely to be buying annuities 
straight away as many will have had to do in the past. In response, we've 
changed the primary objective of the consolidation phase for funds 
maturing after 2020. These funds will now aim to outperform CPI after all 
charges while progressively dampening volatility. In the run up to 2020, we 
believe our members' pots will still be relatively small and it's most likely 
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they'll be taken as cash. We've therefore changed the consolidation phase 
objective for NEST Retirement Date funds maturing up to 2020 to manage 
the risks associated with converting a member's pot into a cash lump sum 
rather than an annuity. We've used the flexibility of target date funds to 
set different groups of members on different glidepaths, according to their 
likely needs in the run up to retirement. 
The second change was to add into the consolidation phase asset mix 
single-year dated gilts that mature in line with their fund's target date. For 
example the 2017 NEST Retirement Date Fund now invests, in part, in a 
2017 gilt, the 2018 NEST Retirement Date Fund invests in a 2018 gilt, and 
so on. This measure is designed to get better returns than the cash we've 
been holding in the portfolios, without needing to worry too much about 
the market value of the bonds in the interim… 
Both these changes have borrowed from concepts of ‘liability-driven 
investment' that are more common in the defined benefit world. The aim is 
to align the investment horizon of a member's portfolio with their saving 
journey. In other words, workers should have a seamless investment 
experience as they move from saving up to withdrawing their pension. So 
far this type of ‘liability aware' approach, which is possible within a target 
date fund structure, has not been widely applied in more traditional 
defined contribution strategies.215 
 
Others, however, are critical of both TDFs and lifestyle as de-risking strategies. A poll carried 
out by the Association of Investment Management Sales Executives (AIMSE) of its members 
found that 55% of respondents believed that, following ‘freedom and choice’, traditional 
life-styling would need to be radically overhauled, while 30% said it would only work if life-
style de-risking also followed through to the decumulation stage. Despite the greater 
flexibility claimed for TDFs by their supporters, only 12% of AIMSE members – whose job is 
to sell TDFs – thought they would work well in the new pensions environment.216  
Another critique is Robert C. Merton, the 1997 Nobel laureate in economics. He believes 
that both TDFs and lifestying focus on the wrong target: ‘If the goal is income for life after 
age 65, the relevant risk is retirement income uncertainty, not portfolio value…The seeds of 
an investment crisis have been sown. The only way to avoid a catastrophe is for plan 
participants, professionals and regulators to shift the mindset and metrics from asset value 
to income’.217 This, of course, is the opposite of what the 2014 Budget changes do. 
Furthermore, de-risking glidepaths will not be effective in a world where individuals make 
ad hoc withdrawals from their pension pot, while leaving much of the remaining pension 
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pot invested for the long-term (i.e., where individuals use their pension pot as a bank 
account). According to information compiled by Hargreaves Lansdown, lifestyle funds lost 
an average of 9% of their value between February and June 2015. Some such as Aviva, 
Blackrock, Friends Life and Scottish Equitable lost more than 10%. The explanation is that 
the funds switched from equities into long-dated bonds at a time when long-term interest 
rates are anticipated to rise which led to a loss in value for these bonds. According to Alan 
Miller, founder of fund manager SCM Private: ‘It is scandalous that losses on this scale have 
occurred with supposedly “safe” funds…Lifestyle funds are no longer fit for purpose’. The 
solution, according to Steve Patterson, managing director of Intelligent Pensions, is for 
people between the ages of 55 and 65 to take on more risk, via a higher equity exposure on 
the grounds that equities give people a better chance of inflation-beating returns which will 
ultimately provide more income in retirement.218 
A report by JLT Employee Benefits published in September 2015 indicates that 56% of 
companies have not changed their investment strategies in the light of the new pensions 
freedoms, despite the fact that just 11% of employers thought members would purchase 
annuities. Maria Nazarova-Doyle, deputy head of defined contribution investment 
consulting at JLT, said: ‘A fund that continues to employ a seemingly safe strategy of 
investing into long-dated gilts and corporate bonds to track the price of annuities more 
closely becomes quite risky if members do not plan to buy this type of longevity 
insurance...For instance, pension savers looking to withdraw cash lump sums [using] income 
drawdown could be left open to the adverse effects of interest rate fluctuations [which 
change the returns offered by bonds] without much of an upside….In addition to the actual 
investment risk consideration, there is now a requirement for default strategies to be 
relevant for the majority of pension scheme members. So, if the majority of members no 
longer intend to purchase an annuity, keeping the old strategy unchanged cannot be 
justified’.  
Another study, by Towers Watson's master trust LifeSight of around 100 employers, found 
that two-thirds were still targeting annuity purchase in their default investment strategy. 
Only 43% of the employers surveyed said they planned to offer drawdown options. When 
asked why not, 70% said the management and implementation was too difficult, 60% cited 
governance problems, 53% had no desire, and 45% mentioned costs and other barriers. 
Fiona Matthews, managing director of LifeSight, said many employers and trustees had 
been slow to respond because they had been careful to balance giving people what they 
wanted with mitigating risk.219 
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Whatever new de-risking solutions now develop in response to the new pensions 
flexibilities, it seems likely that they will be more expensive than previously. In part, this will 
be due to the increased uncertainty about when funds will be withdrawn. In part, it will be 
because the new flexibilities will discourage investment in long-term illiquid growth assets, 
such as infrastructure, thereby lowering the potential returns on pension savings. Although 
pension savers welcome increased flexibility, unfortunately this comes at a price. 
Examples of scheme drawdown 
There are scheme drawdown offerings from investment managers, life offices and 
consultants. We provide some examples. 
AllianceBernstein has launched a scheme drawdown product that integrates both the 
accumulation and decumulation stages and is suitable for the mass market.220  The product 
combines AllianceBernstein’s range of TDFs – which were set up for the new auto-
enrolment market – with an income drawdown product called Retirement Bridge. Its first 
client was the BlueSky Pensions master trust. The product is aimed at scheme members up 
to age 75 and employs an age-related diversified investment approach with a risk-managed  
investment growth target, while allowing member full accessibility to their funds. The 
Retirement Bridge fund will be available to members from age 55. At this age, the member 
is invested 40% in equities. AllianceBernstein’s  Dynamic Asset Allocation strategy is used to 
gradually de-risk the investment portfolio, so that by age 75, the equity investment is 
reduced to 20%. AllianceBernstein also uses volatility management to make short-term 
adjustments to the portfolio to protect against downside risks in turbulent market 
conditions. The aim is to produce an income that is 20% more than that from an annuity 
between 55 and 75.   
AllianceBernstein believes that their product would make a suitable default from age 55. 
According to Tim Banks, managing director of sales and client relations: ‘Our extensive 
market research shows that 74% of 55 to 64 year olds have not decided what to do with 
their pension pot. We believe that providing a default solution that keeps them invested 
during this important time in their life, while offering full flexibility to change their mind, 
best meets the modern working environment’. At 75, members are expected to annuitise 
remaining assets. The reason for this is given by Mr Banks: ‘If someone is in drawdown, even 
if it professionally managed, you don’t really want people in products that require 
engagement in their late 70’s’, given the fall-off in cognitive abilities by that stage.221 
BlackRock has launched the Retirement Income Account for workplace pension schemes. 
Paul Bucksey, head of UK defined contribution, said: ‘We believe this innovation provides 
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our members with a simple, flexible and cost-effective way of moving from the 
accumulation phase of workplace pension saving to decumulation’. The account allows 
members to choose  either regular or ad-hoc income payments which are made by selling 
units in the funds held in the account and drawing down capital over time.  
The core fund in BlackRock’s suite is LifePath Flexi. This is a TDF which extends into the 
decumulation phase with a typical asset allocation illustrated in Figure 2.2.222  
The de-risking glidepath used reflects the new reality following the introduction of pension 
flexibilities, namely ‘an initial focus on growth – equities and other risky assets – and a 
gradual move to a more balanced asset mix where growth and volatility management are 
twin objectives. That move may start 20 years or so from a stated retirement date, and 
accelerate as the date becomes closer. It’s important to remember that the expected 
retirement date is rarely precise – the chosen date is just a best guess for most members’.223  
The member can also choose from another 100 investment funds from BlackRock and other 
fund managers. By remaining invested into retirement, members can retain the potential for 
future capital growth, but also alter income as required. The AMC for the LifePath Flexi fund 
is 0.41% which covers account administration and fund charges. There are no set up, 
transaction, or exit fees. There is also no charge for moving from an existing workplace 
scheme to the BlackRock Retirement Income Account. The minimum fund size is £50,000.224 
Prudential’s offering focuses on four lifestyle solutions: a default solution for those who 
have not specified a retirement preference, a solution for those planning to take their fund 
in cash, a solution for those planning to use drawdown, and a solution for those planning to 
buy an annuity. John Warburton, distribution director, said: ‘The launch of the Dynamic 
Growth Funds, priced to sit between active and passive investments, gives our corporate 
customers a modern, cost-effective, default investment solution which offers diversification, 
flexibility and choice around the new pension freedom. The addition of further default 
lifestyle strategies demonstrates our commitment to offering enhanced levels of flexibility 
to our customers. These enhancements are part of our continuing corporate pensions 
proposition development to meet evolving customer needs’.225 
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Consultants, such as Aon Hewitt, Buck Consultants and Mercer, have designed a scheme 
drawdown product for their existing employer accumulation clients. Xafinity is planning to 
launch a mass-market scheme with full flexibility. 
Despite all these offerings and plans, there have been very few public announcements by 
companies that have adopted any of them in the days and months following Flexiday. This 
raises the question about how willing companies are to offer scheme drawdown to their 
members in practice. There are mixed views about this according to interviews with trustees 
and pension managers conducted by Spence and Johnson in March 2015 on behalf of the 
Defined Contribution Investment Forum (DCIF). Respondents in favour of scheme 
drawdown said this would be best delivered as all-in-one packaged solutions. Schemes that 
were less supportive said they were concerned about the administration difficulties and 
fiduciary implications. Some said scheme drawdown was more likely to be offered through 
master trusts than by single-employer schemes.226 
The reluctance of many trust-based DC schemes to offer drawdown was confirmed by 
Adrian Boulding, then pensions strategy director at Legal & General: ‘A lot of employers are 
reluctant to continue to be involved in a scheme providing drawdown, because it is not a 
“once and done” or “set and forget” solution. It requires ongoing management and 
monitoring, and the difficulties come between 15 and 20 years down the track when the 
money starts to run low. That’s a step too far for a lot of them’.227 Similarly, Nigel Aston, 
head of European DC at State Street Global Advisors, expects little appetite from trustees 
and plan sponsors to shoulder the burden of looking after members once they retire and 
expects them to look to master trusts and platforms instead: ‘You can imagine a situation 
where some of the large master trusts – either the not-for-profit ones or the truly 
commercial ones – will say: “We’ll aggregate all those individuals at retirement”’. At 65, Mr 
Aston believes members will leave the scheme used for accumulation and go across to 
NEST, NOW: Pensions, The People’s Pension, or the Pensions Trust. Alternatively, they will 
move to ‘a platform with Standard Life, Fidelity, Zurich, whoever;…. it’ll be relatively 
seamless for the individual, but they’re sort of on their own, but you still have a plan that is 
well governed’.228 An additional concern of trustees is that partnering with a drawdown 
provider might be seen by members as giving advice.229 
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2.3.2 Retail distribution 
With retail distribution, the scheme member chooses a drawdown provider either directly 
or via a platform and transfers their pension pot to them and sets up a SIPP with flexible 
access. We consider some examples. 
Hargreaves Lansdown’s SIPP is hosted on HL’s Vantage platform which has an annual charge 
of 0.45% for pension savings up to £250,000.  HL have no set up charge, but they have an 
exit charge of £295 + VAT if all the assets are withdrawn within 12 months. There will also 
be the annual fund management charge on the funds that the member chooses to invest in. 
This could average 1.5% pa.  
LV= has launched a simplified drawdown product which charges 0.25% for funds up to £1m. 
It has a set up charge of £295 if the pot size is below £37,500 and £175 if the pot size is 
above. It also has a SIPP drawdown product with a maximum charge of 0.55% and no extra 
transactions costs.230  
Intelligent Pensions has launched a fixed low-cost drawdown plan which allows DC scheme 
members to transfer to a SIPP and use flexi-access drawdown with ongoing advice. The SIPP 
is operated by James Hay. The drawdown plan has an annual charge of 0.75%, which 
matches the new charge cap on default funds in auto-enrolment pension schemes. The 
charge covers both the SIPP administration costs and the annual management charges on a 
wide range of investment funds. There is a set-up fee of 1% on funds above £100,000. The 
company believes that the minimum suitable for pension drawdown is £100,000. It also 
believes that  flexi-access drawdown is only appropriate for people who are willing to take a 
‘fair degree’ of ongoing risk in retirement and are also prepared to take ongoing advice. 
Managing director Steve Patterson said: ‘Ongoing risk management is second only to initial 
suitability and anyone who thinks of drawdown as a DIY process is highly likely to come 
unstuck with potentially disastrous effects. “One size fits all” solutions are no longer 
appropriate – everybody’s retirement will be different. To achieve the best possible 
retirement outcomes a far more personalised approach is needed’.231 
Charges for retail drawdown products can be very high. Which? investigated the drawdown 
market and found that one product was charging 2.76% p.a.232 Natanje Holt, managing 
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director at Dunstan Thomas, has identified the following types of retail drawdown 
charges:233 
 Transfer out charge – for moving from one contract to another 
 Transfer out charge to UK-based schemes 
 Transfers out charge to overseas schemes 
 Annuity purchase charge 
 Tax-free cash charge (in drawdown a member might be charged several of these as 
they drawdown tax-free cash by stages) 
 Income charge (essentially an annual usage fee) 
 Crystallisation charge (as monies are drawdown) 
 Pot depreciation charge (taken just before the pot balance goes to zero) 
 Review charge (for those in capped drawdown where pre-April 2015 drawdown 
scheme members opting to be capped will remain if they do not exceed their 
stipulated maximum income allowance) 
 Death benefit charge 
 Additional designated charges, associated with phased drawdown. 
In addition, the Dunstan Thomas analysis found little uniformity in terms of amounts 
charged. For example, based on a sample of 54 SIPP providers, the average transfer out 
charge was £161.70, but it varied between nothing and more than £500. 
2.3.3 Hybrid institutional-retail distribution 
With hybrid institutional-retail distribution, the occupational pension scheme only offers the 
accumulation stage and then sends its members to a provider of retirement income 
solutions, such as those considered in the previous section, but as retail customers.  
This reflects the reluctance, noted in Section 2.3.1 above, of trust-based DC schemes to 
offer drawdown themselves. Members will have to transfer to a SIPP if they want to use 
drawdown. Some trust-based DC schemes used to allow up to two lump sum withdrawals 
per year, but no more. A key reason is cost. Jon Dean, a consultant at Altus, said: ‘Even 
something as apparently simple as removal of drawdown limits can necessitate changing 
multiple interconnected IT systems, redesigning the business processes and controls they 
support, and communicating the changes to distribution partners’. 234  
Some contract-based schemes, while showing more flexibility on UFPLS, will also require 
people who want drawdown to move to a SIPP or a stakeholder pension scheme. For 
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example, Scottish Widows will allow unlimited UFPLS withdrawals, but customers will have 
to move to another Scottish Widows scheme to use drawdown.  
The costs of transferring between schemes can be high. Exiting an existing pension scheme 
to get a lump sum or transferring a pension scheme to another provider with a drawdown 
facility could involve punitive exit charges imposed by the transferring scheme and the loss 
of valuable benefits such as guaranteed annuity rates. This would be especially true for 
pension policies sold by insurance companies during the 1980s and 1990s by advisers who 
were paid large commissions. These commissions are spread over the life of the policy, but 
need to be paid whether or not the policy holder continues to pay the premiums. Exit 
penalties are the way in which the remaining premiums are captured. It is hard to get 
reliable information on the size of the exit penalties. Insurers claim they are too complex 
and too tailored to individual policies. However, they can range between 2-20%.235 One 
example is Abbey Life which has an annual charge of 5.25% and an exit penalty of 11%.236,237 
2.4 The withdrawal strategy 
Determining the withdrawal strategy for a DC pension scheme is a critical issue.  If too much 
is withdrawn too soon, then there is the risk that the scheme member will run out of money 
while they are still alive. If too little money is withdrawn, then there is the risk that the 
scheme member dies with a large chunk of the pension pot unspent and hence could have 
enjoyed a much higher living standard in retirement.  
2.4.1 Factors influencing the withdrawal strategy 
A number of factors need to be taken into account. 
The first factor is the level of income that should be drawn in relation to income tax (i.e., the 
avoidance of moving into a higher marginal rate band than is necessary) and to longevity 
risk (i.e., the avoidance of drawing a high level of income in the early years that would result 
in running out of money in later retirement should the individual live longer than expected). 
The level of income drawn will also be influenced by the new rules on inheritance. For those 
with sufficient alternative sources of savings, such as ISAs, it will be optimal to draw from 
those sources before drawing from the pension scheme.  This is because income from ISAs is 
tax free, whereas pension income is taxed. Further, ISAs are subject to inheritance tax (IHT), 
whereas the pension fund can be passed tax free to a named beneficiary if the member dies 
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before age 75. If the member dies after age 75, the pension fund can go to any named 
beneficiary who pays income tax at their marginal rate. 
The second factor is the state pension.  For those with sufficient private pension savings and 
in good health, it pays to delay taking the state pension. Alan Higham, then head of 
retirement insight at Fidelity, has shown that those who reach state pension age before 
April 2016 would receive a 10.4% higher state pension for each year that they delayed 
drawing it. To illustrate, suppose someone is about to retire with a state pension of £6,000 
and delays taking the pension for three years when inflation is 3%. The uplifted pension in 
four years’ time will be £8,602 compared with £6,556 if there was no deferral, which is 
31.4% higher. The three years of missing state pension payments amount to £18,922 and 
this has to be withdrawn from the DC pension pot. As an alternative to taking the extra state 
pension as an annuity, it is possible to take it as a lump sum. This would amount to £19,241. 
The retiree has to live 11 years for the strategy to break even, so the strategy is not suitable 
for those in poor health. If someone lived until 90, the total benefit would be £54,000. After 
April 2016, the increase in the state pension for each year of deferral falls to 5.8% which is 
still much better than most investments offer.238 
The third factor is the investment strategy. The withdrawal strategy cannot be made 
independently of the investment strategy. If the scheme member chooses to invest entirely 
in a LTA, then the income from the pension pot will be predictable and lifelong, but also 
inflexible. If, however, the scheme member chooses to invest in a diversified growth fund, it 
is possible to withdraw a higher average, but potentially more volatile income. But investing 
in a DGF will not hedge longevity risk, so at some stage longevity insurance needs to be 
purchased to avoid running out of money before the scheme member dies. 
A number of academic studies have shown that the optimal strategy for someone who is not 
extremely risk adverse is to begin retirement with a significant investment in growth assets 
and then to switch to an annuity in later life.239 For example, according to Raimond Maurer 
and Barabara Samova’s (2009) report Rethinking Retirement Income Strategies – How Can 
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We Secure Better Outcomes for Future Retirees?, commissioned by the European Fund and 
Asset Management Association:240  
[T]he modelling presented in this report [suggests that] the best 
investment strategy for payout solutions is to hold a significant proportion 
of pension assets in well-diversified equity portfolios early in retirement, 
and to switch to annuities and bond holdings progressively over time, 
taking into account individuals’ specific circumstances. This strategy results 
in significantly higher consumption possibilities, at a relatively low risk 
compared to immediate full annuitisation at retirement. 
The risk of being worse off in terms of retirement income in [the] case of 
adverse stock [market] developments is limited for individuals adjusting 
their pension asset portfolio. ….The simulations of consumption levels 
under different financial markets conditions show that the majority of 
individuals (70%) can expect to enjoy up to a third of higher lifetime 
consumption level if they hold equity at the beginning of retirement and 
gradually switch to annuities over time, instead of annuitising all their 
wealth at the age of 65.  Moreover, the consumption level of individuals 
ending up in the worst financial market scenarios would be less than 10% 
lower than under full annuitisation. 
As a consequence, compulsory full annuitisation of retirement wealth at 
the age of 65 results in significant costs in terms of foregone consumption.  
Taking into account the desire of individuals to leave money to their 
surviving relatives and/or build a financial buffer to cope with large and 
sudden expenses, the disadvantage from enforced annuitisation becomes 
substantially aggravated. 
The report also demonstrates that retirees can enjoy a smooth 
consumption pattern during retirement if they keep their retirement 
wealth invested in pension products featuring a switching mechanism to 
increase the proportion of annuities and bonds as time goes by. This result 
reflects the fact that short-term fluctuations in equity markets become less 
important over long investment horizons when the gradual reduction in 
equity expense limits the exposure of pension assets to market volatility. 
 
2.4.2 Is there a safe withdrawal rate? 
As Abraham Okusanya argues: ‘For clients in retirement, developing a sensible and 
sustainable withdrawal strategy is at least as important as developing a sensible investment 
strategy. Unless a client annuitises all or most of their retirement pot, they need to have a 
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robust framework in place to guide their withdrawal decisions or risk running out of 
money’.241  
2.4.2.1 The 4% rule 
The US financial planning community has developed the concept of a ‘safe (sensible or 
sustainable) withdrawal rate' (SWR) which is based on the work of a financial planner called 
William Bengen. In 1994, he devised the ‘4% rule’. The rule stated that an individual could 
withdraw 4% of the fund in the first year and the same amount adjusted for inflation in 
subsequent years. Based on all the rolling historical periods in his dataset, Bengen showed 
that the fund would last for at least 30 years.242 Bengen later introduced the term 'safemax' 
to describe the highest withdrawal rate that would allow at least 30 years' of inflation-
adjusted withdrawals and showed that the safemax rate was 4.5% if the income is tax-free 
and 4.1% if it is taxable.243 
The 4% rule was ‘confirmed’ by the so-called Trinity study in 1998. Philip L Cooley, Carl M. 
Hubbard, and Daniel T. Walz used Monte Carlo simulation techniques on US financial data 
between 1926 and 1995244 to show that a 4% withdrawal rate from a fund invested 50% in 
US equities and 50% in US bonds would have a 95% chance of lasting at least 30 years (i.e., a 
5% failure rate).245 
More recently, Wade Pfau, a professor of retirement income at the American College of 
Financial Services, investigated the 4% rule for the UK and 16 other developed market 
economies.246 He employed 109 years of financial market data (between 1900 and 2008) for 
each of the 17 countries. Using the same historical simulations approach as Bengen, he 
examined the outcomes for individuals retiring in each year of the 80 years between 1900 
and 1979, allowing for a retirement period of 30 years.   
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Table 2.4:  Safe withdrawal rates for UK retirees 
  'Safemax' 10th percentile 
% failures  
(4% rate) 
% failures 
 (5% rate) 
 'Perfect' foresight 
assumption 
3.77 4.17 3.8 27.5 
 UK 50/50 portfolio 3.43 4.01 9.3 55.6 
 Global 50/50 portfolio 3.26 3.55 17.9 31.0 
Source: Wade D. Pfau (2010) An International Perspective on Safe Withdrawal Rates: The Demise of the 4 
Percent Rule?, Journal of Financial Planning, 23(12), 52–61. 
 
The outcomes for the UK are shown in Table 2.4. Even with perfect foresight of future asset 
returns and the most favourable asset mix in the light of this perfect foresight, Pfau showed 
that the ‘safemax' rate for the UK is only 3.77%. If the individual is prepared to accept a 10% 
probability of failure (i.e., a 10% chance of running out of money before 30 years), the SWR 
increases to 4.17%. A 5% withdrawal rate results in a failure probability of 27.5%. Returning 
to Bengen’s original case of a 50/50 portfolio, the ‘safemax' rate is just 3.43%. With a 10% 
failure probability, the SWR is 4.01%, while a withdrawal rate of 5% leads to a failure rate of 
55.6%. The outcome is actually worse if the individual invests in a global 50/50 portfolio 
(i.e., 50% in global equities and 50% in global bonds). Now the ‘safemax' rate is 3.26%, the 
SWR rate with a 10% failure probability is 3.55%, and the failure rate with a 5% withdrawal 
rate is 31%. 
While a fixed SWR is simple to understand, it has a number of weaknesses. 
First and most importantly, it ignores longevity risk.  Office for National Statistics data shows 
that a 65-year old couple has a 25% chance of one of them reaching 97 and a 17% chance of 
one of them reaching 100. A rule designed so that funds last 30 years is clearly inadequate. 
Moshe A. Milevsky and Huaxiong Huang (2011, Table 3) show that, for individuals who are 
concerned about running out of money before they die (i.e., have longevity risk aversion), it 
is optimal for them to use a proportion of their pension pot to buy index-linked LTAs. These 
authors show that lifetime consumption in retirement (as well as lifetime utility or welfare) 
is maximised if all pension wealth is annuitised at the time of retirement.247 Some have 
argued that individuals who do not want to formally purchase an annuity because they 
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value the flexibility of drawdown, should not actually choose a SWR above that of an 
annuity (i.e., 2.5% - 3%).248 
Second, it ignores the individual’s attitude to risk, both in terms of the underlying 
investment portfolio and the failure probability. Individuals with a low degree of investment 
risk tolerance and a low tolerance to running out of funds before dying would want to invest 
in a much more conservative fund and, consequently, have a much lower SWR.  
Third, the rule involves taking out a fixed (albeit index-linked) amount whatever market 
conditions. This leaves open the possibility that individuals could spend all their pension pot 
before dying. It also leaves open the possibility that individuals underspend their pension 
pot before dying and hence could have enjoyed a higher standard of living in retirement. 
Fourth, it is not ‘safe’ in a low-yield world. Michael Finke, Wade D. Pfau, and David M. 
Blanchett show that if the Trinity study was repeated with real bond rates as of January 
2013 (4% below the historical long-run average), then the failure rate with the 4% rule 
increases from 5% to 57%. If bond rates return to their historical average after 5 (10) years, 
the failure rate is still high at 18% (32%).249   
Fifth, it ignores fund management charges. Maria A. Bruno, Colleen M. Jaconetti, and Yan 
Zilbering show that the SWR with a 50/50 US equity/bond portfolio, an 85% success rate 
and a 30-year spending horizon drops from 3.9% with a 0% charge, to 3.8% with a 0.25% 
charge, and to 3.3% with a 1.25% charge.250 
Sixth, it ignores the dynamic nature of market and portfolio returns. Many advisers use 
cashflow models to help clients understand their income and expenditure needs after 
retirement. Included in income is the withdrawal amount from the fund, e.g., 4%. This 
withdrawal rate will be based on an assumed rate of return on the invested fund. The 
problem is that the cashflow models are deterministic and assume that the rate of return is 
fixed and hence ignore real world randomness. In particular, they ignore ‘sequence-of-
returns’ risk.251 This is the risk that there is a sequence of negative returns on the invested 
portfolio in the early years after retirement. If a fixed (in real terms) amount of money is still 
withdrawn from the fund each year, many retirees will run out of money, not only well 
before they die, but also well before they have completed 30 years of retirement. 
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Table 2.5:  Sequence-of-returns risk 
Year Portfolio A Portfolio B Client age Portfolio A Portfolio B 
1 -5.9 5.73 60 89,100 100,730 
2 -13.3 5.73 61 72,250 101,502 
3 -22.7 5.73 62 58,849 102,318 
4 20.9 5.73 63 56,476 103,181 
5 12.8 5.73 64 58,705 104,093 
6 22.0 5.73 65 66,621 105,057 
7 16.8 5.73 66 72,813 106,077 
8 5.3 5.73 67 71,672 107,155 
9 -29.9 5.73 68 45,242 108,296 
10 30.1 5.73 69 53,860 109,501 
11 14.5 5.73 70 56,670 110,775 
12 -3.5 5.73 71 49,686 112,123 
13 12.3 5.73 72 50,798 113,547 
14 20.8 5.73 73 56,363 115,054 
15 -5.9 5.73 74 48,038 116,646 
16 -13.3 5.73 75 36,649 118,330 
17 -22.7 5.73 76 23,330 120,110 
18 20.9 5.73 77 23,206 121,993 
19 12.8 5.73 78 21,176 123,983 
20 22 5.73 79 20,835 126,087 
21 16.8 5.73 80 19,335 128,312 
22 5.3 5.73 81 15,360 130,664 
23 -29.9 5.73 82 5,767 133,151 
24 30.1 5.73 83 2,503 135,781 
25 14.5 5.73 84  138,561 
26 -3.5 5.73 85  141,500 
27 12.3 5.73 86  144,608 
28 20.8 5.73 87  147,894 
29 5.73 5.73 Average   
Source: FinalytiQ 
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This can be shown using the following example.252 Table 2.5 shows the returns from two 
portfolios. The second column (Portfolio A) represents a sequence of realistic annual 
returns, while the third (Portfolio B) represents what advisers might use in their 
deterministic cashflow model by assuming the average annualised return from column 2 
holds for each of the 29 years in the Table. The key point is that both portfolios have the 
same average return, but the sequence of returns is very different. 
A client withdrawing £5,000 a year from age 60 will run out of money with Portfolio A by 
age 83, while Portfolio B allows the customer to withdraw the same level of income 
indefinitely and bequest more than the initial pension pot to their descendants. The 
explanation for what happens to portfolio A is 'reverse pound cost averaging' or ‘pound cost 
ravaging’: the customer has to sell units at low prices to pay the required income and the 
portfolio can never recover from the early poor performance by later good performance, 
however good that subsequent performance is. 253  As Abraham Okusanya argues: 
‘Deterministic modelling tools hide the danger of negative sequence-of-returns, especially in 
the early years of retirement’.254 Some advisers are even less complementary about cash 
flow models. Richard Bishop, director and principal at Premier Practice, says: ‘I'm going to 
come out and say it: cashflow modelling is utter nonsense and is only used to justify 
extortionate adviser fees’.255 
Finally, the SWR ignores the fact that the future might not be like the past: in particular, 
future returns might by lower and more volatile than the historical returns upon which the 
4% rule was based. As mentioned by Jonathan Gardner of Towers Watson, the 4% rule was 
built on the particularly favourable post-World War II investment experience, and this might 
well not be repeated going forward.256 A similar point has been made by Duncan Robertson, 
marketing director at Aegon Ireland: ‘Yes, the past has a useful story to tell, and through our 
experiences of the past we can build models of what might happen in the future. But it 
would be misguided to use it blindly. Models on sustainability need to be calibrated to 
today's world, using today's expectations on rates of return and volatility of assets and 
today's expectations on an individual's longevity….. Withdrawal rates of 5%+ may be 
perfectly sustainable when risk-free yields are at historical higher levels, and planning to 
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exhaust funds 30 years after retiring may also be okay when people weren't living so long. 
However, this isn't the current world’.257  
It is, of course, possible to reduce the failure rate by adjusting withdrawals down in bad 
years and up in good years. The main ways of doing this are through the use of variable 
spending strategies: 
 Giving up the inflation uprating in years when there are poor investment returns 
 Cutting spending when the portfolio withdrawal rate exceeds 20% of their initial 
level  because the portfolio is declining258 
 Increasing spending when portfolio withdrawal rate falls by more than 20% of their 
initial level because the portfolio is growing 
 Withdrawing a constant percentage from the fund, rather than a constant amount. 
All these options involve, albeit to differing degrees, volatile income and hence expenditure 
from one year to the next, although with the last option, the retirees will never run out of 
money before they die.  
Luke Delorme (2014, p.33) examined three common withdrawal strategies in terms of their 
‘utility scores’.259,260 These were the original 4% rule (an inflation-adjusted percentage 
starting at 4% of the initial pot), a constant monetary amount (equal to 4% of the initial pot) 
and a constant percentage (4% of whatever the pot size is at the time of withdrawal). Based 
on bootstrapped simulations which draw returns randomly from the period 1928 to 2013, 
the author shows that the withdrawal strategy with the highest utility score in the worst-
case scenario is the original 4% rule (utility score = 4.93). The strategy with the lowest score 
is the constant monetary amount (utility score = 2.92), while the constant percentage 
strategy lies in between (utility score = 4.11). 
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2.4.2.2 Alternatives to the 4% rule 
Some alternative withdrawal strategies to the 4% rule have been proposed which 
dynamically adjust withdrawals to market and portfolio conditions and we consider the 
most common of these.261  
This first is based on withdrawing the annuitised value of the fund, i.e., withdrawing the 
amount Fx/ax at age x, where Fx is the value of the fund at age x, and ax is the annuity factor 
at age x.262 This is known as the ‘equivalent annuity’ strategy. A variation on this is the ‘1/Ex’ 
rule, where Ex is the individual’s life expectancy at age x, and the withdrawal amount at age 
x is given by Fx/Ex. With these strategies, retirees will never run out of money before they 
die.  
Ed Denbee (2008, Figures 4 and 8) examined the equivalent annuity and 1/Ex strategies.
263 
Both strategies give similar results.264  The pattern in the case of the median simulation for 
someone retiring at 65 is that the withdrawal amount is initially higher than for an 
equivalent index-linked annuity.265  It increases year on year until the early 70s and then 
falls back, dropping below the annuity payment in the early 80s. Someone surviving to 100 
would have around one quarter of the payment they would have received on the index-
linked annuity.  
The second is to draw only the ‘natural’ income from the fund. Mark Rimmer, product 
director for Premier's multi-asset team, defines this as the ‘pay-out of dividends [coupons, 
rent etc] from income-generating investments’. 266 This, of course, is what equity income 
funds do. Since there is no cashing-in of units to pay an income, the annual income received 
will fluctuate from one year to the next and ‘there is no tidy way of getting around this’. 
The third is auto-rebalancing.267 This involves making withdrawals from the asset classes 
that experienced the highest growth during the year. An extreme form would be to 
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rebalance the portfolio annually to a constant asset mix, by selling relative winners and 
buying relative losers. 
The fourth is to use a cashflow reserve (or bond) ladder or bucket (also called time 
segmentation).268 This involves holding enough in deposits or short-maturing bonds to meet 
the next two years of expenditure. This means that equities do not have to be sold in a 
falling market to fund expenditure. The next rung of the ladder includes medium-term 
bonds intended to cover the next 5 to 10 years of expenditure, but which could be sold in a 
prolonged market downturn without too big a capital loss. At the top of the ladder are 
equities. With luck, by the time the client needs to sell equites to meet expenses, the 
market has recovered. A feature of this approach is that the portfolio becomes riskier over 
time, since there is no rebalancing of the portfolio as the safest and most liquid assets are 
sold to pay for consumption.  
The fifth is the rising equity glide path proposed by Wade Pfau  and the US financial planner 
Michael Kitces.269 This starts with a low equity allocation which increases gradually during 
the first decade of retirement.  This strategy reduces portfolio return volatility at the time 
the portfolio is most susceptible to sequence-of-returns risk. Also if there has been a 
sequence of negative returns during the early years of retirement, the rising glide path 
results in the clients buying low. The approach is the exact opposite of conventional wisdom 
which suggests that the equity weighting in the portfolio should decrease with age (as in the 
common rule of thumb used by advisers that the equity weighting should equal 100 minus 
age).  
The sixth is the floor-leverage rule.270  This involves establishing a safe and secure spending 
floor with 85% of the assets in the portfolio. The remaining 15% of the portfolio is invested 
in a 3 times leveraged equity fund. If the equity portion of the portfolio exceeds 15% of the 
total portfolio, equities are sold to reduce the allocation to 15% and the proceeds are used 
to increase spending. Otherwise, do nothing. 
The final one is a ‘least cost’ or ‘collared’ spending strategy.271 The designers of this strategy 
argue that the 4% rule leads to situations where surpluses are accumulated (and unspent) 
when markets outperform and where there are spending shortfalls when markets 
underperform. They estimate that these surpluses amount to 10%-20% of the retiree’s 
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initial wealth, while the spending shortfalls are equivalent to an additional 2%-4% of initial 
wealth. They propose an alternative ‘least cost’ spending plan which eliminates the 
inefficiencies – amounting to 12%-24% of initial wealth – in the 4% spending plan. This 
involves using options to put a cap on spending when the market is underperforming and a 
floor on spending when the market is performing well and hence puts a ‘collar’ on spending 
that eliminates the surpluses and deficits. 
It is important to note that none of these strategies, apart from the first one, hedge 
longevity risk, unless longevity insurance in the form of a deferred annuity is purchased at 
retirement which comes into effect at, say, 85. 
2.5 The longevity insurance strategy 
The longevity insurance strategy determines when longevity insurance is purchased and 
when it comes into effect. The strategy is essential for ensuring that a pension scheme 
serves its primary purpose of providing an income for however long the scheme member 
lives. But when should longevity insurance be purchased and when should it come into 
effect? This essentially boils down to the choice between buying an immediate annuity 
when it is needed and buying a deferred annuity at the point of retirement with the 
deferred annuity beginning to make payments when it is needed. 
 
Figure 2.3:  The Milevsky switching rule 
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The optimal combined investment and longevity insurance strategy in retirement is complex 
and impossible to implement properly without sophisticated stochastic dynamic 
programming software. However, Milevsky (1998) proposed a simple rule of thumb for 
deciding when to switch from risky equity-linked assets to an annuity: this is when the 
mortality premium exceeds the equity premium as shown in Figure 2.3.272 The mortality 
premium for a particular age (x) can be thought of as the excess return on a level annuity 
over a risk-free investment; it is shown by the upward sloping curved line in the Figure. The 
equity premium is the excess return on equities over a similar risk-free investment: in Figure 
2.3, the equity premium is assumed to be fixed at 3% p.a. 
In the early years after retirement, the equity premium exceeds the mortality premium and, 
all other things being as expected, the retiree receives a higher average return from 
investing in an equity-linked portfolio than investing in a level annuity, which is equivalent 
to a bond-based investment. However, the level of the mortality premium increases each 
year and eventually exceeds the equity premium. Figure 2.3 shows that the switchover age 
is around 80 if the equity premium is 3%.  This rule of thumb is a reasonable approximation 
to the optimal switching rule if the scheme member is risk-neutral, but it overestimates the 
switching age if the member is risk averse: for example, if they are extremely risk-averse 
they should annuitise at retirement and not delay.273 
Figure 2.3 shows the ‘average’ investment outcome with a 3% equity premium. But, 
presenting information on the basis of averages is deceptive: investment returns are not 
guaranteed and Figure 2.3 ignores important realities, such as sequence-of-returns risk. To 
show what could happen in the real world, we use the PensionMetrics stochastic simulation 
model.274 
We make the following assumptions: 
 Male retires age 65 with a pension pot of £100,000 (F65) 
 Investment strategy: 25% equites, 75% bonds 
 Expected interest rate = 4% 
 Volatility of interest rate = 4% 
 Expected inflation rate = 2% 
 Volatility of inflation rate = 4% 
 Equity premium = 3% 
 Volatility of equity returns = 20% 
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 Moshe Milevsky (1998) Optimal Asset Allocation Towards the End of the Life Cycle: To Annuitize or Not to 
Annuitize?, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 65, 401-26.  
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 This is demonstrated in David Blake, Andrew Cairns,and Kevin Dowd (2003) Pensionmetrics II:  Stochastic 
Pension Plan Design during the Distribution Phase, Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 33 (1), 29-47. 
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 Total expense ratio = 1% 
 Annuity rate at age 65 (a65) = 5.5% 
 Age at which deferred annuity starts if purchased at age 65 = 85 
 Number of simulation trials = 2,500. 
 
Figure 2.4: Distribution of real income with 100% drawdown and no deferred annuity
 
Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of real income with 100% drawdown and no deferred 
annuity. What is depicted is a fanchart showing the 90% prediction interval for the 
distribution of income from the 2,500 different scenarios. Each year, the member is 
assumed to withdraw the annuity equivalent of their remaining pension pot. At age 65, the 
member withdraws 5.5% of £100,000 (= a65 x F65 = £5,500), which is the same amount that 
could be taken from a level lifetime annuity at age 65.  This means that £94,500 (=£100,000 
- £5,500) is available for investment in the first year of retirement. Suppose the investment 
portfolio loses 5%, so the pension pot is valued at £89,775 (F66 = £89,775) at the end of the 
year, and the annuity rate is 5.8% at age 66 (a66 = 5.8%): then the income that could be 
withdrawn at age 66 would be £5,270 (= a66 x F66 = 5.8% of £89,775). Suppose instead that 
the investment portfolio gains 5%, so the pension pot would now be valued at £99,225 (F66 = 
£99,225), and the income that could be withdrawn at age 66 would be £5,775 (= a66 x F66 = 
5.8% of £99,225). These are two of the possible 2,500 scenarios for what might happen at 
age 66. The most likely outcome for what could happen between ages 65 and 100 (assuming 
the member survives that long) is given by the dark central band in the fanchart. We can 
also be 90% confident that the actual outcome will lie somewhere in the fanchart. 
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Also depicted in Figure 2.4 is a thin slightly curved downward sloping line. This shows the 
real value of the payments on a level annuity purchased at age 65, with the payments 
declining in real terms at the rate of 2% p.a. due to inflation. The average real value of the 
income that can be drawn from the drawdown programme falls each year, since more is 
taken out of the fund every year than the average value of the investment return (and there 
is also the effect of inflation). But it initially falls by less than the fall in the real value of the 
annuity, due to the equity premium earned by the drawdown fund. However, after around 
age 80, the mortality premium exceeds the equity premium. Also a higher mortality rate 
implies a higher annuity rate.  
Since the amount taken out of the fund in a given year depends on the fund size, the 
annuity rate for that year and the equity premium, once the mortality premium exceeds the 
equity premium, the income that can be drawn from the fund falls very rapidly. This is 
because, while the annuity rate increases, the fund size falls at a bigger rate. But note that 
the pension pot never runs out, because the member never draws down more than the 
annuity equivalent of the remaining pension pot. Also note that the prediction interval is 
very wide, particularly for people in their 80s. For example, at age 80, someone could be 
lucky and be drawing £6,500, or they could be unlucky and only be drawing £3,000.  
Figure 2.4 shows that the user of drawdown will on average receive a higher income in the 
earlier years of retirement than the annuitant, but a lower income in the later years if they 
live that long. Of course, when the retiree dies, the residual fund with drawdown goes to 
their estate, whereas the family of an annuitant gets nothing. 
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show what happens if 120% and 150%, respectively, of the annuity 
equivalent is withdrawn each year. Individuals will enjoy a much higher standard of living in 
early retirement than a lifetime annuity, but they will pay for it in later retirement if they 
live that long. 
Figure 2.7 shows what happens if only 80% of the annuity equivalent is withdrawn each 
year. In the first year, £4,400 is withdrawn. The larger sum that is retained in the pension 
pot to begin with means that, on average, increasing amounts can be taken out in 
subsequent years until the early 80s. Thereafter, the amount that can be withdrawn 
declines gradually and falls below that of an annuity by the late 80s.  
Figure 2.8 shows what happens if a fixed amount is withdrawn each year – equal to 150% of 
the initial annuity amount of £5,500 (i.e., £8,250) – irrespective of the subsequent 
investment performance of the investment portfolio. It is clear that this is a very high-risk 
strategy that risks the pot being depleted completely by around age 80. Even taking only 
£5,500 per year is not much less risky as Figure 2.9 shows. 
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of real income with 120% drawdown and no deferred annuity
 
 
Figure 2.6: Distribution of real income with 150% drawdown and no deferred annuity 
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of real income with 80% drawdown and no deferred annuity 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Distribution of real income with a fixed amount withdrawn each year equal to 
150% of the initial annuity amount 
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Figure 2.9: Distribution of real income with a fixed amount withdrawn each year equal to 
100% of the initial annuity amount 
 
The next set of Figures show what happens if part of the pension fund is used to buy a 
deferred annuity at age 65 which starts to pay out at age 85 if the member survives that 
long – the premium for the deferred annuity is lost if the member dies before 85. Figure 
2.10 shows what happens in the case where 10% of the fund is used at age 65 to purchase a 
deferred annuity, and there is 100% drawdown on the remaining fund. Although lower on 
average than the income from an annuity at most ages, the income from this combination 
of drawdown and deferred annuity matches the annuity income quite closely – except at 
high ages – and certainly much better than the pure drawdown strategy shown in Figure 
2.4. And drawdown has much more flexibility. If concerned about the fall off in income at 
high ages, the member could consider using 15% of the fund to buy a deferred annuity as 
shown in Figure 2.11.  Figure 2.12 shows what happens in the case of 150% drawdown with 
10% of the fund used at age 65 to purchase a deferred annuity that starts paying at age 85. 
The benefits from purchasing a deferred annuity at high ages are clear.  
What these Figures strikingly demonstrate is the two key unavoidable tradeoffs people need 
to make in retirement: (a) a higher income earlier in retirement or a higher income later 
(and vice versa), and (b) the higher overall lifetime income from an annuity against the extra 
flexibility and death benefits available with drawdown. Ultimately, the optimal decision 
comes down to choosing what risk of a reduction in future lifetime income retirees are 
prepared to accept for retaining control over their assets.  
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Figure 2.10: Distribution of real income with 100% drawdown and 10% of the fund used at 
age 65 to purchase a deferred annuity that starts paying at age 85 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Distribution of real income with 100% drawdown and 15% of the fund used at 
age 65 to purchase a deferred annuity that starts paying at age 85 
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Figure 2.12: Distribution of real income with 150% drawdown and 10% of the fund used at 
age 65 to purchase a deferred annuity that starts paying at age 85 
 
2.6 Charges, charge disclosure and proposals to cap charges 
2.6.1 Charges 
Charges for drawdown vary considerably and have up to four components: the charge 
imposed by the scheme provider to cover operational costs (such as administration), the 
fund management charge, the platform charge, and the charge for advice.  
Even for a simple fund structure from a low-cost provider, the annual charge might be 1% 
plus an administration fee of £250 per annum, which would cover the cost of income 
payments and income amount reviews, for example. A more common total cost is about 2% 
p.a. which is similar to that for an investment-backed annuity. Guaranteed drawdown 
products could cost up to 2.5% p.a. (or even more), although for large funds, the charge 
drops to around 1.55% p.a. We came across cases where the charges for a SIPP package and 
advice were 4%-4.5% p.a. Platform costs can be between 0.25-0.50% p.a. and advice can be 
between 0.50-0.75% p.a. There are also hidden costs, including bid-offer spreads, the cost of 
sub-funds within the main fund, etc. Where an actively managed fund is selected, there is a 
risk that high turnover (churning) would add significantly to the total cost due to the 
transaction costs involved. Which? found ‘one provider charging 0.5% more than another 
for investing in the exact same fund, and one provider’s charges ranging from 0.44% to 
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1.24% for very similar funds, which can make a significant difference over the course of 
someone’s retirement’. The worst case was a fund charging 2.76% p.a.275 
We pool together some of the charges noted above: 
 Annuities – It is hard to identify the ‘charge’ the annuity provider imposes for selling 
an annuity to a customer. The annuity provider simply sells the annuity for a price.  It 
is possible to work out the annuity rate (which is the annuity payment divided by the 
purchase price), but that does not reveal anything about the charge. We do know 
that agents selling annuities on a non-advised basis get a one-off commission of 1-
3% of the purchase price 
 Short- or fixed-term annuities (FTAs) – Typical one-off commission for sales on a non-
advised basis is about 2% of the fund 
 Investment-linked annuities (ILAs) – Annual charges are estimated at about 2% 
 Diversified growth funds – Annual charges are in the range 0.65% - 0.75% 
 Multi-asset income funds – Annual charges of around 0.9% 
 Multi-manager funds – Annual charges up to 2%.276  
With current charges, drawdown products are more profitable to platforms than annuities, 
according to Ian Gorham, chief executive of Hargreaves Lansdown: ‘we make a one-off 
commission if clients take out an annuity, but in the longer term we make more money on 
drawdown; as long as a client has a drawdown account for more than four years, it is more 
remunerative’.277 
In July 2015, Which? published a comprehensive report on drawdown charges, entitled The 
True Cost of Pension Freedom.278  For the case of a £50,000 pension pot with a 4% 
withdrawal rate, the difference in charges over 10 years between the most expensive 
provider (The Share Centre, which charged £8,100) and the cheapest (Fidelity, which 
charged £4,991) was around £3,000.  
For someone with a £250,000 pot, withdrawing 6% a year, the cost differences over 10 
years between the dearest and cheapest providers was £10,000, with Scottish Widows 
charging £26,490 and LV= charging £16,325. Table 2.6 shows the full set of results across the 
18 companies that took part in the Which? survey.   
The different companies had a variety of ways of charging: six charge to set up a drawdown 
plan, seven charge an annual fee for using drawdown, eight charge an annual fee if the 
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 Which? calls for additional pension reforms , 6 March 2015; 
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customer uses a SIPP, and seven charge a simpler single annual ‘platform fee’ but with 
additional charges for certain types of investments.  
Richard Lloyd, chief executive of Which? said: ‘The old annuity market failed pensioners 
miserably and the Government must ensure the same thing doesn’t happen again with 
drawdown. With such big differences in cost, and confusing charges that make it difficult to 
compare, it’s clear more needs to be done to help consumers make the most of the 
[pension] freedoms’.279 
Table 2.6: Drawdown costs 
 
Company Cost over one year Cost over a decade 
LV= £1,786 £16,325 
Alliance Trust Savings £1,966 £18,155 
AJ Bell YouInvest £2,035 £18,815 
Halifax Sharedealing £2,049 £18,957 
Interactive Investor £2,069 £19,156 
The Share Centre £2,467 £20,597 
James Hay £2,410 £21,152 
AXA Wealth £2,444 £22,081 
Fidelity £2,468 £22,284 
Old Mutual/Skandia £2,491 £22,487 
Charles Stanley Direct £2,636 £22,536 
Hargreaves Lansdown £2,620 £23,600 
Barclays Stockbrokers £2,699 £23,708 
TD Direct Investing £2,724 £24,031 
Bestinvest £2,880 £25,006 
Aviva £2,820 £25,310 
Prudential £2,820 £25,310 
Scottish Widows £2,959 £26,490 
Note: The table calculates the costs based on a pot of £250,000, withdrawing 6% of the fund a year and 
pension growing by 5% per year. It also includes fund management charges. Which? used the Henderson 
Cautious Managed fund as the investment vehicle. 
 
2.6.2 Charge disclosure  
In September 2015, The People's Pension published the results of a survey of 1,256 working 
adults aged below 65 by YouGov which showed that 89% of scheme members did not know 
what charges they pay to their pension provider, while 51% said there were not aware that 
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 Reported in Michelle McGagh (2015) The £10,000 cost of getting drawdown wrong, Citywire, 21 July. 
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they were paying charges. Most (94%) respondents said providers should have to tell people 
how much they were charging them to manage their savings. Darren Philp, director of policy 
and market engagement at The People's Pension said: ‘Our research reveals a worrying lack 
of awareness about pension scheme charges. At the present time, schemes can charge in 
very different ways which makes comparison difficult and means consumers could be being 
ripped off. This survey reveals a strength of public opinion that the Government, regulators 
and wider pensions industry cannot afford to ignore. The public have made it clear that they 
want to see charges explained in a way that they understand, and which allows them to 
easily compare products’.280 
In response to media criticism of their charges, some providers have reduced their charges. 
For example, Standard Life has removed its set up charge of £208 and one-off early 
depletion charge of £312 in its flexible drawdown product. David Tiller, head of adviser 
platform propositions at Standard Life, said: ‘From the feedback we've received, we know 
that it's the fundamentals that matter, such as: the reliability of income payments, the 
speed at which we can pay withdrawals on the day the client chooses and the quality of 
reporting to advisers and clients. It's not just about providing access, it's about providing a 
great service that can be relied on. The impact of the pension freedoms goes well beyond 
provider and adviser operational readiness. This legislation will transform the UK long-term 
savings market. Instead of being seen as inaccessible and opaque, pensions are about to 
become consumers' long-term savings vehicle of choice. Our role is to make it easy for 
advisers to access the flexibility, which is why we've decided to drop these additional 
drawdown charges. We know advisory businesses understand the opportunity arising from 
the new pension freedoms, but, at the same time, are concerned about increasing their 
capacity to deliver retirement advice while managing the obvious risks for clients living off 
their portfolios on a day-to-day basis. Platform technology has a clear role to play in 
providing an efficient and consistent way to facilitate the level of advice these clients 
need’.281 
A requirement for full disclosure of all costs is currently being discussed by the industry, the 
regulators and the Government. MiFID II will also require product providers to disclose to 
clients full details of the costs and charges related to their investment, including cost 
aggregations, the timing of disclosure (ex-ante and ex-post) and information on the 
cumulative effect of costs on the investment return. 
In July 2015, Martin Davis, chief executive of Kames Capital, called on the UK investment 
management industry to agree a common simple, transparent and understandable way to 
disclose fund management fees to investors. Although in 2014, he criticised the Financial 
Services Consumer Panel for recommending a single charge as being ‘over-simplistic’.  
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The Investment Association (IA), the trade body of the investment management industry, 
recommends the ongoing charges figure (OCF). However, some investment managers, such 
as Invesco Perpetual and Legal & General Investment Management, use the term fund 
management fee (FMF), which is similar to OCF. Others still use the less comprehensive 
annual management charge (AMC). But even OCF does not include all costs such as 
transaction charges. 
Mr Davis said: ‘There is no point in certain parts of the industry getting all cleaned up and 
not others. It has got to be meaningful and the customer has got to understand it. I would 
like to see the top ten in the UK, managing the vast majority of funds, come to some sort of 
agreement around the best way to articulate our charges in a way that is simple and 
understandable. Then the Investment Association could turn that into something the rest of 
the industry could sign up to’.282  
 
2.6.3 Proposals to cap charges 
The Pension Schemes Act 2015 allows the Government to impose a charge cap on 
drawdown products in future.  No figure is mentioned, but it would be probably be higher 
than the 0.75% charge cap on DC default investment funds in the accumulation stage from 
April 2015.283   
A number of organisations have put forward proposals to cap costs in the decumulation 
stage, just as they have been capped on default funds in the accumulation stage. For 
example, in December 2014, Age UK proposed a charge cap for income drawdown products 
on the grounds that ‘understanding and comparing the total charges for an income 
drawdown pension is very complicated. It will be very difficult for consumers to compare 
the cost of different schemes, shop around and switch to better value arrangements. The 
extension of the charge cap to income drawdown will help prevent consumers from paying 
excessive charges’. 284  Similarly, in March 2015, Which? launched a Better Pensions 
campaign285  in which it calls for the introduction of a charge cap for default drawdown 
products.286  
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Futher, in the lead up to the May 2015 General Election, the Labour Party called for a cap on 
‘rip-off’ drawdown charges on the grounds that ‘people who draw money out of their hard-
earned pension pot should have similar protections to when the put money in’.287 
The Labour Party’s proposals were not popular with industry practitioners. They said: ‘it 
could be very damaging to how this market develops for customers if we saw an arbitrary 
cap imposed before we see how customers use their freedom or how providers innovate to 
meet their needs’. Further, introducing a charge cap on drawdown facilities is ‘unnecessary 
because market forces will impose an effective cap’. A particular concern was a charge cap 
on drawdown products with built-in guarantees which the industry believes will be popular 
with customers. Steven Cameron, regulatory strategy director at Aegon, said: ‘These 
valuable options come at a cost which may not fit within an arbitrary charge cap. This new 
market could be stunted before it even takes off.’ Alan Higham said: ‘A charge cap would be 
complex to implement across the range of retirement products and could stifle innovation 
at an early stage of development’.288 
Speaking in the House of Lords in June 2015, Lord David Freud, Minister of State for Welfare 
Reform, said: ’We are going to see how the market develops. It has only been going for two 
months and, if it looks appropriate, we will introduce charge caps. We are meeting the 
industry and working with them to make sure they do produce the right level of charging 
and we are able to monitor that’. Lord Keith Bradley, then Labour’s shadow Pensions 
Minister, reminded Lord Freud of Baroness Altmann’s views before becoming Pensions 
Minister when she said that a cap on drawdown charges was important ‘so that customers 
are not ripped off’ and that ‘a 2% a year charge just to keep your pension invested and to 
have access to it would take away much of the investment return and be a terrible deal for 
customers’. Lib Dem Lord Mike German asked the minister: ‘My Lords, at all stages between 
the pension saver’s pocket, the investment and back again, there are hidden charges and 
fees. Does my noble Lord agree that there should be transparency for pension savers and 
they should know what the hidden fees and charges are?’ Lord Freud responded by saying: 
‘We already have the power to limit or ban decumulation charges and if we see that 
providers are charging excessive fees, we will not hesitate to act’.289 
The Which? report published in July 2015 renewed the consumer organisation’s support for 
a charge cap. It said it wanted the Government and FCA to work with the industry to 
simplify charges and to introduce a charge cap for default drawdown products. 
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Again there was industry resistence to this proposal. Tom McPhail disagreed with a cost cap, 
saying that it would lead to savers becoming disengaged with their money. He said: ‘The 
only sustainable answer is that we have a transparently competitive retirement market 
where informed investors shop around for the solutions which will suit them best. 
Drawdown isn't just about the price, it is also about putting investors in control of their 
money and giving them access to online tools and calculators to help them manage their 
money effectively. The risk with a price-capped “default drawdown” is that investors won't 
be sufficiently aware of the risks they face of investment losses or of drawing their money 
out too quickly. A “default” drawdown risks investors sleepwalking into unexpected 
investment losses. We would like to see the barriers to pension freedoms removed so that 
investors who have shopped around can move their money quickly and cheaply, without 
having to pay unreasonable exit penalties’.290 
The Retirement Planner Inquiry for August 2015 asked advisers whether the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) should intervene and cap charges as recently proposed by Which?. 
The vast majority (68%) said no regulatory intervention was needed, 20% were unsure and 
12% thought it was warranted. A typical comment from an adviser supporting a cap was: 
‘Even at modest charges, if the client wants 5% income, this suggests a return of nearly 8% 
will be needed to maintain capital values. Charges in excess will just decimate the fund’. 
Typical views from cap opponents were: 
 ‘Drawdown advice requirements are extremely varied and individual and therefore 
charges would vary accordingly. It always makes sense to try and look for a simple 
and cost-effective wrapper charge with no add-ons – the more expensive solutions 
will have to become cheaper over time or will disappear, anyway’. 
 ‘Drawdown has never been a cheap product. It is inherently risky and requires a lot 
more work from the provider and adviser than an annuity. In a heavily regulated 
environment, people need to understand that they will have to pay for this. The 
products that provide the best value will dominate the market in the end. Or is 
Which? saying they don’t believe in free market economics?’. 
 I don’t feel regulatory action is required, but I do agree that some of the drawdown 
charges are excessive’.  
 ‘I object to any one person or group defining what is right for others. If a particularly 
wealthy individual with a particularly large fund is happy to pay particularly high 
charges, why shouldn’t he? He may buy an £800 suit as opposed to one from M&S. 
                                                     
290 Quoted in Jenna Towler (2015) Which? calls for FCA crackdown on ‘confusing’ drawdown charges, 
Professional Adviser,  21 July.  
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He may buy a BMW as opposed to a Ford. Individual choice and freedom is 
required’.291 
2.7 Product and provider regulation 
In general terms, product and provider regulation comes under the FCA’s conduct risk 
regime which, in turn, relates to the FCA principle of treating customers fairly.292 The risk 
regime covers three main areas: 
 The way the product is being developed (research, knowing target market, customer 
understanding, risks) 
 The way the product is distributed to customers (training, do advisers understand 
the product that they are selling, are sales materials misleading?), and  
 The way the products are subsequently serviced/administered and monitored 
(service levels, claim rates, are products performing as customers have been led to 
expect). 
The FCA has seen fit to criticise the markets for annuities and structured products on all 
these grounds in recent years. 
In March 2015, the FCA published the Final Report of its Retirement Income Market 
Study.293  This followed a Thematic Review of annuities in February 2014 which found that 
the annuities market was not working well for most consumers.294 The Final Report 
confirmed the FCA’s provisional findings that the annuities market was still not working well 
for consumers. In particular: 
 Many consumers are missing out by not shopping around for an annuity and 
switching providers, and some do not purchase the best annuity for their 
circumstances: for example, those with certain medical conditions or lifestyle factors 
had missed out by not purchasing an enhanced annuity 
 Consumers are deterred from engaging with their options by the length and 
complexity of wake-up packs,295 or because they do not believe the sums involved 
make shopping around worthwhile 
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 Consumers’ tendency to buy products from their existing provider weakens 
competitive discipline on incumbent firms and makes it harder for challenger firms 
to attract a critical mass of customers 
 Consumers are highly sensitive to how options are presented to them. Savers 
reaching retirement will face a landscape that is more complex and will need support 
in making the right choices.  
The FCA’s solutions are: 
 To require firms to provide an annuity quotation ranking so that consumers can 
easily identify if they could be getting a better deal by shopping around 
 To require firms to redesign their wake-up packs and to consider including 
signposting letters and standardised pensions statements, before trialing them on 
consumers 
 In the longer term, the creation of a pensions dashboard which will allow consumers 
to see all their pension pots in one place.296 
Although the FCA said that its recommendations had received ‘considerable support’ from 
industry, some in the industry were disappointed. For example, Malcolm McLean, senior 
consultant at Barnett Waddingham, said: ‘Most disappointing of all is the pace at which 
change in a market, so clearly in need of change, is drifting along. The FCA plans to consider 
all this further and to run another customer survey as part of a wider review of its rules in 
the pension and retirement area later in the summer. It will probably be another year at 
least before the remedies kick in, making it eight years since the regulatory probe of the 
market began. Both the FCA and its predecessors have shown a distinct lack of appetite for 
decisive action in relation to annuities. And as far as I can see from this latest lengthy report, 
no sanctions appear to be being proposed against those providers whom the FCA had 
investigated and found evidence of poor practice, particularly where providers actively 
discouraged people from taking up enhanced annuity products, if not widespread 
misselling’.297 
In March 2015, the FCA published its Thematic Review of Structured Products.298 Structured 
products are ‘securities whose cash flow characteristics depend upon one or more indices or 
that have embedded forwards or options or securities where an investor's investment 
return and the issuer's payment obligations are contingent on, or highly sensitive to, 
changes in the value of underlying assets, indices, interest rates or cash flows’.299 Many 
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structured products involve guarantees. Examples are: capital-protected accounts which are 
used as a savings alternative to deposit accounts; and capital-at-risk products which are 
used as investment alternatives to shares or bonds. The FCA had serious concerns about the 
complexity and value of these products. 
The FCA found that retail customers generally struggle to understand the complex features 
common to many structured products and they find it difficult to compare alternatives. As a 
result, they frequently over-estimate the products' potential returns – by almost 10% of the 
assumed investment amount over five years. The FCA has concluded that, not for the first 
time, the structured product market is not working for investors: some firms are falling 
below the standards the FCA expects in their approach to the design, manufacture, 
packaging and distribution of structured products. 
The FCA argues that providers need to define at the product design stage a clear target 
market of end customers and identify what needs these products would serve. Structured 
products should have a reasonable prospect of delivering economic value to customers in 
the target market, which firms must be able to prove via robust stress testing – through to 
the end of their life cycle – as part of the product approval process. Providers also need to 
strengthen the monitoring of their products, including by ensuring distributors – such as 
financial advisers – have enough information about the product to sell it appropriately and 
that each product is being distributed to its identified target market. Firms need to provide 
customers with clear and balanced information on each product and any risks. Products that 
fail this process should not be manufactured nor distributed.  
At the EU level, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is in the process of 
finalising its rules on the implementation of MiFID II which will take effect from January 
2017. Most products which are not plain vanilla shares, bonds or UCITS funds300 will be 
classified as 'complex' products, since they have a ‘structure which makes it difficult for 
clients to understand the risks involved’. This means that many of the products that have 
been designed for the UK retirement income market in the new pensions environment will 
be classified as 'complex', since they have been structured as non-UCITS retail schemes 
(NURS). This, in turn, will mean that non-advised clients must take an ‘appropriateness test’ 
each time they purchase a NURS product.301 The extent of the appropriateness test will 
depend on the complexity of the product’s underlying investments, but, in all cases, product 
providers would be responsible for assessing the knowledge and experience of individual 
retail customers before they are able to invest in the product. Product designers have used 
the non-UCITS route (a) to enable greater diversification than can be achieved by using 
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UCITs and (b) because certain asset classes, such as property, cannot be invested in via 
UCITS.302  
Some feel that the drawdown market could soon attract the attention of the FCA in the 
same way that the markets for annuities and structured products have. For example, Holly 
Mackay, founder of The Platforum and Boring Money, believes that providers need to 
simplify drawdown charges or the regulator will intervene. She said she found it impossible 
to compare the cost of drawdown of different providers because of the variety of charging 
structures and types of fees. Further, her recent consumer research confirmed levels of 
engagement and understanding of retirement products were still low and fuelling the 
problem was the opaqueness of pricing of retirement products. She said if providers fail to 
act to streamline their charges soon the FCA will step in and force them to do so, leaving no 
further ‘wiggle room’: ‘There is a real challenge here for drawdown providers: if they don't 
make [charges] clear, what we will see is what happened in the platform pricing arena 
where the regulator came and [intervened]’.303  
2.8 How to deal with stranded pots 
There is a final issue that will be covered briefly in the Chapter and that is what happens 
when people move jobs. Should the pension pot stay in the leaving scheme, or should it 
follow the member to the member’s new scheme, or should it move to an aggregator 
scheme?  Or should there be another type of solution altogether? 
In Australia, scheme members tend to stay with the same scheme when they move jobs. In 
other words, the scheme follows the member: the member has one pot which they take 
with them when they change jobs. The same would hold for SAFE retirement plans in the 
US.304 By contrast, the UK second pillar pension system is a workplace-based system, with 
schemes typically set up by individual employers, although in a small number of cases, they 
are established on an industry-wide basis, such as the Universities Superannuation Scheme. 
This means that in most cases, people have to decide what happens to their accumulated 
pension pot when they change employers. The default is to do nothing and leave the pot 
where it is (if the scheme agrees to this). The pot then becomes known as a stranded pot. If 
people move jobs many times over their career – and the average is 10 or 11 times – then 
they could end up with a large number of stranded pots. This is not only administratively 
inconvenient, there is the real risk that people could lose track of all their pots and, equally 
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possible, schemes could lose track of their deferred members, which is likely to happen if 
people do not inform their previous schemes when they change address. 
A number of solutions have been proposed for dealing with this problem. 
The first is pot-follows-member. In this case, the pot, if it is below a certain size (£10,000), 
automatically moves to the member’s new scheme when he or she changes job. If it is 
above this size, the member has to specifically ask for the pot to be moved, unless the 
leaving scheme insists that the member takes their entire pot with them.  The size threshold 
is intended to deal with liquidity issues in the scheme. When someone moves, assets have 
to be sold and the cash value of the pot is transferred – it is rare for in specie transfers to 
take place. Schemes do not want to be in the position of having to sell illiquid assets to meet 
these transfers. They would prefer to do so with liquid assets which typically have lower 
returns than illiquid assets. So two of the key problems with pot-follows-member are 
switching costs and lower overall investment returns. If someone changes jobs many times, 
these two factors can materially reduce the value of the pension pot at retirement.   
The second solution is the aggregator model. In this case, when someone changes jobs, their 
pot is automatically transferred to an aggregator fund which collects all the stranded pots 
into a single fund. A small number of funds would be authorised to offer this service. This 
has the benefit of introducing significant scale economies by consolidating assets in a small  
number of large funds, gradually moving assets away from the long tail of 200,000 mostly 
very small schemes. The aggregator funds would also benefit from good governance and 
institutional investment management if they were set up along the same lines as the 
National Employment Savings Trust (NEST).305 Further, the switching costs would be lower 
than under pot-follows-member, since only the assets accrued in the ceding scheme need to 
be transferred when the member changes jobs, not the total assets accrued since the 
member started employment, as happens with pot-follows-member. There would be a 
default fund for those who make no active investment choice. A criticism of this model is 
that the member is unlikely to feel particularly engaged with this type of arrangement. 
However, the same criticism applies to the entire auto-enrolment process. 
The third solution is the Australian solution of scheme-follows-the-member or what is also 
known as one-member, one-scheme. The employer pays contributions into the employee’s 
chosen scheme which follows the member when they change jobs. This approach deals with 
the problems of switching costs and potentially lower returns. But it has the administrative 
inconvenience of requiring the employer to set up a direct debit for every employee’s 
scheme. With a scheme run by the employer, the employer only needs to make a single 
payment covering all employees. The solution to this is to have a central clearing house into 
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which the employer makes a single payment which is then allocated to each employee’s 
scheme.  
The one-member, one-scheme approach has been promoted by a number of industry 
practitioners, in particular Tom McPhail and John Lawson, head of pensions policy at Aviva. 
Mr McPhail argues: ‘With the one-member, one-scheme approach, whenever you change 
jobs, you can pick up the pension and take it with you and the new employer can pay into 
that scheme. This would bring a sense of continuity for the member and the default position 
should not be to keep moving money around’. 
In August 2013, the then Pensions Minister Steve Webb invited McPhail and Lawson to 
contact the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) to canvas support for the proposal. The 
CBI, while not fully endorsing the concept, accepted that that it was better for each saver to 
have a single well-managed pot.306 
The technology available to execute transfers has improved significantly in recent years as a 
result of the introduction of Origo, an open source, e-commerce service established on a 
not-for-profit basis by 12 life and pension companies at the instigation of the ABI. Origo 
built ‘Options’ which does pensions transfers and reduced the transfer time from 4 months 
to 9 days. Version 1 does pensions-to-annuities transfers (via the OMO). Version 2 does 
pension transfers in accumulation (e.g., from Aviva’s to Prudential’s platform).  
Nevertheless, this system has been criticised because the life companies involved still make 
it hard for consumers to switch to a new provider, according to Ben Cocks of Altus Business 
Systems. This is because the new provider has to get the approval of the life offices to 
participate in the service and pay the fees they demand. In response to this, the Tax 
Incentivised Savings Association and the UK Funds Market Practice Group (which sets the 
ISO-based open technical standards for UK financial services) have established an open 
transfer framework that deals with all the technical and legal aspects of transfers. Different 
technology companies can then offer compatible transfer services and all participating 
companies can have an equal say in how the service operates. This approach has been used 
in the ISA transfer market and has increased the level of competition between ISA providers 
considerably. However, Origo and the life offices have so far refused to allow open transfers 
for pensions, despite the Department for Work and Pensions allowing the use of open 
standards for automatic pension transfers.307  
In October 2015, the Pensions Minister, Ros Altmann, announced that legislation dealing 
with stranded pots would be delayed in order to allow schemes to deal with other pressing 
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issues, such as the completion of auto-enrolment and the introduction of both ‘freedom and 
choice’ in April 2015 and the new single-tier state pension in April 2016. 
2.9 Feedback from our interviews and responses to the consultation paper 
2.9.1 Feedback from our interviews 
2.9.1.1 Employers and consultants 
In our meetings with employers and their consultants, we discussed a broad range of issues 
concerning the products and services relevant for scheme members which we summarise 
under the following headings.  
What products/services might good employers be offering? 
Good employers will be looking for something that protects against the longevity risk of 
their former employees. 
This does not necessarily have to be a separate annuity – it could be a drawdown product 
that has a trigger point or crash barrier so that if the fund falls below a certain level this 
triggers automatic annuitisation. The idea would be to default DC members in: they do not 
have to actively join and could opt out at any stage. If the fund was falling due to market 
conditions, members might be offered the choice of annuitising or stopping/reducing 
withdrawals for a period.  
Employers are likely to be influenced by what their AE provider offers, so, as in the US, the 
market will be provider-led. Employers considering making drawdown available will want a 
fire wall between the employer and the provider, ensuring liability is transferred and there 
is no come-back for employers if things do not work out as well as members hoped. 
Employers have not yet come to a firm conclusion about whether their drawdown offering 
should be a retail solution or some sort of straight-through accumulation-to-decumulation 
process, involving scheme drawdown. The BT scheme, for example, is moving members into 
SIPPs for drawdown. This is a retail product, although the employer has negotiated the 
terms. So, employers can use their clout to negotiate better terms with one or more 
providers, which is what they do with other products made available through the workplace, 
e.g., insurance. 
Despite the lack of major launches, many respondents agreed on the merits of scheme 
drawdown. One said: ‘Scheme pensions are more efficient in payment. Scheme drawdown 
is a scheme pension without pooling. It provides better governance and economies of scale 
but doesn’t give individuals the chance to engage to the same degree’. Another said: ‘The 
governance of scheme drawdown is crucial and must mirror that of accumulation. If the 
Grand old Duke of York marched his men to the top of the hill, he should march them down 
again’. And a third added: ‘Scheme drawdown’s big advantage is that it’s done within a 
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pension fund, so it’s not affected by regulatory capital requirements, which can add 1.5% to 
the cost, nor does it get into the grey area round advice – which is the case if a provider 
offers its retail drawdown product – usually a SIPP – to a member of a DC trust-based 
scheme. The chances are that this would – or certainly could – constitute regulated advice 
under FCA rules’. 
The potential for scheme drawdown to offer lower charges than retail products was 
considered crucial: 
 ‘If drawdown costs more than 1%, it won’t work. End of’. 
 ‘Scheme decumulation is likely to be the cost for accumulation plus up to 0.25% for 
added functionality, such as withdrawals. Retail decumulation total costs can be 
anything from 2% to 4%’. 
 ‘Retail advice adds 1% to the price. That might be OK for a one-off transaction, but 
what if it’s a drawdown strategy with an additional 1% for advice each year?’ 
Another lesson from the US is that charges are regulated when members of 401k schemes 
roll-over into their provider’s IRA.  
What are the risks with drawdown? 
We received the following comments: 
 ‘Drawdown is the most complicated of the choices that the employer/trustee might 
offer – there is a need to consider where to invest and how fast to draw down. The 
main risk with drawdown is that the income might have to be reduced. It is 
important for schemes to suggest a ‘safe’ level of withdrawal’. 
 ‘However, it is not the trustees’ responsibility to set the withdrawal rate – this would 
be too risky’. 
 ‘Whatever the withdrawal rate suggested, it must be reviewed regularly – this 
cannot be set and forget – remember what happened with endowment mortgages’. 
 ‘It is crucial to manage the rate because, left to their own devices, individuals will 
panic if there is a market crash and cash out at the bottom of the market’ (called 
composure risk by one participant). 
 ‘Drawdown investment strategies also need to match the annuity rate plus an 
additional percentage to account for the absence of the mortality cross-subsidy’. 
  ‘Without regulated advice, people will find it difficult to manage multiple pots’. 
 ‘One of the biggest risks is the interaction with means-tested benefits – this is an 
area that needs a massive amount of attention’. 
What are the risks with annuities? 
Longevity risk is the biggest concern for consultants. Deferred annuities are currently non-
existent. Sales of immediate annuities have collapsed – historically most people annuitised 
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by age 75. Pricing an annuity for someone who is still healthy at age 85 will look like poor 
value to the annuitant – insurers would expect them to live an additional 12 years on 
average. While it is easier to price a deferred annuity at age 65, consultants are not 
expecting many people will want to buy one – even if the product existed – because they 
would fear that they would ‘lose’ the purchase price if they died earlier. 
Insurers really do not like selling to people in their 80s because of cognitive decline. 
What will providers do?  
In general, all providers are very keen to offer drawdown because this is when the DC pot is 
at its largest, so will provide a good fee income. Providers in the AE market will be keen to 
retain these assets.  
Providers are likely to favour the sale of retail drawdown to retiring members – but if a 
major competitor offers scheme drawdown and this is seen to be better value for money, 
then they will do this too.  
Some providers are developing a 10-year investment/drawdown period with an annuity 
built in, although some consultants think 80-85 is too late to annuitise, preferring age 75 
(NEST is suggesting 85).308 
What are consultants doing? 
Most consultants are focusing only on advising on drawdown. Annuitisation is too far into 
the future to second-guess what the market for later life annuities will look like: ‘There’s no 
point in designing a product today that tries to second-guess what a 65-year-old will need at 
age 75+. There will be a massive differential where medical underwriting is used at older 
ages – far more significant than at the point of retirement’.  
Some consultants that we talked to are advising employers with single-trust schemes. 
Previously, they would have put in place a third-party annuity bureau service. Now they are 
looking at other alternatives, but they do not want to retain the responsibility/liability and 
do not want to run any alternative themselves. 
One consultant is working on a design for drawdown to last 30 years, i.e., a ‘notional income 
for life’ product. They will use a master trust and manage the transition from accumulation 
to decumulation, so the investment strategy is straight-through. This is important for the 
stability of the strategy, but also very important because it avoids out-of-market risk. Where 
a DC member buys a retail drawdown plan, it would be necessary to cash out of the 
accumulation scheme and reinvest in the new product. The plan is to match the investment 
strategy of the drawdown scheme with the tail end of the default accumulation fund.   
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The same consultant believes that, of the drawdown funds offered by providers, very few 
are suitable. Income needs to be reasonably stable, but not guaranteed – i.e., needs to 
reflect the actual experience of the fund – so, say, a 4% of original pot size set-and-forget 
model is flawed. If people want a guaranteed stable income, they need an annuity. 
This consultant also said that adequacy is an important issue. If people cannot afford to 
retire, they need to consider working longer and possibly contributing longer. The problem 
is that members will not know 5 years out when exactly they will retire, so planning is very 
tricky for both the employee and the employer. 
Scheme defaults  
Many employers are uncomfortable with the idea of scheme defaults. While they are 
concerned about the risks facing members, they appear to be equally concerned about their 
own risk/liability. In particular, they are concerned that anything they do would be 
perceived as advice by members. So not only are employers concerned about scheme 
drawdown, they would even be reluctant to support annuitisation. They realise that if things 
go wrong, ex-employees will be knocking on their door first. 
2.9.1.2 Providers and investment managers 
Our discussions with providers and investment managers is summarised here under the 
following headings. 
What about the quality assurance of products offered via, say, a decision tree? 
There was support for having the products listed in the decision tree classified as safe 
arbour products. This means that any adviser recommending these products cannot 
subsequently be sued for poor advice, after having determined their suitability for the 
client. So far the FCA has been reluctant to grant safe harbour status to UK investments, 
unlike the US. We were told: ‘It is important that we try and get the FCA to approve both 
the decision tree and the default options at the end of the decision tree even if they are 
only the least worst options’.  
But where do we set the bar for the products listed in the decision tree? Should the 
products that are listed be the ‘best’ or should they be just ‘very good’ or ‘adequate’? A 
view offered to us is that ‘they should be reasonable options, not detrimental, but not 
necessarily optimal, but not a bad decision. They should be “good enough”’. 
However, any safe harbour products need to be carefully regulated. There needs to be a 
mechanism to ensure these products are indeed ‘good enough’, since there could be no 
Financial Ombudsman Service  referrals with safe harbour products (if their suitability for 
clients had been assessed). 
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Advisers, on the other hand, tend to suggest that everyone needs a perfect tailor-made 
solution. However, we were told that this would be an example of the case where ‘the best 
is the enemy of the good’ – and, in any event, would be too expensive for most people.  
It was also pointed out that, while competition can be good, it can lead to a proliferation of 
essentially identical products which are marketed as being different. This leads to customer 
confusion.   
What investment strategies are appropriate in the new pensions regime? 
This turned out to be a difficult question to answer because it was not clear at the time of 
the interviews how consumers would behave following the introduction of ‘freedom and 
choice’.  
Many of the people we interviewed believed that ‘lifestyle strategies and even TDFs are now 
out of date, but new investment strategies still need to deliver returns, although with 
reduced volatility. However, we will need to observe customer experience in decumulation 
before redesigning de-risking glide paths’. 
It remains the case that diversification is the only low-cost way to reduce volatility. Other 
solutions to reduce volatility involve options and other derivatives, but these cost more than 
0.75%.  It was pointed out that a charge cap would reduce the scope to diversify risk and put 
products using derivatives to guarantee returns out of reach. It was also pointed out that 
the process of paying income to members is expensive, much more than the cost of 
collecting contributions. 
In terms of new product design, investment managers and consultants are designing 
drawdown products with long-term (30-year) investment horizons.  These would invest in 
fully liquid funds, so annuitisation could occur at any time, but these managers questioned 
whether there was any need to annuitise given the investment horizon. They pointed out 
that annuities were originally designed to last for 10-15 years, not 30.  The success of this 
strategy is predicated on the assumption that an investment-based product can be as 
effective as insurance in terms of hedging longevity risk. 
An example was JP Morgan which was designing a drawdown product with a cap on the 
maximum percentage of the fund that can be withdrawn, adjusted in line with fund 
performance, and a charge of 0.35% plus a cost per withdrawal.  It would probably need to 
be held within a SIPP which would add an additional layer of costs. It would be offered on 
both an advised and non-advised basis.  
What is the future of annuities? 
Insurers tended to argue that the value of annuities are now underappreciated due to 
negative norming. It was agreed that the money’s worth of annuities was high – and this 
was confirmed by the FCA’s own research in December 2014. Annuities are the only product 
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that can hedge individual longevity risk. It was agreed that there was a need to reinforce the 
value of annuities. This could be helped by rebranding them as a ‘guaranteed income for 
life’ product. 
Some felt it was hard to see how annuities could be sold without advice, due to the 
complexity of the decisions that need to be made: level vs inflation-linked, single life vs joint 
life, standard vs enhanced; the latter needs individual underwriting, but this can now be 
processed quickly and cheaply using the common quotation form (available since 2008).  
However, this view contrasts with those who believe that these issues could be addressed 
using a well-designed decision tree. It was also pointed out that, before the introduction of 
‘freedom and choice’, NEST was going to operate an annuity clearing house using a filtered 
form (married v single, level v indexed) and an algorithm would recommend a particular 
provider, say, Prudential, from a panel of providers.   
Retail v scheme drawdown 
The standard drawdown product is retail. One of the biggest drawdown providers described 
how their company operates. Their main market is in advised drawdown. They also operate 
in the non-advised market (below £100,000) where they offer only ‘safe’ funds plus lots of 
guidance. They explain that if people need a guaranteed income, they should buy an 
annuity. Previously, this was the capped drawdown market, where the cap was a good 
safety net. They find there is difficulty in explaining volatility to customers and the 
consequential risk of overdrawing relative to the performance of the fund. They need to 
explain that the withdrawal rate cannot realistically be more than, say, 4-5%. But, they are 
conscious that another firm can always come along and say it can deliver 6%. 
Charging is problematic: any fixed charge significantly outweighs a percentage charge in the 
£30,000-£100,000 market. Also administration is more intensive for drawdown customers – 
customers usually contact the provider 2-3 times p.a. – far more than under accumulation.  
The same provider was also looking at scheme drawdown, but said it was hard to tell at this 
stage what DC scheme members will do. They said that it was virtually impossible to design 
a default, since there were too many ‘substantial’ minorities wanting different things: 
 Annuity 
 All cash 
 Drawdown 
 Drawdown plus annuity. 
Some providers told us that there was a false distinction between scheme (institutional) and 
retail drawdown in terms of value for money. This is because it is possible to get low-cost 
non-advised drawdown in the retail market at all-in cost of 0.43% (e.g., Fidelity ‘direct to 
customer’) or 0.45% (e.g., Aviva). One provider said: ‘We need to rethink what economies of 
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scale means in a drawdown market. This isn’t about scheme vs. retail; it’s about scale in 
terms of the institution managing the money’. Similarly, an investment manager told us: 
‘Drawdown means an individual account, so it’s not necessarily cheaper to distribute via a 
scheme because of the need for payment into bank account’. However, we wondered how 
different this was from how DB administration operates in the payout stage – DB schemes 
exploit economies of scale and lower costs using a third-party administrator (TPA), for 
example. 
If the client wants advice, this can raise the cost to around 2.5%. For example, MetLife’s 
guaranteed drawdown product costs up to 1.85% to cover the cost of the guarantees and 
the annual management charge, and another 0.5-0.75% for advice. Further, the drawdown 
rate is around 70% of an equivalent single-life annuity. 
We were told that there remain substantial barriers to getting employers to offer scheme 
drawdown:   
 Employers do not want the liability 
 Trustees (in single trust schemes) do not want the liability 
 There is also lack of clarity about regulation and uncertainty over liability for 
providers. 
2.9.1.3 Trade unions 
A panel of trade unionists and TUC officials (together with two representatives from 
consumer organisations) met with us on 12 January 2015 to address the following 
questions. 
Will longevity insurance remain an essential component of decumulation and if so why?  
This question elicited the following responses: 
 ‘People are generally positive about longevity insurance, but there is a limit to what 
they will pay for it’ 
 ‘What people really want from a pension is a secure and predictable income. I have 
never come across any trade union members complaining they do not have 
sufficient flexibility from a DB pension. Unless there is some kind of longevity 
protection, it is no longer a pension’ 
 ‘Annuity products are really good. But the market has ruined them. It is the way they 
sold them and the way they gamed them. The public have got this perception that 
they are terrible’ 
 ‘If you ask people if they want an annuity they say no. If you don’t call it an annuity, 
but instead call it “income for life”, then this is attractive’ 
 ‘There is still going to be a role for longevity insurance, but much latter. The aim 
should be to start an annuity at 75, 80, or 85 at the latest. The risk of income 
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drawdown is that people will leave the money invested. There is the issue of 
investment risk in the first five years or so after retirement’ 
 ‘We are expecting individuals to make rational decisions about different annuities, 
but it would be much better if schemes could do it. People want someone on their 
side making regular payments until they die. It makes sense for schemes to do it’ 
 ‘There remains the problem of people’s reticence to committing large amounts of 
money to something they may not benefit from. My grandmother resisted buying a 
new settee at 75 because she felt she wouldn’t get use out of it. I would worry that 
way of thinking would be amplified with committing large sums to buying an annuity 
that they think they won’t benefit from for very long. Perhaps it would be better if 
there was a way of gradually buying a longevity product over time’ 
 ‘Denmark with ATP has just one provider. Politically that is very hard to replicate in 
the UK’. 
What are your views on defaults? 
We asked: ‘Can you have a single default option?’. Participants accepted that there had to 
be a ‘default process’ which would work along the following lines: ‘from what we know 
about you, this is what we are going to do as a default. If you want to do something 
different, you need to opt out’. One participant said it would have to be pot-size related. 
Another said: ‘It would also need to be age-related. At the moment for many people with 
DC pots, these represent a small proportion of their pension saving. That will change over 
time. A solution that works for those approaching retirement now is not a solution that 
works in 20 or 30 years’ time. We need to be mindful that 90% of people will do nothing and 
take the default route. Yet £20,000 saved by a low earner can be a higher proportion of 
their pension savings than £100,000 is for high earners. Defaults have to be mindful of that’. 
Another participant took a different view on the default: ‘I am listening to this – is it not the 
case that an actual default, in the world we regrettably find ourselves in, is that the money 
remains invested? I do not think there can be a default to providing income. If the member 
does not make a decision, it remains invested until a member makes a decision. The reason 
people buy level annuities is that people do not want to buy annuities at all. They didn’t 
think they provided value’. 
Another participant (from a consumer organisation) commented: ‘If you default them into a 
product (such as drawdown), you are right squarely in the area of regulated financial advice. 
I think scheme trustees will be very frightened of doing that. They can do that and get 
regulated. I just think they will not want to be. The key problem is people who take the 
money and run because they do not know what else to do’. The previous speaker 
responded: ‘If you default into an annuity, you almost guarantee that people will opt out 
and just take the money’. The first speaker replied: ‘You should only default into an annuity 
once they get the benefits of longevity pooling (at age 75, 80, or 85 whatever). Until then 
you should stay invested so the pot has the chance to grow’. 
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2.9.2 Responses to the consultation paper 
We summarise the responses to Questions 3-21 in the consultation paper. 
3. (a) Do you expect products with longevity insurance (e.g., a lifetime annuity) to 
remain an essential component of a well-designed retirement programme? 
All respondents agreed that some form of longevity insurance would be needed at some 
point in retirement. However, there was a diversity of opinion about how this should be 
achieved. The two most commonly suggested options were to purchase an annuity later in 
retirement or to purchase a deferred annuity, possibly via the payment of regular 
premiums. Product innovation would be needed to deliver such products in practice. 
3. (b) How should those individuals who continue to buy lifetime annuities be assisted to 
obtain the best value products for their circumstances?  
A quarter of respondents suggested explicitly that it would be necessary to have a 
combination of approaches to ensure that individuals who choose to buy annuities get value 
for money and purchase appropriate products. The range of suggestions from other 
respondents also suggested that no single option would be adequate. So to help individuals 
get best value from annuities, they would need a mixture of nudges, better education, 
better market provision and better advice/guidance. 
3. (c) If individuals do not purchase lifetime annuities, how does an individual hedge 
their longevity risk in retirement? 
Most respondents suggested that new products, typically some form of deferred annuity, 
would be necessary to help individuals hedge longevity risk if those individuals chose not to 
buy a conventional annuity at retirement. Without some form of annuity product, the main 
alternatives suggested were additional saving (and hence under-consumption) and/or 
reliance on family support.  
4. (a) Where annuities are purchased later in retirement, what are the most effective 
and efficient products for providing income in the period between retirement and the age at 
which the longevity insurance comes into effect? (b) Should such products have a maximum 
recommended level of income withdrawal? (c) If so, how should that level of income be 
determined?  
There was considerable agreement that drawdown was appropriate in the early period of 
retirement, with two-thirds saying this explicitly and the remainder suggesting approaches 
very similar to drawdown. Several suggested that drawdown products should or could have 
guarantees. There was also strong support for recommendations or guidance on the 
maximum that should be drawn down each year. Very few responses provided suggestions 
for how to calculate this maximum. There was little support for a compulsory maximum 
level of income drawdown. 
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5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of scheme drawdown (i.e., where the 
scheme provides an income to the retired member prior to the purchase of an annuity)? 
There were a variety of responses to this question and very few respondents were certain 
whether the advantages outweighed the disadvanges. Respondents were clear that scheme 
drawdown might have the advantages of lowering costs through economies of scale and 
providing better governance. However, economies of scale might be absent for small 
schemes which would find it difficult to cater for the diverse needs of different members. 
While improved governance would be an advantage for members, some schemes might 
struggle to take on the additional responsibility of looking after funds in the drawdown 
phase, and so this was potentially a disadvantage for the trustees, especially since the 
regulatory framework for this is not sufficiently clear. 
6. (a) Should decumulation default products provided by, say, large-scale master trusts, 
be subject to the same trustee-based governance and quality standards that apply to the 
accumulation default fund?  (b) Where decumulation products are offered by contract-based 
schemes, should they be included in the requirements for the new Independent Governance 
Committees to provide governance and quality standards and to assess value for money? 
Eighty-two per cent of responses accepted the principle of a default decumulation product, 
while 76% thought that the decumulation phase should be governed by the same 
governance standards in master trusts that apply to the accumulation default fund and 
should be overseen by IGCs in contract-based schemes. But a significant minority were 
unhappy with defaults, despite the fact that people were free to opt out of a default, and 
thought that IGCs were not appropriate, preferring instead to rely on existing FCA rules. 
7. (a) What could be the typical total expense ratio (TER) for a default drawdown 
product provided by a large-scale master trust?  (b) How might this TER compare with 
individual drawdown products sold in the retail market?  (c) Can you give any examples of 
TERs for retail drawdown products? 
Very few respondents were prepared to say what a typical total expense ratio should be for 
a default drawdown product. However, one respondent suggested that the TER should be 
no more than than 0.5 per cent, while another suggested it should be equal to accumulation 
TER plus 0.25 per cent. The small number of responses to this question noted that it is 
difficult to answer while new products are still being developed. Default products should be 
cheaper than retail products, but retail products, it was noted, can be expensive. 
8. (a) Should scheme default drawdown products be subject to the charge cap? (b) 
Should this be the same as for accumulation (i.e. 0.75%) or is there a case for a higher cap?  
If higher please explain why and what the difference might be? 
Sixty-three per cent of responses were against a charge cap on scheme default drawdown 
products, at least in the short run. 
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9. Retail drawdown products will be sold via regulated advice and they will be 
purchased via non-advice (execution-only). Is there a case for: (a) Higher quality controls and 
consumer protection in relation to risk and costs? Explain;  (b) Making retail products subject 
to a charge cap? Explain. 
Overwhelmingly, there was support for higher quality controls on sales of retail drawdown 
products, with 65 per cent of responses favouring this. However, there was virtually no 
support for a charge cap on retail drawdown products, on the grounds that it would stifle 
innovation, with two-thirds being explicitly against a cap. 
10.  What is the optimal investment strategy in scheme drawdown prior to the 
introduction of longevity insurance? 
The strongest theme from responses to this question was that the investment strategy in 
scheme drawdown prior to the purchase of longevity insurance should be fairly cautious, 
namely to provide growth of the fund while reducing risk, with 43 per cent explicitly naming 
this as the appropriate strategy. However, 29 per cent of respondents noted that individuals 
have different needs and so there was no single strategy that would be appropriate for all 
individuals. 
11.  What are the advantages and disadvantages of institutional annuitisation (i.e., 
where annuities are provided on a bulk basis either by the scheme (self annuitisation) or by 
an insurance company, rather on a retail basis as currently)? 
Institutional annuitisation has the obvious advantage of scale and potentially the 
disadvantage of not being suitable for the individual, if not individually underwritten.  
Another disadvantage was that the scheme would be creating DB-like liabilities and the 
question was raised about who would ultimately underwrite these liabilities (employer, PPF 
or state) if the scheme underestimated the longevity and investment risks. Some 
respondents were uncertain whether the advantages outweighed the disadvantages and 
overall there was no clear majority one way or the other. 
12.  Could institutional annuitisation deal with the individual underwriting of annuities 
and still encourage competition from providers in the open market to maximise consumer 
outcomes (e.g., in the case where a retired member has a medical condition which reduces 
their life expectancy)? 
The overwhelming majority of responses thought that institutional annuitisation could deal 
with individual underwriting and still encourage competition from providers. 
13.  (a) Would a market for advanced life deferred annuities be viable? (b) What is the 
likely demand for advanced life deferred annuities? 
Sixty per cent of respondents thought that there could be a market for advanced life 
deferred annuities, but it is clear that there would be significant problems to be overcome 
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to achieve this. To make the product more attractive, some respondents suggested it could 
be paid for in instalments. 
14.  Is there likely to be demand for inflation protection? 
There was virtually unanimous support for the idea of inflation protection, but respondents 
doubted whether individuals would pay the high price needed to buy it. 
15.  What are your views on the proposals by HM Treasury to allow annuities to have 
more flexible payment terms by: (a) allowing lifetime annuities to decrease, (b) allowing 
lump sums to be taken from lifetime annuities, (c) removing the ten-year guarantee period 
for guaranteed annuities, (d) allowing payments from guaranteed annuities to be paid to 
beneficiaries as a lump sum, where they are under £30,000? 
There was a clear majority in favour of some or all of these options to increase the flexibility 
of annuities’ payment terms, with 68 per cent of responses supporting at least one of the 
options. But many respondents also raised significant concerns that such products would 
increase complexity and potentially confuse customers: in addition to this, many of the 
suggested products would only be suitable for a small component of the market. So, at best, 
one would say that there was qualified support. 
16.  What are your views on U-shaped or J-shaped annuities? 
There were mixed views on the provision of U- or J-shaped annuities, with responses fairly 
evenly divided between those for and those against. A particular issued raised was where 
the minimum of the U should be. It was also suggested that these more complicated income 
streams could be achieved by more straightforward mixtures of drawdown and 
annuitisation. 
17.  Should DC retirement products and decumulation strategies be linked to the single 
tier state pension? If so, how? 
Respondents disagreed on whether retirement products should be linked to the state 
pension. While many thought that it was a good idea in principle, there were issues about 
complexity of pensions in practice, which might make linking the two infeasible. 
18.  What other retirement products do you expect to become available? Please provide 
details if possible. 
A range of products were suggested, including new (flexible) annuity products and new 
(guaranteed) drawdown products. Products which combined more basic products were also 
suggested,  such as those combining drawdown and annuities. Several responses suggested 
products involving long-term care assurance. 
19.  Is there a case for designating certain retirement products as ‘safe harbour’ 
products? Explain. 
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There was a small majority of respondents in favour of designating retirement products as 
safe harbour products, but there were strong views both for and against. 
20.  Following the impact of the Budget 2014 tax changes on annuity providers, do you 
have any concerns about supply-side contraction or other developments in the annuity 
market that might make it less competitive?  
Respondents were unanimous that the market would probably get smaller and less 
competitive as a result of the 2014 Budget changes. 
21. (a) What is the best way to deal with stranded pots? Explain. (b) Two approaches 
have been put forward to date: ‘aggregator’ and ‘pot-follows-member’. Do you have 
preference for one over the other? Explain. (c) Would ‘scheme-follows-member’ be feasible? 
Explain. 
The majority of responses were in favour of pot-follows-member to deal with stranded pots, 
although 25 per cent favoured aggregation (with a limited number of aggregators). An 
alternative was a central clearing house or virtual or notional aggregation via a central 
database. There was little support for scheme-follows-member: a number of respondents 
said the issue of costs to employers was believed to be so great that it was considered 
infeasible, while another said that given the recent changes it is too late to be considering 
this. 
2.10 Analysis and Recommendations 
2.10.1 Analysis 
As we stated at the beginning of this Chapter, an effective and efficient retirement income 
plan in the new world of ‘freedom and choice’ will be one that implements a retirement 
financial strategy – comprising an investment strategy, a withdrawal strategy, and a 
longevity insurance strategy – using products that offer: 
 Accessibility – the degree of flexibility to withdraw funds on an ad hoc basis 
 Inflation protection either directly or via investment performance, with minimal 
involvement by individuals who do not want to manage the investment risk 
 Longevity insurance 
which are combined together in an arrangement that:  
 Benefits from institutional design, governance, and pricing 
 Is simple to understand, transparent and low-cost 
 Requires minimal consumer engagement 
 Benefits from a low-cost delivery system. 
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Longevity insurance needs to be a key component of any good retirement income solution. 
Indeed, we believe that any retirement income plan that does not involve longevity 
insurance is seriously flawed, since it fails to achieve a pension scheme’s primary goal of 
providing retirement income security for as long as the scheme member lives.  
2.10.1.1 The problems with existing products and their providers 
Since no single product offers accessibility, inflation protection and longevity insurance, a 
well-designed retirement income plan needs to involve an appropriate combination of 
annuity and drawdown products.  
Annuities and drawdown have different advantages and disadvantages which can be 
summarised as follows: 
 Standard annuities give higher more stable (life-long) income than drawdown, but 
no flexibility or death benefits. However, Wadsworth et al. (2001) argue that 
investment-linked annuities fully hedge longevity risk, while also benefiting from 
both the mortality premium and higher average returns than fixed annuities. Tom 
Boardman (2006) shows how death benefits can be built into annuities.309 
 Drawdown gives more volatile incomes, greater flexibility and death benefits, but no 
longevity insurance. While people might well like the flexibility of drawdown, this 
flexibility comes at a cost, either in terms of higher charges or lower average 
incomes compared with an annuity. Yet it appears to be a cost that people are 
prepared to pay. According to Rowena Griffiths, director at Female Financial 
Management: ‘If the product suits their needs, they tend to be happy to pay the 
charge’.310 In addition, people also like the idea of guarantees on capital or income 
or both. They also appear to be prepared to pay heavily for these. Yet products with 
guarantees could be up to twice as expensive as products without guarantees.311 
The 2014 Budget changed the balance away from annuities in favour of drawdown 
products. This change in balance was reinforced by the announcement on 29 September 
2014 ending the 55% tax charge312 on the residual pension fund when the member dies 
after 6 April 2015. This made pensions wealth inheritable if held in a drawdown product, but 
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not in an annuity. Sales of annuities have more than halved since the Budget 
announcement. The inheritability of pension wealth is being emphasised at the expense of 
the longevity insurance that a pension is intended to provide. 
This is potentially damaging for the sustainability of income at higher ages, since if people 
rely only on drawdown, more of them are likely to run out of money before they die than 
leave assets to inherit – recall the average pension pot is £28,000 and can be accessed from 
the age of 55. It also reduces the effectiveness of the annuity product as a longevity risk 
sharing device since it (a) reduces the overall size of the annuity pool and (b) shifts the pool 
towards the select group of voluntary and more healthy annuitants, thereby making them 
more expensive.313 
Further, annuities are either being publicly trashed or treated as just another, not especially 
good value product along with a number of others that might be considered for inclusion in 
a retirement financial strategy, without mentioning, or if mentioned underplaying, their 
unique ability to hedge longevity risk. 
Typical are the following media comments: 
 ‘Annuities stink. That is the general message from consumer groups, regulators and 
the UK Government, which last year legislated to remove the de facto obligation on 
retirees to use their pension savings to buy one’.314 
 ‘One of the great benefits of the new pension freedoms is that they make it easier 
for savers to take an income from their retirement fund without buying an annuity. 
While an annuity pays a guaranteed income for life, it does so at the cost of 
surrendering your savings at the outset; when you die, there is nothing to pass on to 
your family. The alternative offered by the new freedoms is to retain ownership of 
your pension savings but draw an income from them, either by taking income from 
investments, such as dividends, or withdrawing some of the capital. Either way, 
there should be money left to pass on to your family’.315  
While, in the second of these comments, the longevity risk feature of annuities is mentioned 
in passing, it is downplayed in favour of the inheritability of the pension pot. It’s rather like a 
commercial aircraft designer who pays little attention to landing the plane safely at the end 
of the journey on the grounds that such a small proportion of the total journey time is 
devoted to landing that it can be ignored. It’s right at the end any way and the inflight 
experience is much more important. 
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Even more significantly, the same sort of dismissive comments about annuities are being 
made by senior people in the investment management industry, which, for the first time in 
history, is able to compete unrestrictedly with the insurance industry to manage retirement 
assets. Typical are these comments by Martin Gilbert, chief executive and co-founder of 
Aberdeen Asset Management writing in the Financial Times (emphasis added): ‘For the first 
time, individual investors have full and free access to their pension pots rather than being 
compelled to use the bulk of those funds to buy an annuity’.316 
Any close observer of the pensions industry will be aware of the long-standing running 
battle between the investment management industry and the life assurance industry to 
manage pension scheme members’ assets. The situation used to be clearcut: the former 
(which included the investment management divisions of life insurers) ran the money during 
accumulation, while the latter managed the money in decumulation, mainly via life 
annuities, since only authorised and appropriately capitalised insurers are allowed to sell 
annuities in the UK.   
Fund managers have long complained about the lack of a level playing field. Their various 
trade bodies have spent years promoting the merits of drawdown products, claiming that 
this would encourage innovation. Here, for example, is an extract from the report 
commissioned by the European Fund and Asset Management Association in 2009 which 
clearly fails to acknowledge the unique role that annuities play in providing a life-long 
income in retirement:317 
The regulatory framework in Europe should find a reasonable balance 
between satisfying the concerns of policymakers and addressing the needs 
of retirees. Enforcing compulsory conversion of pension savings into 
annuities does not give individuals the level of flexibility needed to choose 
the best approach to suit their circumstances and risk tolerance. This is 
particularly the case given the very different range of retirement income 
likely to be available, ranging from a very strong support from state and/or 
salary-related pension schemes through to greater reliance on a defined-
contributions savings pot. 
Ideally, regulatory frameworks across Europe should support, on equal 
terms, both annuities and other payout solutions. Restrictions on non-
annuity products should be relaxed and pooled, non-pooled and hybrid 
solutions should enjoy equal tax treatment. 
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A more balanced regulatory framework for the payout phase of funded 
pension schemes would spark innovation in the European financial market 
and stimulate the creation of payout products tailored to meet individuals’ 
retirement needs. Competition between providers of payout products 
would also increase, thereby lowering the cost of products. The evidence 
from countries where drawdown plans and other non-pooled solutions are 
not hindered by legislative or tax rules, highlights the benefits of 
innovation and competition. 
Less restrictive rules and regulation towards non-pooled solutions would 
also create incentives for the financial services industry to create a variety 
of standardised pooled, non-pooled and integrated payout products, 
designed especially for retirement. As such pre-packaged solutions are 
likely to include a range of choices with respect to risk attitude and 
preferences regarding the structure of periodic payments, improved 
information requirements, advice and financial education should assist 
individuals in deciding how to invest their accumulated pension savings. In 
addition, appropriate default options should be in place to help individuals 
who cannot or do not want to choose between the available payout 
products. 
If nonetheless compulsion is still favoured, then the upper age limit for 
compulsory annuitisation should be pushed towards 85 in order to achieve 
a right balance between the objectives of securing a sufficient level of 
retirement income and protecting retirees from longevity risk at very old 
ages. This can be achieved by using some part of the accumulated assets 
to buy a deferred annuity starting payments at age 85 or requiring a 
switching of assets into annuities at that age. 
One possible compromise between compulsion and a more liberalised 
market would be only to make pooled solutions mandatory if a basic 
standard of living is not available from other annuity-like sources, such as 
state pension, defined benefit schemes etc. Above that minimum level, 
individuals should be allowed to make a free decision for themselves given 
both that individual circumstances will vary considerable and that it is 
difficult to set regulatory restrictions that do not end up becoming 
burdensome for individuals. 
 
The 2014 Budget has opened up the management of UK retirement assets to all comers. The 
investment management industry claims that consumers will benefit from new products 
which provide higher expected returns and greater flexibility than annuities, Martin Gilbert, 
in the same article in the Financial Times, confirms that: ‘The fund management industry is 
working to develop transparent and attractive investment vehicles to win this important 
new business’. A survey of investment advisers by State Street found that 70% predicted an 
increase in product development involving capital and income guarantees. There was 
178 
 
expected to be, by contrast, very little innovation in annuities, except for U- and J-shaped 
annuities.318  
However, some commentators question whether much innovation has actually taken place. 
Tom McPhail argues: ‘Since the Budget, we have seen development work on hybrid 
retirement income products which use complex investment guarantees and hedging 
strategies. So far we have not seen anything which appears to deliver a better mix of 
guarantees and potential investment returns than simply splitting a retirement fund 
between an annuity for certainty and a drawdown for flexibility’.319 
Another important issue is cost. This is recognised by Martin Gilbert in his FT article: ‘We are 
stewards of other people’s money, with an accountability and responsibility to those 
individual savers to deliver a valuable service at a fair price. Our interests must be aligned 
with the interests of our clients, and transparently so….This aim for transparency is more 
easily stated than delivered. In addition to the fees charged by the fund manager for 
investing the money, the individual’s pension plan provider, financial adviser or investment 
platform will usually charge fees that may be as large or larger than the underlying fund 
charge. And there are transactional costs that are…rarely well understood, including broker 
commission…[W]e must be open and transparent, not least about the fees and all other 
costs that are borne by the client…[F]ee structures on funds should align the fund 
management business’s interests with those of the clients’.  
Yet, there is, very little evidence that this improved transparency over charges is taking 
place,320 despite attempts by Daniel Godfrey, chief executive of the investment manager’s 
trade body, the Investment Association, to move the investment management industry very 
slowly in that direction, as, for example, with the publication of a position paper Meaningful 
Disclosure of Costs and Charges in February 2015.321 Such was the hostility to such moves 
from member firms of the Investment Association that Mr Godfrey was forced to resign in 
October 2015. A senior investment manager told the Financial Times: ‘He launched 
initiatives on transparency of fees and fund performance and remuneration, which are all 
important, but there are other bigger issues out there that matter to our institutional 
clients, such as the pensions time bomb’. According to the FT, ‘concerns about the direction 
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of the trade body’ were raised by Aberdeen Asset Management, Fidelity, Henderson Global 
Investors, Invesco Perpetual, Investec Asset Management, Legal & General Investment 
Management, M&G  and Schroders.322  
The investment management industry is saying very clearly that ‘fees and fund 
performance’ are really second-order issues. Yet, David Ferguson, chief executive of ‘wrap’ 
specialist Nucleus, has branded retail fund management ‘out of control’ and called for it to 
catch up with good practices in the institutional sector. There was over reliance on ‘risk-
rated’ funds, accompanied by poor performance and high charges. He said: ‘Where the 
institutional market is tight and responsive, the retail market is slack and sluggish. 
Institutional clients wouldn’t tolerate the pricing, the accountability or the performance of 
the retail sector, so why should your customers?’.323 
When it comes to insurers, it is evident that the insurance industry has no intention of 
letting ‘asset managers eat their dinner’.324 They are taking full advantage of the natural 
inertia of their customers to stay with their existing provider when they move from the 
accumulation to the decumulation stages of their pension scheme. To switch the scheme to 
an investment manager, the member would have to ‘take financial advice and move to a 
retail-based platform’, according to Paul Bucksey, head of UK defined contribution at 
investment manager BlackRock. However, a reluctance to pay for financial advice ‘may leave 
slim pickings for asset managers that do not have a large UK life insurance company as a 
parent or are unable to forge a relationship with one’. Further, people who have been auto-
enrolled in a default investment fund are unlikely to suddenly want to become heavily 
involved in investment decisions after retirement and are therefore likely to stay with their 
current provider, according to Robert Holford, principal at Spence Johnson. Mr Holford 
believes that investment managers without a platform will only be able to gain some market 
share if they partner with pensions companies that do not have a particular investment 
expertise in-house or with the master trusts, such as NEST or The People’s Pension. Spence 
Johnson predicts that there will be £125 billion under management in master trusts by 
2025. The level of fund management fees charged is also likely to have an impact on the 
market share achieved by investment managers. According to Lorna Blyth, investment 
strategy manager for Royal London’s pensions business, there is a 0.75% higher fee charged 
by external managers on Royal London’s pension platform than that for internally managed 
funds, which explains why the in-house funds were gaining a greater market share.325 
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So at the very start of the ‘freedom and choice’ initiative, we have the following. Annuities 
are being trashed in the media and the investment management industry is reluctant to 
acknowledge that there is any role for annuities in retirement income plans. At the same 
time, there are serious question marks over the effectiveness and cost of the alternative 
retirement income solutions being offered by the investment management industry. The 
insurance industry and the investment management industry are at loggerheads with each 
other. The insurance industry is relying on customer inertia rather than good valued 
decumulation products to capture market share. At the same time, it is bifurcating between 
pure insurance companies and those insurers which have investment management 
divisions, such as Legal & General and Aegon, which see the greatest growth prospects in 
investment management rather than in insurance. This explains why Legal & General and 
Aegon have both decided to resign from their trade body, the ABI.326 
This is not good news for consumers. Both annuities and drawdown products are necessary 
to provide a good outcome for pensioners under ‘freedom and choice’. And this means that 
both life insurers and investment managers are needed to offer effective and good value 
annuities and drawdown products. This, in turn, means that the insurance and investment 
management industries need to cooperate as well as compete in order to improve customer 
outcomes. To illustrate, a deferred annuity is potentially an ideal asset in a drawdown 
programme. It would require investment managers to partner with insurance companies to 
provide deferred annuities. The investment management industry is unable to sell products 
that provide longevity insurance, since these can only be provided by authorised life offices. 
This cooperation is simply not happening, although NEST has announced that it will look for 
such a partnership.327 In addition, annuities need to be rebranded as ‘guaranteed income 
for life products’,328 and deferred annuities need to be rebranded as ‘longevity insurance’. 
Even if it can be agreed that both annuities and drawdown products are necessary to 
provide an effective retirement income solution and that there is evidence of a partnership 
developing between insurers and investment managers, there are a whole range of other 
issues that need to be resolved before we can be confident that consumers have a good 
choice of retirement income solutions. These relate to the withdrawal strategy, the 
investment strategy, and the longevity insurance strategy. Our interviewees indicated that 
the following factors were important to take into account: 
 If drawdown is offered by schemes, consultants believe it is important for the 
scheme to suggest, but not set a safe withdrawal rate. Further, the suggested rate 
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must be reviewed regularly. Consultants are also concerned that if scheme members 
have complicated arrangements, such as multiple pots, and do not take advice, these 
members could soon find themselves in trouble in terms of increased tax liability and 
loss of means-tested benefits etc329  
 The appropriate investment strategy should balance the demands for both flexibility 
and a secure income for life that covers at least essential life-long expenditure  
 When it comes to annuitisation to deal with the longevity risk, the later that this is 
deferred, the more challenging it becomes due to issues of pricing and cognitive 
impairment 
 The most common age suggested by the consultants we interviewed for triggering 
annuitisation was 75 and this could be paid for in a number of ways: (a) set aside 
10% of the fund at retirement (to buy an annuity at 75) and keep it in a reserve fund, 
(b) pay a monthly premium during drawdown, (c) buy a deferred annuity at 
retirement, or (d) buy a series of annuities over, say, 5 years. 
2.10.1.2 Issues with the arrangements for delivering retirement income 
The first point to clarify is about nomenclature. Only arrangements for delivering retirement 
income schemes which involve longevity insurance (in the form of current or deferred 
annuities) should be allowed to call themselves ‘pension schemes’.  Arrangements which do 
not involve longevity insurance should not be allowed to call themselves ‘pension schemes’, 
but should be required to use another name, such as ‘drawdown management schemes’. 330 
In other words, the term ‘pension scheme’ should be a protected name. Furthermore, 
arrangements which do not involve longevity insurance should be classified as complex and 
high risk from a regulatory standpoint. 
Turning to delivery systems, efficiency requires economies of scale. This is one of the most 
effective ways of keeping costs low. So products delivered by institutional delivery systems 
can be offered at lower cost than retail delivery systems. One overarching goal of innovation 
should therefore be to change the retail model for DC decumulation into an institutional 
model, in terms of product design, delivery and cost. This was a key lesson from auto-
enrolment. 
On the other hand, some providers told us that there was a false distinction between 
scheme (institutional) and retail drawdown in terms of value for money because drawdown 
involves individual accounts and it is possible to get low-cost non-advised drawdown in the 
retail market.  
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So there is a difference in view amongst industry practitioners about which type of 
arrangements would be more effective for delivering retirement income. We therefore 
need a clearer picture of the economics of scheme vs retail drawdown. 
The disagreement might well be moot, however, since there has been little evidence since 
the 2014 Budget of new institutional delivery systems being offered.  Two probable reasons 
are that the industry has been given so little time to implement the changes and that there 
has been so much uncertainty about how consumers would respond to the Budget changes. 
In short, no one has had the time or incentive to invest in new delivery systems.  
2.10.1.3 The criteria for safe harbour status 
There was support amongst those we interviewed for certain products to be classified as 
safe harbour products. Such products need to be ‘good enough’, since there could be no 
Financial Ombudsman Service referrals with safe harbour products, i.e., advisers, having 
confirmed their suitability, could not be sued for recommending them to clients. Bearing in 
mind that ‘the best is often the enemy of the good’, we would argue that, for most 
customers, the ‘best products’ are those that will be ‘good enough’ to be classed as safe 
harbour products for use in safe harbour retirement income plans.331 
This, in turn, would require products to be rated according to a set of agreed criteria. These 
would relate to how effective and efficient the products were in delivering the outcomes 
claimed for them.   
We suggest the following criteria: 
 Design and construction – There needs to be a much clearer picture of how products 
are designed and constructed, especially if they involve guarantees. For example, if 
the guarantees are hedged with options, there needs to be clarity over whether the 
options are exchange traded or over-the-counter and, if the latter, the nature of the 
counterparties. It also is critically important that the charges, particularly for 
guarantees, are not excessive 
 Investment strategy – It needs to be made clear how the investment strategy meets 
the aims claimed for the product. The circumstances under which the investment 
strategy fails to meet these aims also needs to be specified 
 Projected real returns – Providers of drawdown products should present stochastic 
projections of the range of likely real outcomes (i.e., incomes adjusted for inflation 
and total charges and costs) that their products could deliver based on the product’s 
underlying investment strategy 
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 Accessibility – The degree of flexibility to withdraw funds on an ad hoc basis 
 Longevity protection – The degree of longevity protection afforded by the product, 
illustrated by the probability of running out of money at different ages for a range of 
possible withdrawal strategies. Also included here will be the impact of the amount, 
if any, paid on death 
 Value for money – The benefits and costs of the product need to be clearly stated 
and the balance between them assessed.332   
We should establish minimum standards for each of these criteria. Any product satisfying 
these minimum standards could be classified as a safe harbour product. Defaqto recently 
launched a provider rating service.333 What should be considered is a product rating service 
along similar lines. 
2.10.1.4 A metric for measuring value for money 
There needs to be an agreed metric for measuring value for money, but first we need to 
recognise how challenging the concept is. Despite constant references to ‘value for money’, 
policy-makers and regulators have yet to define clearly and fully what this means in relation 
to DC retirement income products.  
Nevertheless, two broad definitions from government agencies, used in non-pensions policy 
areas, provide a good starting point:  
 The National Audit Office:  ‘Good value for money is the optimal use of resources to 
achieve the intended outcomes. “Optimal” means “the most desirable possible given 
expressed or implied restrictions or constraints”. Value for money is not about 
achieving the lowest initial price’. 334 
 HM Treasury: ‘Value for money is not about achieving the lowest initial price: it is 
defined as the optimum combination of whole life costs and quality’. 335 
While these definitions are clear and simple, they are nevertheless challenging in the 
context of DC retirement products.  
What is required is a policy and regulatory definition of value for money that cannot be 
gamed, as argued in the Murray Report.336 Murray said the measurement of value for 
money must be based on ‘credibility and transparency: make relevant information public; 
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avoid room for gaming the process; and ensure metrics are clear, simple, difficult to dispute 
and difficult to manipulate’ (p.114). 337 
A 2014 Pensions Institute Report, VfM:  Assessing Value for Money in Defined Contribution 
Default Funds, 338  argued that value reflects a range of features, including the 
appropriateness of the product structure for the target market, the price, a dynamic 
investment strategy (as opposed to ‘set and forget’), effective communication, efficient 
administration, and good institutional-quality governance. While we agreed that cost is not 
the only consideration, we continue to believe that it is hugely important, especially when 
comparing products with similar objectives, such as SIPPs and drawdown funds. 
Given its multi-dimensional nature, it is clearly impossible to find a single measure that 
captures all the different aspects of value for money. However, we believe that there is a 
measure that provides a good starting point and that is the ‘money’s worth’ (MW) of a 
product. This is the ratio of the expected present value of payouts on the product to the 
price; in other words, it is the ratio of what you get back over time to what you put in. MW 
will always be less than 100% to allow for the provider’s administrative costs and profit, but 
if the MW is high, then this implies that the value for money of the product is high. 
MW can be used to compare different retirement income products, but we need a 
benchmark for comparison.  We believe that the most obvious benchmark is provided by a 
life time annuity. This is because it provides a life-long income (hence satisfying the primary 
purpose of a pension scheme) and it is easy to understand how it is constructed. Moreover, 
the MW concept was invented for annuities. 339 
For annuities, the empirical evidence shows that the MW of annuities is fairly high,340 but 
we would add the following caveats: the annuity type must be appropriate for the 
individual, medical underwriting is applied where appropriate, and the open market option 
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is used to secure a competitive rate. 341 Nevertheless, many people regard the product as 
unattractive. This is due to a combination of the irreversible nature of the purchase,342 lack 
of trust in the industry, and historically low rates, which, in turn, are due to external factors 
such as increasing longevity and low interest rates as a result of quantitative easing.  
For drawdown products, assessing value for money is still a ‘work in progress’, not least 
because the charges for drawdown are reported in different ways – e.g., annual 
management charge, annual fund management charge, total expense ratio, ongoing charges 
figure, reduction in yield – none of which is as informative as MW.   
The standard MW formula would have to be modified in the case of drawdown to reflect 
both the flexibility of being able to withdraw funds on an ad hoc basis and the death 
benefits. In a financial engineering sense, this flexibility can be expressed in the form of 
options. Each period while alive, the drawdown customer draws down a regular pre-agreed 
income (say, based on GAD rates), but also has the option to withdraw up to the entire 
remaining pot. These options are valuable and, if exercised, add to the MW of drawdown, 
but reduce the present value of all the remaining regular income payments. The options 
could be valued using standard option pricing methods. The MW formula should also 
incorporate penalties for withdrawal strategies that lead to the pension pot being depleted 
before the member dies (e.g., in the form of a penal negative cash flow for these periods). 
Death benefits can be valued using the same framework. 
While, the MW formula provides a measure of expected value, it does not take risk into 
account. Since drawdown products need to generate a sufficient additional return over the 
risk-free rate to beat the benchmark return on an annuity which benefits from the mortality 
premium, the risk of drawdown products could be expressed in terms of the likelihood of a 
potential shortfall relative to an annuity.343 
The need for better benchmarking to be able to assess value for money was discussed on a 
panel at the 2015 NAPF annual conference. Under the new DC governance rules, trustees 
are required to prepare a report on value for money and compare their offering with what 
other schemes provide. But the panel said it was very challenging and expensive to get 
hands on the data to do this. Lynne Rawcliffe, BASF pension manager, believes the data 
could be provided by the regulator, especially for trustees of small schemes that do not 
want to pay additional costs. Tim Banks, pension strategies group managing director at 
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AllianceBernstein, said: ‘We need more transparency and have better benchmarking that is 
then down to each scheme to decide what their setting value is’.344  
2.10.1.5 Measuring and reporting charges, and a charge cap 
There needs to be a commonly agreed method for measuring and reporting the charges for 
all retirement income products. Currently, charges are either not reported at all or, if they 
are reported, they are reported in a range of different ways – sometimes the same term is 
used, but what is included is different – so that a comparison between products is difficult if 
not impossible. Further, if charges are reported, they are generally not reported in full. 
For example, there is no explicit charge reported for life-time annuities. An annuity buyer 
pays a premium and receives an income stream and is never told what the ‘charge’ is. Yet 
depending on how the annuity is sold, a sales agent might receive a 1-3% commission. This 
would be the case with a non-advised sale. MW was invented in part to deal with this issue, 
but the MW measure for an annuity takes into account much more than any commission or 
other charge. Administration costs and provider profit are included in the MW figure, for 
instance. As mentioned in the previous section, drawdown, by contrast, has a number of 
different ways of reporting charges, but they all give different answers and none can be 
regarded as giving a complete measure of the total costs borne by the customer.  
In our view, the charge measure should cover all the costs borne by the customer either 
directly or indirectly. The costs chould be reported in the form of both a ‘rate of cost’ – 
which could then be deducted from the gross rate of return to give a net rate of return – 
and as a monetary amount – which can then be compared with the monetary value of the 
customer’s fund. 
For example, the cost of withdrawing funds, the platform charge and any adviser’s fee 
should be included in the cost measure. Also the following investment costs should be 
included:345 
 Visible cash costs (Level 1 costs) 
o Commissions 
o Taxes 
o Fees 
o Custodial charges 
o Acquisition costs 
 Hidden cash costs (Level 2 costs) 
o Transactions costs of turnover, such as bid‐ask spread 
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o Transactions costs in underlying funds 
o Undisclosed revenue 
 Hidden non‐cash costs (Level 3 costs) 
o Market impact 
o Information leakage 
o Market exposure 
o Missed trade opportunity or market timing costs 
o Delay costs. 
In terms of charge capping, we note that there is now a charge cap of 0.75% on auto-
enrolment scheme accumulation default funds. This does not currently include transaction 
costs, although the FCA and DWP plan to revisit this issue. If transactions costs are included, 
will the cap remain at 0.75%? 
What would be included in a charge cap on a decumulation default strategy if it were to be 
introduced? We believe that at, a minimum, the following should be included in scheme 
drawdown: 
 The total expense ratio or ongoing charges figure on the default investment strategy 
(including the costs of any guarantees) 
 Transactions costs (what is covered to be agreed) 
 Cost per ad hoc withdrawal subject to a maximum number of withdrawals. 
The following additional costs would apply with retail drawdown: 
 Platform charge 
 Adviser fee. 
It was clear from our discussions with industry practitioners that there was a very strong 
view that any charge cap on drawdown products – including even on a default decumulation 
product – would reduce the scope to diversify risk, put guaranteed drawdown products out 
of reach, and stifle innovation.  
There was equally strong support for a charge cap from consumer champions. They pointed 
out that the same sort of objections were made to the idea of a charge cap in default funds, 
yet we know that high charges are the surest form of consumer detriment and they 
compound dramatically over time.  One told us: ‘all we have at the moment is a 
proliferation of expensive retail drawdown products which are being sold to individuals in 
place of annuities. There is also no real innovation, just a repackaging of existing multi-asset 
funds. A charge cap would in fact be a spur to innovation and would be one of the 
mechanisms that would help encourage institutional as opposed to retail solutions. The 
consequence of not having a charge cap will be a proliferation of thousands of non-
innovative retail products which it will be prohibitively disruptive to then attempt to 
aggregate. An eventual cap will then be introduced, as in accumulation, which, in order to 
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avoid damage to the multitude of providers, will just shave off the extreme excesses. That is 
why we have ended up with a UK charge cap for accumulation at 0.75%, while in Sweden 
charges are at 0.2% (and heading below) for a country where the scale is, in principle, much 
lower than the UK’. 
We therefore believe that it would be reasonable to have a charge cap in due course on a 
simple default decumulation product. Such a charge cap would be relatively straightforward 
to justify if it can already be justified in the accumulation stage. If charges are linked to asset 
values, the charge is maximised at the point of retirement when the pension pot is at its 
highest, implying that the revenue received by decumulation product providers is front 
loaded. This contrasts with the providers of accumulation products whose revenues are 
back loaded, but can still run a profitable business. It would also be useful for product 
providers to be aware that a charge cap was going to be imposed, so that they are not 
surprised as in the case of the cap on the default investment strategy in auto-enrolment. 
2.10.1.6 Product and provider regulation 
Annuities are amongst the oldest financial products in the world and structured products 
are amongst the newest. Both have a critical role to play in the new pensions environment. 
Yet in the months leading up to the introduction of the new regime, the FCA found serious 
flaws in their design and delivery. This suggests that there is an important role for product 
regulation, given how poor most customers are at assessing the efficiency and effectiveness 
of financial products. We are not proposing regulation for its own sake, only in the case 
where consumers are particularly vulnerable. Even where consumers are generally good at 
assessing value themselves, such as in the case of food, they are still vulnerable to fraud, as 
in the case of the 2013 horsemeat scandal346 and need the protection of the Food Standards 
Agency.347 
There could also be a role for provider regulation. Mick McAteer, director of the Financial 
Inclusion Centre, argues: ‘asset managers [if they get involved in retirement income 
provision] will need to be subject to prudential regulation as annuity providers are’. He 
believes that investment managers would find it challenging to design products that had 
higher returns than annuities over the long term. He continued: ‘We needed reform, but I 
think we are replacing something that is suboptimal with something that is catastrophic. We 
risk undermining the progress made with auto-enrolment and I feel that uncertainty and 
lack of confidence reverses trust’.348 
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2.10.1.7 Modelling outcomes 
An important part of determining whether a product meets the safe harbour criteria is 
modelling outcomes and this requires making projections of future returns on the product’s 
investment strategy. 
Traditionally, the modelling of outcomes of retail financial products in the UK has been very 
poor, since it involved the deterministic projections of returns. As Andrew Storey, technical 
sales director at eValue, says: ‘Wouldn't it be great if markets performed in exactly the way 
they had done in the past? If, every year, equities managed to generate the 5% real return 
they have averaged since 1899, then advising on income drawdown would be a piece of 
cake? But as we all know, markets don't work in straight lines, even though a surprising 
number of projection tools, offered by big-name organisations, behave as though they 
do….Sequencing risk is one of the biggest challenges facing drawdown investors. It is not 
just a question of what returns an investor gets over their retirement, but the sequence in 
which these returns happen. As any adviser knows, suffer a couple of bad years in the early 
stage of drawdown and a client will never get their financial plan back on track. Yet many 
modelling tools being used by advisers today do not make any allowance for the fact that 
markets are complex, irregular and ever changing. It goes without saying that projections 
based on Excel spreadsheets – amazingly still used by a surprising number of advisers – are 
destined to be inaccurate from the outset. Base your projections on historical averages and 
they are guaranteed to set the client off with inaccurate information’. Mr Storey concludes 
that ‘Advisers are putting themselves and their clients at very serious risk if they do not 
understand the considerable difference in the accuracy of the best and the worst financial 
modelling tools on the market’.349  
In October 2015, the FCA released a Consultation Paper in which it stated it was concerned 
that product providers’ projections of what retirees can expect to receive if they buy certain 
products are too high, and it wants to standardise the process.350 In particular, it was 
concerned that firms using higher projections may be able to gain an unfair competitive 
advantage over their competitors. Since April 2014, the FCA requires firms to make 
projections using three deterministic rates 2%, 5% and 8%, denoted the lower, maximum 
intermediate and upper projection rates. Firms are required to produce projections of 
future benefits for pension products that reflect the investment potential of the product, 
subject to the maximum rates. However, the FCA has discovered that there are two 
different ways of calculating the maximum intermediate rate.  
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For example, suppose two firms assume gilt returns of 3% p.a., and equity returns of 7% p.a. 
A customer buys a product that is invested 30% in gilts and 70% in equities. Firm 1 caps the 
equity return at 5% and uses a projection rate for the product averaging 4.4% (i.e., 30% of 
3% plus 70% of 5%). Firm 2 calculates the average projection rate for the product as 5.8% 
(i.e., 30% of 3% plus 70% of 7%), but then caps this at 5%. Over a 20-year investment 
horizon, the retirement income would be 12% higher under Firm 2's projection compared 
with Firm 1. We also pointed out earlier the problems with ‘Type A Critical Yield’ analysis 
which is again a feature of using deterministic projections. 
These examples illustrate the ludicrousness of deterministic projections. Projections must 
be stochastic and the uncertainty around the projections must be illustrated –  we favour 
fancharts – as we showed in Section 2.5 above. 
In September 2013, the Pensions Institute set out a methodology to model the quantifiable 
uncertainty associated with DC pension products and illustrated it with projections from the 
PensionMetrics model.351 The methodology established 16 good practice principles in 
modelling DC pension products as shown in Table 2.7. These principles could be adapted for 
modelling the outcomes with annuity and drawdown products. 
 
Table 2.7: Good practice principles in modelling DC pension products 
1. The underlying assumptions in the model should be plausible, transparent and 
internally consistent.  
2. The model’s calibrations should be appropriately audited or challenged, and the 
model’s projections should be subject to backtesting.  
3. The model must be stochastic and be capable of dealing with quantifiable 
uncertainty.  
4. A suitable risk metric should be specified for each output variable of interest, 
especially one dealing with downside risk. Examples would be the 5% value-at-risk 
and the 90% prediction interval. These risk metrics should be illustrated graphically 
using appropriate charts.  
5. The quantitative consequences of different sets of member choices and actions 
should be clearly spelled out to help the member make an informed set of decisions. 
6. The model should take account of key member characteristics, such as occupation, 
gender, and existing assets and liabilities.  
7. The model should illustrate the consequences of the member’s attitude to risk for 
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Table 2.7: Good practice principles in modelling DC pension products 
the plan’s asset allocation decision. It should also show the consequences of 
changing the asset allocation, contribution rate and planned retirement date, 
thereby enabling the member to iterate towards the preferred combination of these 
key decision variables.  
8. The model should take into account the full set of plan charges.  
9. The model should take account of longevity risk and projected increases in life 
expectancy over the member’s lifetime.  
10. The model should project both at-retirement pension outcomes and post-retirement 
outcomes. The risks associated with the following strategies should be clearly 
illustrated:  
a) the risk of taking a level rather than an index-linked annuity in terms of a 
reduced standard of living at high ages;  
b) the risks associated with drawdown strategies in terms of taking out more from 
the fund initially than is justified by subsequent investment performance.  
11. The model should consider the pre- and post-retirement periods in an integrated 
way. This is necessary to avoid undesirable outcomes at a later date – such as a big 
fall in the standard of living in retirement. It will also help to determine what 
adjustment in member choices – in terms of higher contribution rate, an increased 
equity weighting and later retirement – are needed to avoid this.  
12. The model should consider other sources of retirement income outside the 
member’s own pension plan. These include the state pension and home equity 
release. A well-designed DC model will also help with lifetime financial planning.  
13. The model should reflect reality as much as possible and allow for such extraneous 
factors as unemployment risk, activity rates, taxes and welfare entitlements.  
14. Scenario analysis and stress testing are important. For any given scenario, one 
should also:  
a) Make key assumptions explicit;  
b) Evaluate key assumptions for plausibility; and  
c) Stress test assumptions to determine which really matter and which do not. This 
allows the modeller to determine the important assumptions and focus on 
getting them (as much as possible) ‘right’.  
15. The model will need to be updated periodically and the assumptions changed. Such 
modifications should be carefully documented and explained in order to make sure 
the model retains its credibility with users.  
16. The model should be fit for purpose.  
Kevin Dowd and David Blake (2013) Good Practice Principles in Modelling Defined Contribution Pension Plans, 
Pensions Institute Discussion Paper PI-1302, September;  
http://www.pensions-institute.org/workingpapers/wp1302.pdf 
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2.10.1.8 Stranded pots 
The current system whereby job movers leave behind stranded pots which can all too easily 
be forgotten about is simply too inefficient to be acceptable. However, each of the three 
solutions that have been proposed for dealing with this problem have weaknesses. 
The pot-follows-member model has the disadvantage of requiring assets to be sold and 
rebought when someone changes jobs. The switching costs involved and the high weight in 
low-yielding liquid assets that schemes need to hold in anticipation of these switches will 
have a material effect in reducing the value of the pension pot at retirement. The 
aggregator model involves lower switching costs than pot-follows-member, but does have 
the advantage of economies of scale. 
A third solution, scheme-follows-the-member or one-member, one-scheme, deals with the 
problems of switching costs and potentially lower returns, but requires a central clearing 
house to operate effectively. Further, this solution would not be able to exploit economies 
of scale if there remains a large number of company-based schemes, many of which might 
be quite small. However, this solution becomes considerably more attractive if there are a 
small number of very large schemes. Now this might be the natural outcome of the auto-
enrolment process as the Pensions Institute predicted in its 2014 report VfM: Assessing 
Value for Money in Defined Contribution Default Funds: ‘We expect five or six trust-based 
multi-employer schemes to dominate the market by 2020….Single employer schemes are 
likely to transfer to multi-employer arrangements once employers have removed their 
defined benefit liabilities from the balance sheet, at which point they will be able to 
dismantle their DB trustee infrastructure’.352 This outcome would considerably lower the 
cost of the clearing house and make greater use of other scale economies. However, the 
model does involve a movement away from work-based pension schemes which have been 
the foundation stone of supplementary pension provision in the UK for the last 150 years. 
 
2.10.2 Recommendations 
Our discussion in this Chapter leads us to make the following 10 recommendations. 
Recommendation 2.1: Implementing the retirement financial strategy  
We recommend that providers offering retirement income solutions make clear to 
customers how their solutions for implementing the customer’s retirement financial 
                                                     
352 Debbie Harrison, David Blake, and Kevin Dowd (2014) VfM: Assessing Value for Money in Defined 
Contribution Default Funds, Pensions Institute, January; www.pensions-
institute.org/reports/ValueForMoney.pdf. This prediction was reinforced by a subsequent report: Debbie 
Harrison and David Blake (2015) The Meaning of Life: An Uncertain Future for the Traditional Life Company 
Business Model in the UK’s Private Sector Pensions Market, Pensions Institute, November; 
http://www.pensions-institute.org/reports/MeaningOfLife.pdf 
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strategy – comprising an investment strategy, a withdrawal strategy, and a longevity 
insurance strategy – make use of products that offer: 
 Accessibility – the degree of flexibility to withdraw funds on an ad hoc basis 
 Inflation protection, either directly or via investment performance, with minimal 
involvement by individuals who do not want to manage the investment risk 
 Longevity insurance. 
We recognise that there may be important differences in implementation strategy and 
disclosure requirements, depending on the distribution channel, i.e., these will be different 
where a customer pays a fee for a personal recommendation – selected from the retail 
product market and based on an adviser’s understanding of the customer’s complete 
financial position/objectives – and where a trustee (or governance) committee offers a 
decumulation product to auto-enrolled members (which might also be via a default or 
default pathway). It is also important to bear in mind that many customers in the mass 
market may not have a clear retirement financial strategy.353 
 
Recommendation 2.2: Terminology  
We recommend that the pensions industry reviews the terminology it uses in order to 
both modernise the language and bring greater clarity to customers. In particular: 
 Arrangements which do not involve longevity insurance should not be allowed to 
call themselves ‘pension schemes’, but should be required to use another name, 
such as ‘drawdown management schemes’. The term ‘pension scheme’ should be a 
protected name 
 Annuities should be rebranded as ‘guaranteed income for life products’, and 
deferred annuities need to be rebranded as ‘longevity insurance’ 
 Arrangements which do not involve longevity insurance should be classified as 
complex and high risk from a regulatory standpoint. 
 
Recommendation 2.3: Criteria for granting safe harbour status to key retirement income 
products 
We recommend that regulators agree a set of criteria for granting safe harbour status to 
key retirement income products. Providers and advisers could not subsequently be sued 
for offering or recommending a safe harbour product, having first determined its 
suitability for a client as part of a safe harbour retirement income solution. 
                                                     
353
 These issues are considered in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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We recommend the following criteria are used to do this: 
 Design and construction – There needs to be a much clearer picture of how 
products are designed and constructed, especially if they involve guarantees. For 
example, if the guarantees are hedged with options, there needs to be clarity over 
whether the options are exchange traded or over-the-counter and, if the latter, the 
nature of the counter-parties involved. It is also critically important that the 
charges, particularly for guarantees, are not excessive 
 Investment strategy – It needs to be made clear how the investment strategy 
meets the aims claimed for the product. The circumstances under which the 
investment strategy might fail to meet these aims also needs to be specified 
 Projected real returns – Providers of drawdown products should present stochastic 
projections of the range of likely real outcomes (i.e., income adjusted for inflation 
and total charges and costs) that their products could deliver based on the 
product’s underlying investment strategy 
 Accessibility – The degree of flexibility to withdraw funds on an ad hoc basis 
 Longevity protection – The degree of longevity protection afforded by the product, 
illustrated by the probability of running out of money at different ages for a range 
of possible withdrawal strategies. Also included here will be the impact of the 
amount, if any, paid on death 
 Value for money – The benefits and costs of the product need to be clearly stated 
and the balance between them assessed.  
The regulator should establish minimum standards for each of these criteria. Any product 
satisfying these minimum standards could be classified as a safe harbour product. As part 
of the process of product regulation, a product rating service should be established to 
assess whether products satisfy the minimum standards. 
If the regulator fails to do this, the industry itself could establish a quality mark for in-
retirement products – the Retirement Quality Mark (RQM) – as recommended in December 
2015 by the Board of the Pension Quality Mark (PQM), building on the experience of the 
PQM and PQM READY quality mark.354 The RQM would: 
 Provide strong governance to in-retirement products so they operate in the 
customers’ best interests not just at the point of sale, but on an on-going basis 
 Ensure there are high quality, clear and actionable member alerts 
 Ensure that default investment options are well governed and appropriately 
designed, and 
 Provide value for money to savers.  
                                                     
354
 Board of the Pension Quality Mark (2015) Developing a Retirement Quality Mark, Consultation Paper, 
December.  
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Recommendation 2.4: Modelling outcomes for different retirement income products 
As indicated in Recommendation 2.3, an important aspect of product design and 
construction is modelling outcomes. We recommend that: 
 The use of deterministic projections of the returns on products should be banned 
 They should be replaced with stochastic projections that take into account 
important real world issues, such as sequence-of-returns risk, inflation, and 
transactions costs in dynamic investment strategies 
 There should be a commonly agreed parameterisation for the stochastic projection 
model used, i.e., a ‘standard model’ should be developed355 
 There should be a commonly agreed set of good practice principles for modelling 
the outcomes from retirement income products, as outlined in Table 2.7. 
 
Recommendation 2.5: Establishing a metric for measuring product value for money 
We recommend that the regulator establishes a metric for measuring product value for 
money that would: 
 Reflect the benefits and costs of the product and the balance between them 
 Reflect key risks 
 Have credibility and transparency 
 Be clear, simple, difficult to dispute and difficult to manipulate (i.e., avoid room for 
gaming the process). 
An example of such a metric would be the money’s worth (MW) of a product, which is the 
ratio of the expected present value of payouts on the product to the price, with due 
allowance made for the greater flexibilities of some products in terms of accessibility and 
death benefits. The MW of a product could be measured relative to the benchmark 
provided by a lifetime annuity. Similarly, the risk of a product could be expressed in terms of 
the likelihood of a potential shortfall relative to a lifetime annuity. 
 
Recommendation 2.6:  Measuring and reporting charges and other costs 
We recommend that: 
 A standardised method for measuring the charges (and other costs) for all 
retirement income products is introduced. The measure should cover all the costs 
                                                     
355
 As in the case of Solvency II, product designers would be free to use an ‘internal model’, so long as they 
explained the differences between this and the standard model. 
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borne by the customer either directly or indirectly, including operational 
(administration) costs, fund management (including transaction and guarantee) 
costs, and delivery (platform) costs 
 A standardised method for reporting the charges (and other costs) for all 
retirement income products is introduced.  
Charges are a key aspect of a product’s money’s worth. They could be reported in the form 
of both a ‘rate of charge’ – which could then be deducted from the gross rate of return to 
give a net rate of return – and as a monetary amount – which can then be compared with 
the monetary value of the customer’s fund. 
 
Recommendation 2.7: Candidate products for safe harbour status 
Subject to meeting Recommendations 2.3 – 2.6 and to meeting suitability requirements, 
we recommend that the regulator grants safe harbour status to the following products 
used to provide retirement income: 
 In the annuities class:  
o Lifetime annuities (with/without capital protection) – fixed and inflation-
linked 
o Investment-linked annuities (with a minimum income underpin and 
with/without capital protection) 
o Enhanced annuities 
 In the drawdown class: 
o Capped drawdown (with a minimum income underpin) 
 In the hybrid class: 
o Variable annuities (with a minimum income underpin) 
o Guaranteed drawdown (with a minimum income underpin). 
It is important that there is full transparency over the product design and over charges for 
each of the above products – and that the charges are demonstrably not excessive. 
 
Recommendation 2.8: Provider regulation and the economics of both institutional 
solutions and retail retirement income solutions 
We recommend that the regulator: 
 Aligns provider regulation with Recommendations 2.1 – 2.7 
 Reviews the economics of both institutional solutions and retail retirement income 
solutions, and  
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 Encourages the use of institutional solutions over retail solutions where it can be 
demonstrated that these provide better value. 
 
Recommendation 2.9: Capping charges 
We recommend that, in due course, a charge cap should be imposed on a simple default 
decumulation product. The regulator should undertake preliminary work on what a 
reasonable level for the charge cap would be. 
At a minimum, the following should be included in any cap: 
 The total expense ratio or ongoing charges figure on the default investment strategy 
(including the costs of any guarantees) 
 Transactions costs (what is covered to be agreed) 
 Cost per ad hoc withdrawal subject to a maximum number of withdrawals. 
The following additional costs would apply to any cap for retail drawdown: 
 Platform charge 
 Adviser fee if any. 
We do not have a view on the size of the charge cap or when it should be introduced. 
However, if there is little further evidence of innovation, there would be little point in 
delaying its introduction. Of course, products outside the decumulation default would not 
be subject to a charge cap. 
 
Recommendation 2.10: Stranded pots 
We recommend that the Government investigates the feasibility of introducing one the 
following two models for dealing with the issue of stranded pots: a) the aggregator model 
and b) the scheme-follows-member or the one-member, one-scheme model.   
While both have disadvantages (principally switching costs and the requirement for a 
central clearing house, respectively), they are both consistent with a transition of the UK 
pension system towards a small number of large trust-based schemes – which might be the 
natural outcome of the auto-enrolment process, an outcome that the Government should 
encourage.  
The pause on dealing with this issue, announced by the Government in October 2015, gives 
the Government an opportunity to completely rethink the problem of stranded pots. 
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